THE THOMIST

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OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

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REAFFIRMATION

TEN YEARS AGO this spring, THE THOMIST edged its way into the ranks of American magazines, with a word of explanation, almost of apology, on its lips. In view of the high aims it set for itself, there was reason for both explanation and apology. In founding THE THOMIST, its Editors, the Dominican Fathers of St. Joseph's Province, offered to the English-speaking world the first speculative quarterly devoted exclusively to the presentation of theology and philosophy. This in itself is a high aim, but THE THOMIST was aimed higher still. Its Editors proposed to present theology and philosophy in a manner proportioned to the demands and needs of the professional and the non-professional alike.

The prospects of success in achieving such an aim were not encouraging. In itself the aim was dubbed difficult, if not impossible, of attainment. Further, it was said, there was no room in America for such a journal; theologians and philosophers worthy of the name were thought rare; such as there were had little speculative bent. From another point of view, the times were not right for such a venture. War was in the air;

the practical exigencies of a period of stress and tension would doom such a review to a death from inattention.

In spite of these very plausible points of argument, the first number of THE THOMIST appeared in the spring of 1939. Many of the prophecies proved true. The task of producing the kind of review envisioned was indeed difficult; no one realized the short-comings of the product better than the Editors. Also, not many people, relatively—so it turned out—are interested in that sort of thing even when it is accomplished. The war indeed came, almost upon the heels of the first number. It narrowed the choice of contributors, eliminating almost completely those European writers upon whom the Editors had depended. All European circulation was wiped out, foreign circulation in general was reduced to a trickle.

Somehow THE THOMIST rode out the storm, despite the unpromising beginning and the first difficult years. To have even weathered this last decade has been an accomplishment, for it was not a time which smiled on journals which were frankly speculative. However, THE THOMIST'S accomplishments have not been confined to preserving its own existence. It has achieved its high aims, if not always and in each one of its efforts, at least with sufficient frequency to give it, to-day, an established position of honor the world over. The courage of its founders, the generous loyalty of its sponsors, the labors of its staff have been vindicated, and it enters its second decade with the knowledge of achievement and a consciousness of responsibility.

Through the work of THE THOMIST, the wisdom of St. Thomas, which is the wisdom of the Christian Church, has found a wider public and a deeper understanding in the modern world. It does not seem too much to say that through THE THOMIST that wisdom has received a more universal application to human affairs. Few subjects which arrest or concern the modern man have been neglected in its columns. War and Peace, Marriage and the Family, Democracy, a Supranational Society, Existentialism, Psychiatry and Human Conduct, these are but

a few of the practical aspects of modern living which have been illumined by the clear light of speculative thought.

But, while we review something of our accomplishments, it is not with any sense of satisfaction with a work perfectly done. There is much more to do, there is a nearer approximation of our aims to be worked towards. And, while THE THOMIST can be proud of its achievements in our own land and in many others, it hopes to advance constantly the frontiers of its influence in the years which lie ahead. If the past is any promise of the future, the courage, loyalty, and labor which made the first ten years of THE THOMIST'S life successful should advance it ever further in the realization of its aims, in future decades.

In its ten years of life THE THOMIST has rejoiced to see itself joined by other reviews of like, if not identical, aims. On the occasion of this tenth anniversary of THE THOMIST, its Editors are particularly happy to welcome a review which is close to it in blood, in sympathy, and in aim. This new review, CROSS AND CROWN, edited by the Dominican Fathers of St. Albert's Province, a Thomistic Review of Spiritual Theology, will fill a long-felt need. It will be the only magazine in America devoted to an exposition of the principles and practices of the spiritual life, written for all classes and all vocations.

The Editors of THE THOMIST hope that as the decades roll by, the English speaking world and especially our own land, may experience a quickening sympathy to the wisdom of St. Thomas, throught the combined efforts of the THE THOMIST and its younger brother, CROSS AND CROWN.

THE EDITORS.

MAN IN MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

WRITING of twelfth century Bernard Sylvestris, Miss Waddell has pointed to the conflict of poet and philosopher. "The poet in Bernard . . . has his moments of rebellion against the muddy vesture of decay, of lament for the 'poor soul, centre of my sinful earth,' for 'the gross body's treason.' . . . 'From splendour to darkness from Heaven to the Kingdom of Dis, from eternity to the bodies by the House of the Crab are these spirits doomed to descend, and pure in their simple essence, they shudder at the dull and blind habitations which they see prepared.' But when he comes to the making of man in that place of green woods and falling streams, he holds, plainly and determinedly, the dignity of his creation. . . . Only, he would have a man fix his eye upon the stars, and his term ended, thither let him go . . . 'perfect from the perfect, beautiful from the beautiful, eternal from the eternal: from the intellectual world the sensible world was born: full was that which bore it, and its plenitude fashioned it full.' The war between the spirit and the flesh has ended in a Trace of God, even as the Last Judgment of the Western rose-window in Chartres melts into 'heaven's own colour, blue.' St. Bernard of Clairvaux spoke of the dung heap of the flesh; Bernard Sylvestris saw in their strange union a discipline that made for greatness, and the body itself a not ignoble hospice for the pilgrim soul. The spirit is richer for its limitations: this is the prison that makes men free. His Adam is the Summer of Chartres Cathedral, naked, fearless, and unbowed. . . ." [1]

This long quotation from a brilliant study of medieval humanities shows something of the complexity, the extremely variegated nature, the intensity, of this question of Man in

[1] Helen Waddell, *The Wandering Scholars*, pp. 121, 122.

the Middle Ages. It is all too easy to simplify the medieval man and turn him into a doll, either the evil leering marionette, or the immovable statue of a saint. The average modern opinion tends to regard all the ideas about man of that earlier age as corrupt and materialistic. A recent book by a Quaker author shows how the Holy Spirit was released by the Reformation. According to this view, man had been buried beneath an ecclesiastical system of centralised truth which prevented him from thinking for himself; it had utterly quenched the Spirit.[2] He is taking for granted the authenticity of the picture painted by Coulton, Moorman and many other so-called historians of the Middle Ages. In that picture, great accuracy of detail with the more sombre and earthy colours had left a total impression that can have little connection with reality. Medieval man as seen from the registers of episcopal visitations and monastic prisons is a gross materialist, all body and no soul. His life is one of competition in a struggle to triumph over his neighbour, with the clergyman always most successful in filching money and land from the laity, and the chief clergyman, the Pope, the perfect forerunner of the soulless modern authoritarianism.

To dip one's brush into the livelier, brighter colours is a temptation. In order to confound the overaccurate historian, we could depict a man of wisdom and culture, shining with the best traditions of ancient Greece and Rome blended with the spiritual glories of Augustine, Chrysostom, Gregory, and Cyril. Medieval hagiography would offer grounds for showing the men of that age to be more angels than men, dispensing with their bodies like St. Catherine unable to take food, developing their minds like St. Thomas whose body was large but almost ignored, or exhaling their souls in the tenderest but mightiest love, like St. Francis and St. Clare. We could tour the great medieval Cathedrals and admire the artist so preoccupied in the work of his hands that his name is forgotten and he is known only by what he had done, even as without grace God is known not by name but by His creation. We could sing with

[2] G. F. Nuttall, *The Holy Spirit in Puritan Faith and Experience*, p. 4.

the troubadours of the divine love hidden within the beloved's human breast, and we could modulate imperceptibly from that intensity of human song to the sweet plaint of plain chant which was so desirable as to have led the Cluniacs to spend their whole day at it. We could, finally, follow the mystical teaching of those men who would live in heaven while still sitting in their hermitages and anchorholds, the men who inherited Plato through Dionysius, the wisdom of the East through Avicenna. To take any one of these aspects and develop it into a whole portrait of medieval man is tempting because it could be encompassed without too much complexity. To take them all without the Coulton category tempts also because it is easy and pleasant to swing on the end of a pendulum. But if we were to give a true picture we should have to gather all these pigments together and work out a balanced portrait of a man into whom stream many traditions and from whom proceed the greatest and the meanest works, the greatest and the meanest thoughts, from which the Renaissance and the modern man were to grow.

It is necessary to insist on the complexity of this question and hence any fair estimate of the medieval man must leave in the reader's mind, not a simple and very clearly delineated outline, but a hazy, perhaps blurred, idea of a man of many parts not easily synthesised or fitted together. We will first consider the Neoplatonic and Augustinian tradition which is characteristic of a good deal of the spiritual writing and sermons of the period. The Platonic idea of the soul imprisoned in the body had gained a very firm foothold in a religion which taught the importance of the immortal soul and its final destiny which was usually impeded by the lusts and pride of the flesh, a religion which since the death of Christ had set such store on mortification—death to the bodily element. This idea influenced the medieval period through Dionysius rather than through St. Augustine but it was largely represented in the later Augustinian tradition which can be seen clearly from St. Bernard to the English Mystics . It would be wrong, however, to regard the rage of the Abbot of Clairveaux against the sickly

flesh of man as indicating a complete separation and enmity between these two elements in human nature. We find his friend William of St. Thierry speaking of the point where animality and reason meet, in man's mind by which man can use his body morally and artistically; " in which things," writes William, " God has set man above the works of his hands, and hath set all those things of the world beneath his feet; to the proud sensual man, for a witness to the losing of his natural dignity and the likeness of God; but to the simple and humble, for an aid to get him that aid again, and to keep that likeness." [3] He shows how such men of necessity use the " many kind of callings, subtleties, exquisite sciences, arts and eloquences, offices and dignities, and the inventions of this world without number which come forth from the many manners of study in books, in works of the hand and in buildings." [4] This is a remarkable attitude toward the wholeness of the animal and spiritual of man in one of Abelard's enemies. We find the image of God in human nature bringing integrity, not to the soul alone, but also to the whole cultural output which had already risen to the heights of its powers in chant and was soon to rise to equal heights in the structure and embellishments of the Cathedrals.

At the same time, Hugh of St. Victor was writing such things as the *Soul's Betrothal Gift* in which man in a soliloquy with his soul leads the latter away from the love of worldly things up to the unseen and mysterious touches of divine love. But he displays no hatred of the animal side of man. He is simply setting forth the overwhelming desirability of the divine love which swamps all other desires: " Look then my rash and silly soul, look what you are doing when you long to love and be loved in this world. The whole world is subject to you, and you do not scorn to admit to your love, I do not say the whole world, but scarcely a scrap of it, which is eminent neither in fair seeming nor in needful usefulness nor in great extent nor in exceeding goodness. If indeed you delight in these things,

[3] *The Golden Epistle*, ch. 6, n. 15. [4] *Ibid.*

delight in them as subjects, as things that do you service, as gifts, the betrothal gift of your bridegroom, as the presents of a friend, the bounty of a lord . . . love them for his sake, love him through and above them." [5]

Man, the microcosm, man, the crown and glory of the universe, was a conception that had seized these medieval writers and preachers even when they were tempted to think the universe harboured so many evil allurements that man would be better out of it. The world lay at man's feet and although he often tripped over that world it was still destined to support him, to contribute all its good things for the well-being and expansion of human nature. The renascence of learning and the new humanism of the time inevitably took this view of man in his relation to the rest of the world with its many re-discovered pagan treasures; but for the moment we must insist that the same attitude was still instinctive among the moralists who were otherwise suspicious of everything lacking the hall-mark of Christianity and the polish of grace. The glory of the art of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries shows this clearly. The Cathedrals, which were still the moralists' castles reflected a translucid objectivity in which the artist is forgotten but man reigns amid all the wealth of foliage, beasts, and birds, who join him here to support his praise of God. The trees may be all trees of knowledge or of paradise like the beautifully shrub-like tree captured by Professor Tristram from Canterbury Cathedral in his great work on 12th Century English wall-painting. The lambs may be Lambs of God, the eagle the fourth evangelist, and the pig a hoggish devil in some harrowing of hell, but they are all there. And later we find the thirteenth century foliage of Southwell Cathedral bringing under man's eternal control all the trees and shrubs of the English countryside.[6]

These works of man's hands, so wisely brought within the range of the simple and humble man by William of St. Thierry, reveal more remarkably the supremacy of the spirit ruling the

[5] *Soul's Betrothal Gift* (translated by F. S. Taylor), p. 12.
[6] Cf. *The Leaves of Southwell*, by Nikolaus Pevsner.

whole of the man himself. The skill and technique of the twelfth and thirteenth century sculptors and illuminators are as great as any of the Renaissance and their realism is as accurate, although many modern reactionary artists of today seem to overlook this fact. The great difference between medieval art and that of the Renaissance lies in the domination of the whole man over his material element in the former rather than his subservience to it in the latter. Technique was in fact controlled by human nature. In the cathedrals of Toulouse, Strasbourg, Amiens, Chartres, and all over the rest of Christianised Europe, these sculptors gave to stone the suppleness, without the pride, of life. They showed a reverence for the human physical frame which, though it may be partly inspired by the joy of human love of the troubadours, can only spring from a recognition of the soul which is wholly in the whole body and wholly in every single part of the body. There is no hatred for the animal side of man here, but the vitality of these works springs from the mortification of the flesh and the preaching of penance, which from time to time echoed through these liturgical palaces. We have only to turn for examples of this fact to a recent brochure of photos called " The Men of the Middle Ages." [7] The art of the period expresses a conception of the wholeness of man which needed no sophisticated cult of " integration " to bring it into being. It sprang surely from an instinctive grasp of the idea of man as the *Imago Dei* which saved the medieval theologians and preachers from desecrating the frame in which this image was to be found.

The Albigensian heresies of the period acted as a stimulus to a true understanding of the whole man, and perhaps we do not always recognise what a debt we owe to these haters of the flesh for the sound inspiration of the peak of medieval art. With these licentious ascetics before us, we should here recall not only the whole view of man in creation and man in himself in regard to his animality, his flesh and blood, but also his wholeness in his relation to his fellows. The true and sane view

[7] *Les Hommes du Moyen Age* (Editions du Cerf: Paris, 1947).

of human nature stands out most clearly in the loving friendship which existed between such men as St. Bernard and his brother Gerard, between St. Thomas and Brother Reginald, between St. Catherine and her select band, and also in the early teaching of St. Aelred of Rievaulx. This test of their integrity stands in contrast to the post-renaissance horror of particular friendships in all but the married couple.

This living witness in art and in friendship to the true humanism of the best period in the Middle Ages needs emphasis because, for a greater part of the period, the synthesis was not really an intellectual one and there was an increasing tendency to split man in two, a tendency which sprang from an ardent and over-simplified devotion to true religion. For example, we can find an uneasy suspicion of the body hidden under a phrase in the *Ancren Riwle*: " Though the flesh be our foe, we are yet commanded to sustain it. We must however afflict it as it often well deserves; but not withal to destroy it, for, how weak soever it be, still it is so coupled, and so firmly united, to our precious soul, God's own image, that we might soon kill the one with the other. And this is one of the greatest wonders on earth, that the highest thing under God, which is the soul of man, as St. Austin testifieth, should be so firmly joined to the flesh, which is only mud and dirty earth." And the *Riwle* continues by describing the degrading of the " heavenly nature " of the soul by its being drawn into love of the " base nature " of the flesh.[8] The soul is indeed the image of God for this writer but the body is in fact divorced therefrom and finds no place at all in that image. Can we be surprised that the union of the two is the greatest wonder on earth? Such a wonder in fact must either lead to a deepening understanding of the mystery or to an increased dissatisfaction with the irrational element therein disclosed. The unity therefore began to crumble as the breach continued to widen. A century or so later we find the blessed Ruysbroek, though still professing the unity of the two, speaking in very similar terms: " Therefore

[8] *Ancren Riwle*, ch. 8, p. 105.

we should hate and despise our body as our mortal enemy, who would lead us away from God into sin; yet we should love and prize this body and our life of sense as being an instrument of the service of God. For without the body we cannot render to God the external service that we owe; fasts, vigils, prayers and the other good works which we ought to perform. And so we should be ready to feed and clothe our bodies so that we may be able to serve God, ourselves and our neighbours." [9] We can find little sign of integration here, where we ourselves are considered as something quite separate from the body. Man may be a whole, but the wholeness is rapidly approaching the wholeness of an angel.

Gilson in writing of the disputes between the Arab philosopher and theologians in the earlier Middle Ages says: " The easiest way for theologians to hold their ground is to show that philosophy is unable to reach rationally valid conclusions on any question related to the nature of man and his destiny. Hence Gazali's scepticism in philosophy, which he tries to redeem, as is usually the case, by mysticism in religion. The God whom reason cannot know can be reached by the soul's experience. . . ." [10] It is in this question of knowledge that the separation of spirit and flesh shows itself in its most radical and argued forms, for the purge of the flesh tends soon to liquidate the whole of the purely natural side of man and so to show him as not-being rather than being.

William of St. Thierry in the *Golden Epistle* underlines the nobility of the reasoning power of man's mind and how it should control the rest of man's nature and how (to use our modern jargon once more) it should integrate all his powers. But, even, so, the supernatural grace of God is required to free the reason from the bondage of an attached will. Only when the will is freed by grace can the reason of man become dominant. " Now it is truly reason, that is an estate of the mind which in all things agreeth with the truth. For when

[9] Bl. Jan van Ruysbroeck, *The Seven Steps of the Ladder of Spiritual Love* (translated by F. S. Taylor), p. 21.

[10] Etienne Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, p. 35.

the will is freed by the grace that freeth and the spirit beginneth to be led by the free reason, then is its own indeed, having free use of itself, and becometh a spirit and a good spirit. A spirit I say inasmuch as it doth truly animate and perfect its animal soul. . . . It becometh a good spirit, fearing God and keeping his commandemnts; for this is the whole man." [11]

So far he keeps the balance although he is faced with the rationalism of Abelard. But later on in the 14th century the mystic strain seizes on passages in the Pseudo-Denis to support a divorce from reason and the natural man which is made possible by the invocation of grace as a necessity for the exercise of natural wit. So the author of the *Cloud of Unknowing* adopts with eagerness the Neo-Platonic mysticism of the *Hid Divinity*: " Thou friend Timothy, what time that thou purposest thee by the stirring of grace to the actual exercise of thy blind beholdings: look thou forsake, with a strong and a sly and a lusty contrition, both thy bodily wits (as hearing, seeing, smelling, tasting, and touching) and also thy ghostly wits, the which be called thine understandable workings . . . look that thou rise with me in this grace . . . to be one with him that is above all substance and all manner of knowing." [12] Thus the author of *The Cloud* paraphrases the *Mystica Theologia* of the Areopagite. No wonder that in his own book he is so suspicious of natural reason and ordinary human scholarship. Yet he admits that natural reason is in its nature good " for it is a beam of the likeness of God." [13] His approach is a very positive forgetting rather than a despising of the natural side of human life and knowledge.

Thomas à Kempis goes much farther in his condemnation of human learning and study. Gerard Groot had begun this special train of anti-natural thought because of his disgust at the theological disputations of the Universities, but it was an over spiritual attitude which is to be found hidden in every over-simplified appeal to divine wisdom against the possibility

[11] *The Golden Epistle*, ch .15, p. 89.
[12] *The Cloud of Unknowing* (edited by Justin McCann, O.S.B.), p. 254.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

of human error; and in every case, although in varying ways, it involves a deadly attack on the wholeness of man.

It would be interesting at this juncture to allow the Arabian philosophers and mystics to shed their light on the medieval man. Undoubtedly there is a strong influence here, although it was in the main an influence of reaction. The significance of the Arabian philosophers in this context has been suggested by Gilson,[14] but the extent to which it may have influenced the later Christian view of man has yet to be studied with the laborious and wearisome care proper to the professional historian. However, we need not await the fruit of his researches. Without treading the stony and wearying path of historical investigation, we have at hand the man *par excellence* of the Middle Ages. He took the middle path, to bring together two realities which had been unnaturally divorced. Unlike the Scribe and the Levite of the parable, this medieval man, St. Thomas, would not despise the natural merely because it was wounded. Nor was he so lost in the contemplation of supernatural truth (a contemplation he enjoyed with the greatest of the mystics) as to deny the validity of his bodily powers. So was St. Thomas Aquinas the true representative of the Middle Ages, for he judged always as a man in his prime, not as one hurried into the enthusiastic oversimplification of youth nor as one bogged down in the pessimism of old age. As Gilson says of him, he was a " very simple and modest man . . . putting everything in its place." [15]

From Aristotle, St. Albert and St. Thomas received the fundamental principle of potency and act to close what had been conceived as a gulf between spirit and matter. Unaware of original sin as he was, Aristotle realised the fundamental unity of human nature and so brought its parts together to form the whole, rather than dividing and scattering. It is noteworthy that the wholeness achieved by the art of the period in which the created form controlled and dominated the stone, wood, and paint, to produce a whole image of man, was con-

[14] *Op. cit.*, ch. 2.

[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 61.

temporaneous with St. Thomas; the introduction of Aristotle was not influenced by this new movement of intellectual integration. The greatest achievement in sculpture, architecture, and stained glass, as well as in plain chant had been reached before St. Thomas' death and had begun sixty or seventy years before his birth. Aristotle had the answer to what the creative artists knew by instinct but could not explain, the answer to what the pious theologians tried to explain, with a dichotomy which broke man in twain. The sculptor knew that in his fashion he could breathe human life into his stone; but until he had grasped the proper meaning of *materia* and *forma*, *figura* and *substantia*, *actus* and *potentia* he could not have understood what he had done. The pious theologians regarded every fundamental aspect of man as a " thing," an " *actus*," so that man had to fall in pieces.

St. Thomas brought Aristotle to show that the body was not body without the form of the soul, that there could only be one form in man, an intellectual form which made his toe a human, living toe even as his ear and his brain were human organs. This one form, the soul, is not the man; the material element is equally essential to the concrete human being, who is only individualised by this *materia signata quantitate*, and whose activities are generally the activities of the *conjunctum*—the body-soul. Thus a man cannot feel, see, or even appreciate the great works of art and music except his body and soul are wedded as one. It is not his body, nor his soul which perceive, for these though separable can not function apart except by divine intervention. Even the special activities of the mind, although independent of the body in themselves, can not in fact proceed without the bodily activity of imagination and even sense. Into this *conjunctum* St. Thomas works all the faculties—the sense both exterior and interior, memory, understanding, and will. The passions, too, like the rest, are made by God as part of a whole and are in themselves good and, indeed, wholesome.

Nor is this one thing, the human being, an isolated unit having relation only to God. St. Thomas follows him in his re-

lationship to his fellow human beings and indeed to the whole universe. Man is a social animal. Many of the activities which flow from his nature involve the give and take of a part of society; his virtues are not merely an ornament to himself but they contribute to the *bonum commune* in which men are hierarchised to form another sort of body, an organism which has its own type of unity made up of many men with different functions and dignities. In his flight right to the outer rim of created reality he shows that even the heavenly bodies influence man, enhancing or diminishing the movement of his mind and will, movements which spring from the soul but are thus not completely independent of the universe.

It is useless to quote from the *Doctor Angelicus*, for all this is common knowledge today. People are beginning to discover the satisfaction of finding their balance in an unbalanced world and they are turning more and more to this complete and satisfying man of the Middle Ages. But it would be a mistake to regard his Middle Way as being purely Aristotelian or naturalistic—even rationalistic—as some are indeed tempted to regard his *Philosophia Perennis*.

In his tract " On Man " in the First Part of the *Summa*, St. Thomas treats of the Ideal Human Being as he was made by God with all his faculties and passions regulated and possessed by the supreme power of the *Mens*. He proceeds thence to show that the image of God is to be found principally in this *Mens*, the superior part of the soul. It is here that St. Thomas introduces the best elements of the Neo-Platonic teaching about man. He leaves this *Mens* nestling in the centre of the whole man, the man who walks with his head among the stars and his feet on the sodden earth: " Although the image of God in man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because ' the body of man alone among the terrestial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it is made to God's image and likeness rather than the bodies of other animals' as Augustine remarks. But this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body; but in the sense that the very

shape of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by way of a *vestigium*.[16]

This image is the term or end of the production of man because " God made man to his own image and likeness." St. Thomas in this place views him principally as in the ideal state before the fall when he was also in grace and so by knowing and loving God had the gracious image which gave him his fullness and perfection; this was enhanced by preternatural gifts which gave him complete power over material creation with its space and time limitations. But the Saint is not carried away by the ideal into an unreal Platonic humanism. All these things which go to make up the complete and integral man have their goodness, but original sin injured man's nature and disturbed the harmony. The nature and its goodness are not destroyed—there is still no dichotomy between this central *Mens* and the physical make-up of man. But the destruction of the harmony between all these powers acts as a wound in nature, making the nature weak and prone to sink to the animal level which is virtually included in the soul. The elements are good still but their adjustment is disturbed so that they rub against each other and cause friction. The image remains even though it be obscured by a cloud of animality. There is still a unity; indeed original sin arises from the very unity of soul and body. It is the *conjunctum* which inherits this parental evil. The soul itself is created pure, the body is a part of a disorganised universe; the two together are a contaminated person. This maladjustment insofar as it is in the bodily part of man is only a penalty; insofar as it is sin it is of course to be found resident in the soul.

It may be noted in this connection that St. Thomas corrects the tendency to condemn the full flowering of human friendship in marital union. St. Augustine had seemed almost to suggest that original sin was to be identified with its most obvious effects in the unruliness of erotic passion, to be handed down because each child was generated in concupiscence. St.

[16] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 96, a. 6, ad 3um.

Thomas insists that original sin which is not an act should be distinguished from its effects. Thus, though marital union might often be blurred by the evils of unruly concupiscence, it remained in itself a noble thing. But obviously this wound in nature together with all the others cried out for the healing cure of grace, and it would be childish to consider St. Thomas a champion of the *humanum* unredeemed. We must follow his analysis in sorting the good from the evil but we must never omit to follow him to the end, for it is only at the end that his full stature can be recognised. Flesh and animality are not to be despised; they are not even implacable enemies in themselves; together they are the necessary parts of a whole. Left in the state of wounded nature the lower part would predominate over the higher and lead to all sorts of actual vices which are, one and all, against nature.

The nature of man needs grace to restore its powers in itself and in its surroundings. Grace is built up on this natural *conjunctum*. It does not destroy it or bear the soul post-haste off to the Elysian fields leaving the animal man to grub about in the mud flats of the world. Charity comes to restore man's love and overcome his lusts, but charity does not destroy his natural relationship. Although a man loves the saint more in theory because of his greater grace, he still loves his wife and family more intensely within the realms of charity because of their propinquity. Where there are things in common between two men, there the common bond of divine love should prosper and flourish.

There remains of course the war between the flesh and the spirit in the sense that the penalty of sin remains and indeed the relics of actual sins whose guilt has been cleansed by grace. When the Apostle speaks of the war in his members he is speaking, as St. Thomas tells us (here following St. Augustine), of man already redeemed and freed from guilt but remaining subject to its penalties, for which reason sin is said to dwell in the members. The image of God in the soul can be revealed only by redemption; it lies hidden by sin, until grace has come to restore it. Even then it has not the perfect like-

ness precisely because of this penalty in the flesh of man, making complete wholeness unattainable this side of the grave and the final rising on the Last Day. This double view of man must be taken into account in following the teaching of St. Thomas who is no upholder of the good pagan (Aristotle's conception) outside the Christian teaching of the Redemption. Man is made whole and good, his nature has been wounded by sin, but the grace of redemption builds upon the good foundation which yet remains. The *Summa* thus concludes with the doctrine about *the* Man, the Word made Flesh, and his continuation in the Church and the Sacraments. The image of God in the soul has to be restored by means of the image of Jesus Christ in the whole man introduced into his Mystical Body and thus living the Christ-life, both human and divine. The idea of Christ as the *exemplum* for man, exciting him to the love of God and to the fulfilment of his destiny is no mere external or accidental occasion of contrition and charity. It takes its place in the rank of Formal Cause insofar as exemplary causality must be taken formally. Hence the *exemplum* is as a matrix or mould in which all men should be fashioned into the likeness of Christ.

In this way the flesh of man sanctified is by the Word made flesh, and his rational knowledge and natural joy in the beautiful are safeguarded, preserved and perfected by faith and the intellectual gifts of the Holy Spirit. These do not destroy nature but perfect it. As the gift of wisdom does not supersede faith but perfects and deepens it, so faith does not supersede natural knowledge but strengthens it as well as encourages its working on the mysteries presented to it. St. Thomas teaches that even Christ himself had acquired knowledge for otherwise he would have been lacking in human experience and therefore to some extent lacking in wholeness. Here was a balance which avoided the " theologism " of his opposite number in the Franciscan Order and the pure naturalism of the pagan. Wisdom was the highest form of knowledge, intuitive and unreasoned, but the investigation of the natural sciences and philosophy, was only thereby preserved from error and encouraged. The

faith set up definite milestones to truth but did not necessarily shorten the road to it. Nature was wounded, the flesh was prone to lust, the mind prone to error, but Christ the *exemplum* had come to rectify the error without destroying the mind and to sanctify the flesh without dehumanising its instincts. This was the answer the medieval artist wanted as an explanation of his work—but of course it followed his work as all art criticism must. He acted on St. Thomas's principles without being conscious of them, because this Middle Way is the way of common sense. This best of all may be seen in Dante, but with him it was already more conscious—as it needs must be for the artist of words. It is to be found too among the more balanced spiritual writers and it is there we would turn for examples of the working out of the doctrine of this, *the* man of the Middle Ages in the daily spiritual life of the Medieval Christian.

We may take Walter Hilton and Mother Julian of Norwich as the best examples in the later Middle Ages of the flowering of these Thomistic ideas in the growth of the spiritual man. In the meantime there had been a tradition of healthy spirituality established on regenerated human nature as may be seen in the letters of Blessed Jordan to Blessed Diana, but nowhere perhaps does it come out more clearly in the spiritual direction of the following century than in the *Scale of Perfection*.

The main theme of the *Scale of Perfection* is the revelation of the image of God in man and its restoration by grace. Hilton begins in the first chapter "Turn thy heart with thy body principally to God, and shape thee within to his likeness." His inspiration is of course Pauline and he quotes frequently from passages referring to the image of God in the soul. To this he adds a great deal of Augustinian teaching on the image of the Trinity in the three powers of the soul. But the interesting point of his doctrine lies in his insistence on the re-forming of this likeness to the Trinity through the image of Jesus. And by this he means not simply knowing by faith of the Incarnation, but the identification of the soul with this Exemplar through union of love. "As long as Jesus findeth not his image

reformed in thee, he is strange and far from thee. Shape thee therefore to be arrayed in his likeness, that is in His meekness and charity, the which are his liveries, and then will he homely know thee and show to thee his privities. Thus said he himself to his disciples 'whoso loveth me, he shall be loved of my Father, and I shall show myself unto him.'" He may be in my reason but I am not in him until I have found him.

All this is certainly expressed in terms of the soul alone wherein is the image of the Trinity, and this emphasis may be found in Mother Julian who wrote very much under the same inspiration. But the modelling of man upon Jesus as Man conveys a balanced view of the whole of human nature. Thus in the celebrated 16th Revelation Mother Julian saw "the soul so large as it were an endless world and as it were a blissful kingdom. And by the conditions that I saw therein I understood that it is a worshipful City. In the midst of that City sitteth our Lord Jesus Christ, God and Man, a fair Person of large stature, highest Bishop, most majestic king. . . . And worshipfully he sitteth in the soul, even-right in peace and rest." And this follows her profound teaching on the operation of the Trinity in the making and saving of the soul with such statements as "And because of this great, endless love that God hath to all Mankind, he maketh no disparting in love between the blessed Soul of Christ and the least soul that shall be saved."

Of course these two writers share the same hatred of the world and fleshly loves as their confrères. But the full manhood of Christ plays such a central part in the whole teaching that we cannot easily forget the fact of sin. It is sin, not human nature, that is condemned. Natural reason too is secured by Hilton's way of contemplation and is not jettisoned. Indeed the higher reaches of the life of the spirit may not be attained without considerable use of natural wit, sustained and redeemed by the intellectual graces . . . "with great devotion in praying and with much business in studying going before." This passage on Holy Writ continues: "See now how grace openeth the ghostly eye, and cleareth the wit of the soul won-

derly above the frailty of corrupt kind; it giveth the soul a new ableness whether it will read Holy Writ or hear or think it, to understand truly and savourly the the soothfastness of it . . . and to turn readily all reasons and words that are bodily said into ghostly understandings."

The importance of this 14th century teaching lies in the fact that the ideal doctrine about Man, made a whole being contrived wondrously of many parts, is brought down to the real concrete life of man in which he has to struggle against the unmanliness of original and actual sin and fight to regain integrity precisely through identification with this image of Jesus in the Christian life. And it is here that William Langland is so useful a guide to the practical idea of man and human living, showing in the figure of Piers Plowman the fulfillment of St. Thomas's teaching. He has a wholesome view of man himself and in his origins in the divine work of Creation. The significance of the whole poem lies in the identification of the common man, blessed by grace and called to follow the path to truth and lead others there, with the person of Christ himself. Piers begins as the Plowman and stepping forth with the generality of the poor and down-trodden he passes through "Do Wel," "Do Bet," and "Do Best" (the three lives upon which Hilton's scale is also based and with it the writings of all the Mystics of the period), and so reaches to an identification with Christ himself. Piers is Christ in the final scenes when the world is called into the Unity for Truth and Holy Church. This restoration of human nature through grace and by the practice of the virtues gradually taking on the image of Christ the Exemplar, shows the idea of man in the middle ages at its most perfect and its least Albigensian. Even sin itself once overcome has contributed to a greater understanding and experience in man, it is here that the *O Felix Culpa* plays its part.

The final contribution of the medieval idea of man is to identify him with all his good parts, the one good composition, the one form enfleshed, with the Mediator, who as Man was head of Mankind. As the period drew to its close the great

theme of Langland's poem became the inspiration for countless miracle plays, but they had lost this principle moving power, the cornerstone of the whole structure. The human race (*Humanum Genus*) plays a leading part in many of these productions as, for example, in *The Castle of Perseverance* in which the good and bad qualities (*Malus Angelus, Mundus, Belial, Caro, versus Bonus Angelus, Confessio, Schrift*) struggle for the mastery of man. The play is certainly a morality play and the old dichotomy is well to the fore again, even when the clowns and buffoons make the evil life so much more jolly and attractive.

Everyman of course, stands out from this tradition; it bears the same stamp but holds something more akin to the power and spirit of Piers Plowman. The idea of Man was then practically swamped by the effects of the nominalism begun by Scotus in antithesis to St. Thomas and brought to its height by Ockham. It was nominalism that blessed the dichotomy between soul and body; it was nominalism that encouraged the denial of the validity of human reasoning and led people to go straight to God ignoring all secondary causes. Man of the Middle Ages could not live in this scheme, he was either so old as to have left his body behind altogether and had become an angel dependent on God for direct and immediate revelation for every idea in his head, or he was left young and lustful, a mere animal amidst the pleasures of beasts. And there we find Man blinded by the error of the false philosophies which had to deny God in order to preserve any apparent human dignity. The nature assumed and redeemed by the Word, in Whom all was made and according to Whose image man was destined to find his goal, was dissected and desecrated. The Age of this Man was no longer the Middle.

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THE BASIS OF THE SUAREZIAN TEACHING ON HUMAN FREEDOM

[*Conclusion — The Criticism*]

III. Criticism of the Metaphysical Background

I. potency and act in the order of being

1. *The Metaphysical Order.* Having seen the teaching of Suarez on human freedom and on potency and act, we are ready now to begin our analysis and criticism of that teaching. Since our purpose in considering potency and act is only to determine whether it throws further light on Suarez' notions on human freedom, it is clearly reasonable that we should begin our criticism by considering the teaching on potency and act; then, later, we shall see how those teachings enter into the Suarezian treatment of freedom.

The essential thing to be grasped about Suarez' whole treatment of potency and act is its remarkable unity. We have already indicated that the entire treatment can be unified in the principle that a simple reality can of itself be both actual and its own intrinsic limitation of act; conversely, the potential can somehow contain its own act. Is that principle, which obviously has vast implications for the order of operation, and, therefore, for free human acts, truly to be found in Suarez' discussion of (1) potency and act in the order of created being, both metaphysical and (composed) physical and (2) potency and act in the order of operation? Our task here is to re-examine the teachings of Suarez and determine the fact. We shall consider first his discussion of essence and existence, potency and act in the metaphysical order of being.

1. *Potency and Act in the Metaphysical Order.* At the

beginning of this discussion [415] Suarez assigns as the foundation for real identity of essence and existence the principle that nothing can be intrinsically and formally constituted in the ratio of real actual being through something distinct from itself. The very fact of distinction argues that each is independent of the other. Later Suarez repeats essentially the same proposition, saying that nothing can be constituted in its very entity through something distinct from itself.[416] The concept involved in these statements (and Suarez himself identifies that concept as the foundation of his opinion in this crucial matter) is the fundamental simplicity of every being. If a thing can not be formally and intrinsically constituted in the ratio of real actual being through something distinct from itself, then of itself it is (whatever its intrinsic limitations) its own actuality. Here, then, as the very foundation of his teaching on created essence and existence, Suarez enumerates the very principle we have indicated above, the principle that a simple reality is both its own perfection and intrinsic limitation of that perfection. Given the fact of existence, the same reality which is its own very perfection of being is also of itself that which limits and restricts being to this limited thing. Potency and act are not really distinct principles which through a real composition intrinsically affect one another.

For any Thomist the real identity of these two is unthinkable for many reasons; [417] of these reasons we will consider three.

(1) Any being in which essence and existence are identical is pure act. But pure act is unique whereas creatures are multiple. Therefore, in creatures, essence and existence are distinct. The major is clear because any essence which is its own existence *is* its own being; and the being of existence which it is is actual being unreceived by any distinct and contracting principle and not ordered as potency to any further act; therefore it is purely actual. The minor is also clear because pure act embraces all perfection; and the all perfect can be only one

[415] *Ibid.*, disp. XXXI, sect. 1, n. 13.
[416] *Ibid.*, sect. 6, n. 3.
[417] Cf. Del Prado, *de Veritate Fundamentali Philosophiae Christianae*, pp. 29-70.

for if there were two or more no one of them could be all-perfect, for each would lack that actual being by which the other (or others) would be distinct.

(2) If in creatures, essence and existence were identical, there would be among them no grades of nobility, for if that which participates being and the being participated do not differ there can not be in things a diverse participation of being and therefore a diversity of nobility. On the presumption, there is nothing to cause the diversity inasmuch as being, of itself, is simply being and not, in Thomistic thought, also a restriction and limitation of being.

(3) The creature must be composed of a really distinct essence and existence; otherwise it would be infinite, for act, of itself is, in that order in which it is act, unlimited. Now being-of-existence is of itself being; if therefore it is not truly composed with a really distinct and limiting potency it is infinite being. The answer that actual being can be limited intrinsically by itself the Thomist rejects on the ground that perfection of itself is unlimited and unique. Wherever actuality is found in a limited, measured way, or wherever it is found multiplied it must be in union with a limiting or multiplying principle really distinct from itself. Act is that which by its very nature tends to give the plenitude of perfection of that order in which it is act. Whatever by nature, tends to give the full perfection of any order is not also that which limits and multiplies that same plenitude (since multiplication supposes a limitation). In view of this fundamental principle underlying Thomism (potency and act are really distinct principles which so divide being that whatever is is either Pure Act or composed of potency and act as distinct, intrinsic principles), the answer to the arguments of Suarez is easy.[418]

His first argument (the being sufficient for the truth of the proposition "Essence is" is only being of existence) is to be distinguished. Of being which is subsisting and absolute, it is conceded, but of being which is a participated being it is denied,

[418] *Ibid.*, pp. 152-164.

for the Thomist cannot forget St. Thomas' dictum, "Whenever something is predicated of another through participation there must be something there besides that which is participated, and therefore in any creature the creature which has existence is other than its very existence." [419]

The second argument (the characteristics attributed to existence convene to the being of an actual essence) is also to be distinguished. These marks convene to such an essence precisely as it is existing and by reason of its existence, yes; but that they convene by reason of the essence alone is denied, for essences in themselves are eternal, necessary, and as such dependent on God's intellect rather than on His efficiency.

Suarez' third argument proceeds thus: Existential being is that by which a created thing is formally and immediately constituted outside its causes, and by which it ceases to be nothing. But this is that being by which a created thing is constituted in the actuality of essence. Therefore, essence and existence are identical. Again the Thomist distinguishes. To the major he answers that existential being, as an act received in the essence, as an ultimate act inhering in the substance, constitutes a created thing outside its causes and outside nothing, yes; but that existential being as an act without a distinct subject so constitutes a thing is denied. The minor is distinguished in the same sense: this being as an act received in the essence and completing the substance constitutes the creature in its actuality of essence yes; but as an unreceived act, it does not, for not everything that actually is, is, of itself alone, actual. A thing can be actual either because it is act, or because, while potential in itself it participates act, for while there is no medium between possible being and existing being there is a medium between a possible thing and the act of existence namely, the essence which receives that act. Suarez frames his fourth argument in this way: Being in act is formally the same as existing. But an existing thing is formally constituted

[419] Quandocumque autem aliquid praedicatur de altero per participationem oportet ibi aliquid esse praeter id quod participatur; et ideo in qualibet creatura est aliud ipsa creatura quae habet esse et ipsum esse ejus (*Quodl.* 2, a. 3).

only through existence, so that it is really the same thing to say " man is " and to say " man is man," if in each case " is " indicates act and not merely aptitude or truth. The major is admitted but the minor is denied, because in everything outside God, the existing thing is not constituted in act by existential being alone since its existence is not *per se stans*, so to speak, but rather adheres to the *substance* which participates and receives it.

Suarez' arguments are perfect indications of his mind for they rest, all of them, on the single concept we have already explicated, the concept that the principle of every being is fundamentally simple. In the first argument, for example, Suarez clearly assumes that all real being is actual existing being, that, in other words, this limited creature is its own actuality. Essentially the same concept underlies the other arguments. The second one asserts the fact that an actual essence is temporal, contingent, and so forth; what is presumed is that what convenes to a nature must convene to it by reason of itself, that the actual being which these notes characterize is identical with the essence. Suarez then is arguing in light of the judgment that this limited essence is also its own actuality. Having postulated such simplicity in things, Suarez was certain to reach this conclusion. The Thomist asks, granted that an essence as actual is temporal, contingent, etc., do these characteristics convene to it precisely by reason of itself, or by reason of its existential actuality? One little phrase at the end of the second argument (distinction is a result not a condition for being) sums up Suarez' thought succinctly. Distinction in the sense of distinction of things clearly supposes being as Suarez says; but the question is how can there be a distinction of actual things unless there be satisfied a prior condition of distinction in the principles of things? Actual being of itself bespeaks only actual being; and actual being is not distinct from itself nor is it, of itself, multiplied and various. We should note here, too, that Suarez writes [420] that by the very fact that

[420] *Disp. Meta., loc. cit.*, n. 8.

we conceive an actual being made by God we conceive it as existing. Since there is nothing false in that concept it follows that no added thing is necessary for the formal effect of existence. One can reach that conclusion from such premises only if one absolutely accepts the proposition that all being is simple; whatever fundamentally convenes to it, convenes to it by reason of one principle.

The third and fourth arguments rest on this same assumption that what constitutes a thing as actual is identical with that which constitutes it this limited thing. What is basic to these arguments is that an existing thing is constituted only through existence (or actuality); that is, this intrinsically limited nature, or this intrinsically limited individual of such a nature, is exclusively through that perfection which is existence. The fundamentally simple reality which is that actual perfection is of itself its own restricting limitations.

Consider, too, Suarez' negative argument for the identity and existence: [421] "Existing" cannot add any ratio distinct from that of an actual being outside its causes; hence there is no existence distinct from the being which constitutes each thing in the actuality of its essence. The very wording of the consequent shows Suarez' conception of all being as itself actual being. Granted a thing to be actual in the order of essence and he concludes that that limited actuality is actual existential being.

From the position, then, that created essence and existence are not really distinct (a position which rests, as we have shown, on the principle that all real being is actual of itself even when it is also, of itself, limited and restricted) certain consequential propositions are inevitable. To this class of consequential propositions can be reduced every major point of difference, in this matter of created essence and existence between Suarez and the Thomists.

The first of these (so intimately connected with the position that created essence and existence are identical as to be virtu-

[421] *Ibid.*, sect. 5.

ally contained in it) is the judgment that in the entitative order there is no composite to be made of essence and existence.[422] This patently, rests on the principle that the very actual perfecting principle of acting is also, of itself, the limiting restricting principle, and so no real process is necessary to show the illation. If there is no composite to be formed, then, by rigorous necessity, the thing is entitatively simple; hence, one principle must embrace the two aspects found in the existing creature, namely, the perfection of actually being, and the limitation to being this restricted thing.

Almost equally closely linked with the identification of essence and existence is Suarez' teaching that no created essence can be conserved through an existence other than its own, even through God's power.[423] Thomists teach that the human nature of Christ did in fact exist, not through a connatural human existence, but through the existence of the Word of God, a teaching which supposes (among other things) that since an essence is potential for existence and not its own actuality (of existence) it can, by God's power be actuated by an existential act other than that connatural to it. The Suarezian teaching is a corollary from the identification of essence and existence, as is clear: If a thing is its own existence it cannot have another existence than its own because it cannot be other than itself. But that teaching rests on the premise that everything is entitatively simple; a thing cannot receive an existence other than its own, even by God's power, because it does not receive any entitative act at all; each limited creature *is* its own actuality.

Following necessarily, too, on the identification of essence and existence, is Suarez' teaching that some existence can convene to things which are not supposites. For example, incomplete substantial existence can convene to a nature not yet subsisting; incomplete existence can convene to matter and to form, accidental existence to accidents, etc. These things have some essence; therefore if real essence is, of itself, existence,

[422] *Ibid.*, sect. 13.

[423] *Ibid.*, sect. 12.

these realities must of themselves, have some existence.[424] The argument is easily grasped, but the Thomist cannot accept such an argument. Existence is that by which a thing is formally constituted outside its causes and outside nothing. Existence then, for the Thomist, since it places a thing outside its cause presupposes the causes of a thing to have already fully exercised their causality so that no further cause of that same order can cause the existing thing. So the Thomist does not admit a distinct existence of matter and form, for example, arguing that if each is existing, then each is already in the order of being beyond the causality of the other, beyond any intrinsic, substantially causal union. As the Thomist sees it, the only union possible between them is that which is had between two actual things, that is accidental union. How can realities so perfect in their own actuality that each is outside its causes and, therefore, beyond further causal intrinsic composition be yet so imperfect as to be incomplete in the order of essence, and crying out, so to speak, for composition with the other? As existing, they cannot mutually exercise substantial causality on one another; so how is their union substantial? Again the Thomist asks, what would an existing but not yet subsisting substantial nature be? As substantial, and outside its causes, it is beyond any further causality in the substantial order; how can it be other than subsisting? The same question arises with regard to the separate existence of primary matter. This matter of its essence is, formally, actually nothing; its existence then would be the existence of that which is, formally speaking, no actual thing. As to a substantial form existing of itself, since it is beyond any intrinsic causality of matter, the Thomist argues, would it not be, in its order, unlimited actuality? But these objections, to Suarez, all miss the point. Because he starts with the judgment that that which is itself actual can be itself limited, incomplete, imperfect, he composes in one principle both aspects. Matter and form can exist independently for even existence can be incomplete, and imperfect; and so too for the other Thomistic arguments.

[424] *Ibid.*, sect. 11.

Suarez next concludes that creatures can be principal, not merely instrumental, causes of the existence of their effects.[425] Having identified the essence of the effect (which clearly can be caused by a creature as by a principal cause) with its existence, he could not teach anything else without denying all principal causality to creatures. (Suarez' argument on this point is very interesting and has important ramifications for our principal interest, but before coming to that we must consider the Thomistic answer to this other question.) The Thomist holds that creatures can be only instruments in the production of any existence, because a power which is a principal cause of existence must be subsistent being, i. e., it must have existence of its very nature for a thing must first *be* such before it can produce a like thing and a created essence *is not* its existence. Suarez, of course, admits that such a cause must be its own existence, but denies that it is therefore, subsisting being. His arguments against the position that the creature effects *such* being, not being simply, are illuminating.[426] In part, at least, they seem to rest on the motion that the action of the created cause must effect *something* or else it is not real action. If it effects something he would say that it must effect (as a principal cause) an existing reality (again we notice the notion that what is real is of itself actual) for whatever is, is of itself actual even though it also be of itself limited.

Suarez did not understand the Thomistic position that, since not all that is actual is itself act, a cause can be the principal cause of essence without being a principal cause of its existential actuality. What is of more interest to us is this: if the existence of an effect (action and its term) is from the creature as from a *principal* cause, then that cause is not premoved physically to the action, for a principal cause is that which, by *its own proper power*, and not by any instrumental force, produces its effect. If, then, a creature causes its action and the term of that action as a principal cause it does so by its *own power*; the effect *is* by reason of that creature's own power, not

[425] *Ibid.*, sect. 9.

[426] *Ibid.*, n. 12 ff.

by reason of the application of that power through an instrumental force (physical premotion). It would follow that without premotion any created agent can have some second act depending on it causally; the very thing, then, which is by nature a *potency*, can have second act depending on it without God's premotion. Truly Suarez judged that whatever is, is, itself, actual.

Intimately connected with this teaching that creatures can be principal causes of the existence of their effects is Suarez' stand that existence is really that through which creatures cause.[427] This clearly supposes that a created existence *of itself* has all the limits and restrictions found in any secondary cause. A Thomist considers existence of itself as simple actuality in its order; if it (*per impossibile*) were to act efficiently, its adequate effect could be only simple actuality in that order of being supposing no extrinsic limitation of its causality. That is not true for Suarez, and it is not true for him simply because he conceived the actual as intrinsically limited by itself.

Side by side with these propositions which flow from Suarez' identification of the creature's essence and existence, are certain other judgments which are very revealing—his view of what is entailed in the Thomistic teaching of a real distinction.

At the outset of his discussion, Suarez points out that if essence and existence are distinct, then by the very fact that each is really distinct from the other, as being from being, each has this that it is a being and distinct; and consequently one cannot, formally and intrinsically, *be through that other.*[428] Here the interesting thing is the concept that things really distinct are distinct as being from being, one of which cannot constitute the other. Thomists, in maintaining the real distinction, do not imply that neither of the two can intrinsically constitute the other, for they never conceive these two as *things*, i. e., each a being in itself. Suarez did so conceive them (on the supposition of a real distinction) because, so it seems, he did not understand well the Thomistic teaching that the

[427] *Ibid.*, sect. 10.

[428] *Ibid.*, sect. 6, n. 3.

perfecting and the perfectible *must* be distinct, yet complementary; they are not things but principles of things. Suarez, already convinced of the fundamental simplicity of things and on the assumption that these principles are really distinct, concluded that each of them in its own right must be a real actual thing.

Again, Suarez writes that, supposing a real distinction between created essence and existence, an actual essence could be conserved without existence by divine power, for while God cannot supply for intrinsically component formal causes He can supply for the dependence of one component part on the other.[429] This proposition shows how Suarez conceived this whole question, for even when, for the sake of argument, he supposes a real distinction of the two elements, even then he does not conceive them as intrinsically constituting or modifying one another. So utterly basic is his conception that all real being has some actuality of itself, that, even in supposing the Thomistic position, he does not suppose the more basic doctrine behind it, namely, that a reality can be actual through an act which is not the actuated element, proximately, that an essence can have actual existence through an act which is not the very essence itself. It is no accident that Suarez does not suppose this; his principles do not allow it. He saw that to a Thomist for any essence to be in nature without any existence is impossible, but his position, even when he grants the distinction which Thomists teach, is that an actual essence which *is* not its existence is impossible. There is one basic reason why he teaches this: his principle that real being is actual being.

In much the same way, Suarez says [430] that those who hold for a real distinction can give no reason why God could not separate a created existence and existence one from the other and preserve each alone. Thomists do teach a real distinction and at the same time teach that God cannot preserve each element separately (created existence with no essence, created essence with no existence). For them this has to be so, because

[429] *Ibid.*, sect. 12, n. 3.

[430] *Ibid.*, nn. 9-12.

existence, without *this* determined limiting essence, is pure actuality; it is being outside of its cause and of itself unlimited. Essence without existence cannot be preserved in reality because, without existence, it *is* not in reality; a non-existing thing *actually in nature* is, to Thomists, a contradiction. To Suarez there is no contradiction; having supposed a real essence he already supposes entitative actuality, for he does not admit the doctrine of subjective potency as Thomists understand it, i. e., a reality which is made actual through an entitative act distinct from itself. Thus Suarez writes that a thing ceases to be in potency when it is created.[431] The Thomist admits this but adds that some reality even after it is created continues to be *potency*, a potency now actuated, to be sure, but still potency with respect to that act. Suarez can write too [432] that if one holds that an essence-in-act adds distinct existence to an essence already an actual being, but potential with respect to existence, it follows that an actual essence differs from itself in potency, not in the act of being, but in its very essential entity. Thomists hold that an actual essence, as such, does add a distinct existence to an essence; they do not teach the consequent Suarez draws, and that precisely because they teach that the existence *is* the actuality of the essence-in-act. Hence it is through that act of being that the actual essence is distinct from the potential, and not through some actuality which is the essence itself.

2. *The Physical Order.* We have seen that, in the metaphysical order, the entire body of teaching in which Suarez differs from the Thomists is reducible to the single principle that, since even created being is not intrinsically composed of distinct potency and act as its first and intrinsic principles, all being is of itself actual. In the physical order (the realm of substantial form and primary matter) we shall find again that the core of Suarezian doctrine is this very principle; here too, those particular teachings in which Suarez differs from the Thomists rest on this single foundation.

[431] *Ibid.*, sect. 3, n. 4. [432] *Ibid.*, n. 6.

The heart of the Suarezian teaching about matter and form is this: each of them has its own distinct entity of essence and existence; each of them, of itself, *is*. It is abundantly clear that this is his teaching. In explicit terms Suarez says that matter of itself alone has its own entity of essence and existence;[433] it is of itself in an ultimate species of matter;[434] form, too, has its own being.[435] These basic proportions of the Suarezian account of matter and form are simple applications of the principle we have indicated; if in the physical order both matter and form have their own separate entities of essence and existence, it can be only because all being is of itself entitatively actual.

In his arguments for the proper essence and existence of primary matter Suarez clearly shows how actual he conceived primary matter. His proof for the independent *essential* reality of matter is simple: Matter is a real subject in nature; therefore, it has some real essence. But the essence of matter cannot be constituted intrinsically through form.

Therefore, matter is independent of form. The minor is proved by this that matter is simple and incomplete; therefore it is not constituted through anything other than itself. If so constituted it would be a composite and complete thing. Suarez adds to this that, since matter can preserve numerically the same entity while losing one form and gaining another, its essential perfection is different from that given by the form.[436] To all this the Thomist answers that matter certainly is a reality with a real function in nature, but it is not of itself an entity, a perfection; it is but mere potency or capacity for being, not actual being.

In view of the fact that many things have the same specific being, the Thomist reasons that something which is not that specific being must receive it and is its principle of limitation and multiplicity, for one thing cannot of itself be multiple. The receiving thing since its function is only to receive, is purely passive. It is not properly a thing but rather one of

[433] *Ibid.*, disp. XIII, sect. 4.
[434] *Ibid.*, sect. 3, n. 18.
[435] *Ibid.*, sect. 5, n. 17; sect. 4.
[436] *Ibid.*, sect. 4, nn. 9-11.

the principles of many things. Hence, it is not really an essence, but a capacity to compose, with formal actuality, an essence; therefore, it *is* not of itself. Even that it be a *real* capacity to receive convenes to it not by reason of itself but because it is constituted as real, and that constitution is through another. Suarez cannot concede that; to him, if the general proposition " what is is of itself actual " be true, then this matter which in nature *is* must be actual of itself. If nothing can be constituted in its own reality through something other than itself, then, certainly matter cannot be so constituted. We have seen his proposition that matter of itself has being which is real, for if matter were nothing it would have no real function in nature.[437] From that Suarez concludes that matter has its reality from *itself*; he cannot entertain that other possibility advanced by Thomists, that matter can be real by reason of an actual reality derived from something other than itself. He cannot entertain it because of his guiding principle of his: what is, is, of itself, actual.

The argument for the proposition that matter of itself has existence is fundamentally this: Matter has its own essence.[438] But existence adds no real thing or real mode to the entity of essence as this latter is actual and outside its causes. This is only a particular application of Suarez' general identification of essence and existence (even partial essences as we have seen), and so we shall not consider it here. But the second proposition by which the argument is confirmed (which teaches the distinct entity of matter and, therefore, its distinct creation) most clearly shows that Suarez conceived matter as an actual thing directly produced by God in its own proper actuality. The third confirmatory proposition (if matter did not really exist it could not be a real subject) would be quite acceptable to all Scholastics. However the conclusion, that matter has this existence of itself, does not follow for those who hold that not everything which is actual is its own act but that act can be

[437] *Ibid.*, nn. 3, 5.

[438] *Ibid.*, disp. XV, sect. 8, n. 7; disp. XIII, sect. 4, n. 13.

distinct from the thing actuated; on the other hand, it must follow for those who identify reality with entitative actuality. In summary, one needs only reread Suarez' argument: Matter has its own actuality of essence and existence, not from form, but of itself, because matter is a real subject; therefore, of itself, it has actual being. One premise is not explicitly advanced in the argument; it is the major " Whatever is real and actual is *of itself* real and actual ". And there is the crux of the whole problem.[439]

An immediate consequence of Suarez' teaching that both matter and form have of themselves actuality of essence and existence, and, as it were, a property of that teaching, is Suarez' conception of the nature the composition of bodies. He writes, for instance, that substance cannot be composed of nothing, but requires at least incomplete substances.[440] Further, he says that a thing which is *per se* one can be composed of things which are incomplete actual beings.[441] Even more explicitly he affirms that, as the essence of a corporeal substance is composed of the partial essences of matter and form, so its existence is composed of the partial existences of these two elements.[442] Suarez could not have fully understood the Thomistic position that of two actual things a thing which is *per se* one cannot be made, for he answers here that the principle is true only of things which are *complete* in actual being. To the Thomist that is not satisfactory; for him the very notion of the actual is that it be, in its order, perfection. For the Thomist any existing actuality, must be, in the order in which it is actual, complete, for the actually perfect cannot be incomplete in that order in which it is perfect. The position then, that a substance is composed of two actual (though incomplete) existences a Thomist must dispute on the ground that act of itself, is precisely *perfection* in its own order. On the other hand, that position Suarez must affirm on the ground that what is, however imperfect it be, is of itself. Here again is the omnipresent proposition that created being is simple. Suarez affirms the

[439] *Ibid.*, disp. XIII, sect. 4.
[440] *Ibid.*, nn. 3-5.
[441] *Ibid.*, sect. 5, nn. 16-17.
[442] *Ibid.*, sect. 4, n. 13.

actuality of the incomplete, and implies that one thing, as actual, has of itself its own perfection. As incomplete he implies that of itself it has its own intrinsic limitation, since nothing extrinsic to it limits it in its actuality. Here then is a clear application of the central Suarezian proposition.

Flowing from Suarez' notion of the partial actuality of even primary matter are many other points in which he disagrees with Thomists. Foremost among them is his teaching about the pure potentiality of matter.[443] By his premise that there is nothing which does not, of itself, have its own entitative actuality, Suarez was led to assert that matter is metaphysically an act, but an act which is pure potency in the sense that it is totally ordered to receiving an informing act. It is, therefore, an actually existing thing which is at the same time formally only potential in the physical order, but partially active in the metaphysical order. We have seen the difficulty of that position, the difficulty that what is actual, since it is outside its causes, is already so perfect that it cannot be in dependence on any other cause in the same order. How can such a thing be incomplete in the order of essence? Suarez did teach that matter does not depend on its form as on a cause, and so there is difficulty in seeing how their union can be substantial. As to form, also, since it is of itself existing, and therefore is outside its causes, it is hard to see how it can yet depend on matter as on its cause (as Suarez teaches that it does depend). If form and matter are so complete and perfect in themselves as to exist by their own distinct existence and if they can be conserved without one another, the Thomists find it difficult to understand how they are partial essences. But Suarez, sticking fast to the proposition that one thing can be perfection and intrinsic limitation (even incompletion) of perfection affirmed that (1) both matter and form have distinct existences; (2) matter is purely potential with respect to substantial form; (3) its union with form is not accidental but substantial, and this last in spite of the fact that the Suarezian system also main-

[443] *Ibid.*, sect. 5.

tains that it is not of the ratio of existing matter that it have form, nor does the essence of matter demand this. Truly there is a conception of substantial potency which is far indeed from what Thomists name by that term.

Matter is produced and conserved by an act distinct from the act inducing and conserving its informing form.[444] Should any doubt remain that in the Suarezian system potency, of itself, *is*, this proposition must dispel it. Matter (which is substantial potency) as the term of substantial production and conservation properly *is*, for, as Suarez affirms, that is properly made and created which properly *is*. Hence a thing *is*, and *is* potential in one and the same order, the order of substance. Suarez would answer of course that only under different aspects is it both acutal and potential, entitatively is is actual, formally it is potential. But the thing to grasp is that here once again the Suarezian system does in fact admit that in one and the same order a thing can be both actual and potential.

Closely allied to this teaching is Suarez' proposition that matter alone, without any form, can be conserved in nature, not in the ordinary course of nature, but through God's power,[445] a clear corollary from the teaching that matter of itself alone *is* and does not have intrinsic *dependence* on the being of its form. It is patent that one who teaches this doctrine cannot conceive primary matter as purely potential to all act. But, interestingly enough, Suarez develops the point that, even if essence and existence were really distinct in creatures, there would be no reason why God could not give existence to matter alone, as God does in fact make accidents exist separated from any subject. From this [illegible] the supposition of a real [illegible] and without form could be actuated by [illegible] primary matter, but is a reality distinct from it. It is clearly an act, the act of being outside of its cause and outside noth-

[444] *Ibid.*, disp. XV, sect. 8, n. 18; cf. also sect. 3, nn. 6-7; disp. XIII, sect. 4, nn. 16-17.

[445] *Ibid.*, disp. XIII, sect. 9, n. 1.

ing, but it is the act of that which is, of itself, both formally and entitatively, actually nothing.

The Thomist can not grant what Suarez here supposes, on the ground that matter, since it is of itself actually nothing, can not receive existence, for the existence of what is actually nothing is repugnant. Suarez does not have that difficulty: having already placed in primary matter its own partial essence, he can, on his principles, admit a corresponding partial existence, even if that existence be supposed as distinct. Again, the reason he can teach this is the judgment that what is of itself limited can, of itself and in the same order, be actual. The argument of Suarez from the fact that accidents without a subject can exist to the possibility of matter's separate existence seems to indicate that he conceives matter, like an accident, as itself having some essence.

The being of matter depends on form, not as on a cause, but as on a necessary condition and added actuality,"[4] yet matter is a true cause of form."[5] The first part of this proposition seems to the Thomist a simple deduction from the position that matter is, of itself, actual: what is already act does not depend for its entity on the causal influence of some further act of the same order. This position, immediately following from Suarez' central proposition of the physical order, is mediately reducible to his central point in the metaphysical order—what is, is its own actuality.

The position that form depends on matter as on a cause, yet has its own separate existence and can be conserved in nature [by God's power] without matter"[6] is, on Suarez' principles, harder for the Thomist to understand. Whatever is existing for the Thomist, is so perfected and completed that, having been constituted by all its causes it is placed outside them and outside nothing. How, then, can form, causally depending on matter, be without matter? On the position that form depends on matter for its initial constitution, not for its

[4] *Ibid.*, disp. XV, sect. 6; sect. 8; disp. XIII, sect. 4, n. 18; disp. XXVII, sect. 2.
[5] *Ibid.*, disp. XXVII, sect. 2, nn. 4-5.
[6] *Ibid.*, disp. XIII, sect. 4.

conservation, the positions seem reconcilable. In that case, the Thomist says, given matter and form, each is so complete in being that it is existing without the other being metaphysically necessary to it. How is substantial union possible between elements each so complete in its own actuality? Substantial union is that which is required in order that a thing be so complete that it can exist without a subject of inhesion and without a further co-principle. Suarez' basic notion that the substantially actual can itself be so incomplete as to require further actuality in the same substantial order allows him to teach what he does.

To be expected from Suarez' principles is his position that a composed substance is not really or modally distinct from its essential parts taken together and united, but at most is rationally distinct from them.[449] This would seem to follow necessarily from the position that each element has its own actuality; the actuality of the composite therefore is a union of the component actualities and not distinct from all of them taken as united. The Thomists argue there is but *one* actuality, one being in any substance, not a union of actualities. The difference is fundamental.

II. POTENCY AND ACT IN THE ORDER OF OPERATION

In order to understand the background of Suarez' teaching about the dependence of the human will on God and its motion by God, we have examined his teaching about potency and act in general. Our analysis of that doctrine in the order of being led to the conclusion that it rests upon one principle: whatever is (except God Who is pure act) is both actual (has perfection) and potential (has limitation) of itself, and not by reason of distinct principles which compose it. Or, equivalently: created act is not limited by potency only but can limit itself; and, conversely, what is limited can be its own actuality. That proposition expresses the sum of the Suarezian teaching about potency and act in metaphysical terms. We have seen that in the physical order, too, the same judgment is fundamental to Suarez' doctrine as to Suarez' teachings on

[449] *Ibid.*, disp. XXXVI, sect. 3.

potency and act in the order of operation, the question is whether that same metaphysical notion is applied by Suarez. Is the judgment conceived in the order of being adapted to and applied in the order of operation? The answer is that that same judgment is applied here also; there is continuity between the two orders in Suarez' teaching. The judgment in this order has its own peculiar form. It can be best expressed, perhaps, in this way: an operative potency can be at one and the same time in formal potency and yet have some act, in virtue of which it can physically reduce itself to formal act. We do not say that Suarez maintains this of *every* potency. He does teach, however, that it is not repugnant to the nature of a potency so to reduce itself to act, and he maintains that some potencies do thus reduce themselves to act.

It is evident that Suarez teaches passive operative powers and some active operative powers, although with respect to formal act they are merely potencies, are yet so actual that they do not need to be premoved in order to have their acts depending upon them.

Suarez does not explicitly say of any active powers that they are, as powers, forms which are a virtual and eminent act through which they can reduce themselves to the formal act with respect to which they are in potency. Yet, from the start of his treatment, it is evident that Suarez did not consider it repugnant to the nature of an active power that it be, in itself, so actual that it can reduce itself to formal act. He writes " they (i. e., active powers) do not suffer by receiving anything after the manner of first act by which they are completed in the ratio of agent principle, for, as I suppose, they are principles complete in their own order (i. e., proximate or instrumental) and do not require a further act by which they are intrinsically completed for acting. Nor is it to the point that such faculties sometimes need application or the motion of another potency to exercise their actions . . . for this motion is not through physical action and passion . . . but is brought about through a sympathy of the powers of the same soul, and

therefore this does not keep such a faculty from being purely active, physically and properly speaking." [450]

Here, then, in clear terms, Suarez indicates his conception that a purely active power, as such, does not necessarily need any physical application to its own act. Such a power can be so complete as to have sufficient actuality in itself to move itself, without any extrinsic physical application, since as formally potential such a faculty lacks formal act. Since, however, it is physically sufficient to move itself to act, it must have in some way the very act which it lacks in a formal way. This single passage we have quoted might easily lead one to suppose that Suarez teaches, not only that some active powers are of themselves sufficiently actual to reduce themselves to act, but that *all* active powers are such. However, he teaches explicitly [451] that when formal act is to be acquired through a virtual quality through physical and natural motion, then the formal act in question is *natural* to the agent; therefore, motion to it is principally from the generator. That does not contradict what Suarez said later. What is involved is not an assertion that it is intrinsically repugnant for a thing to be in virtual act and in formal potency, but an assertion that motion to a connatural form is principally from the generator. Hence, in those cases in which the motion is principally attributed to the generator, Suarez assigns, not the nature of *potency*, but the demands of natural motion as the reason why the virtual act which is a potency to a natural form is *moved* to formal act.

We must not forget that Suarez explicitly states that, even for active powers which do require application, the application is through moral not physical motion. In the twenty-second disputation, he rejects a distinct physical premotion of created powers by God; [452] in the thirty-first, he teaches that creatures

[450] *Ibid.*, disp. XLIII, sect. 2, n. 1; cf. footnote # 392.

[451] *Ibid.*, disp. XVIII, sect. 7.

[452] Dico ergo: divinus concursus quatenus est aliquid ad extra per se essentialiter est aliquid permodum actionis vel saltem per modum cujusdam fieri immediate manantis a Deo . . . Concursus primae causae praeter id quod est per modum actionis non includit ex intrinseca necessitate aliquid de novo inditum ipsi causae secundae quod sit principium actionis ejus, vel conditio ad illam necessaria. Dico

can be principal causes of the existence of their effects.[453] The corollary of these teachings is that at least some created physical powers can physically apply themselves to second act. In the cases where one thing can not be at one time in virtual act and in formal potency the reason is the special nature of the formal act involved and, therefore, of the motion to it. Suarez teaches that it is not contrary to the nature of an active power that it can apply itself to its own act, and that some active powers do so. It would follow that such a faculty as a power, has in itself in some way the acts in question.

As to *passive* powers the teaching of Suarez is even more clear. He writes that a passive power *per se* ordained to a determined act is *eminently* its active principle.[454] Again he says a passive power, in as much as it has the actual perfection of such a species, can be a power *eminently* or *virtually* containing another act and formally actuable through this act. Later he implies that a power *can* both receive an act and be its principle inasmuch as it contains that act virtually or eminently.[455] Suarez, we have seen, taught that the principle "one thing cannot be in potency and in act at the same time" does not apply in the case of immanent or vital actions.[456] Hence, some things can be in virtual act and in formal potency; as to immanent acts, the second act is contained in first act, virtually and eminently. In these cases, the dissimilarity between agent and patient is dissimilarity between a form formally taken and another which eminently contains it. The human will, for example, as first act, eminently contains its own second act. Any form that contains another form virtually and eminently has that other in a more perfect mode; it *actually* contains it in an exceeding degree. Here, then, in the notion of the eminent actuality of passive powers and of all

de novo inditum quia certum est concursum causae secundae supponere in illa virtutem agendi datam et conservatam a prima causa (*Ibid.*, disp. XXII, sect. 2, nn. 15, 19; consult this whole section for Suarez' rejection of premotion and predetermination).

[453] *Ibid.*, disp. XXXI, sect. 9.

[454] *Ibid.*, disp. XLIII, sect. 6.

[455] *Ibid.*, sect. 2, n. 14; *Ibid.*, n. 16.

[456] *Ibid.*, disp. XVIII, sect. 7, n. 19.

equivocal agents is his basis for saying that many things seem to move themselves from potency to act.

It is worth noting that, concerning the particular principle of immanent acts which is the human will, Suarez teaches that it *alone* is the proximate principle *quo* of both acting and receiving. He rejects the position that, whereas will plus appetition of the end is the principle of acting, the will alone is the principle of receiving.[457] The will as principle of acting is not distinct from the principle of receiving even by partial entity as the including is distinct from the included; by *itself* it is sufficient to move itself. Here then in the order of operation is a clear application of the metaphysical notion that the limited can itself be somehow actual.

Interesting, too, is the Suarezian teaching about the relative nobility of potency and act.[458] Speaking of active power he says that its act is not from its very genus more perfect than the power for, to the latter, act adds no perfection since it does not exceed the active power of the potency; that is, the potency from its very genus is more perfect since the potency perfects the act rather than the other way around. Speaking later of passive powers, Suarez says, that the act is in some way the more perfect, since it is better to be with act than without it, but this view does not consider things simply.[459] A passive power which is *per se* ordered to this act is more perfect than the act, for the potency is eminently the active principle. Thomists hold that it does in fact exceed the power of any faculty, that of itself it actually moves itself to act and through such motion its act causally depends on it. Since the very perfection of potency consists in actually having its act and since potency cannot give itself act, the potency *receives* its perfection; it is not sufficient to give its own perfection to itself. Then, precisely as potency, it is less perfect for it can not alone achieve that for which it *is*, namely, its operation.

[457] *Ibid.*, n. 51.
[458] *Ibid.*, disp. XLIII, sect. 6.
[459] *Ibid.*, n. 19.

IV. Criticism of the Teaching on Human Freedom

I. the free act

1. *The Central Doctrine.* Having seen the background for the whole of Suarez' doctrine on potency and act, we can hope to approach with understanding the task of criticizing his teaching about that potency which is the human will and its act. The student who would read Suarez on human freedom alone and attempt to criticize that doctrine without regard to the more general teaching could hardly arrive at a certain conclusion. While he might suspect the Suarezian principle underlying the teaching on the will, he would not find adequate verification of the principle in the doctrine on liberty alone. What then is the underlying concept in Suarez' whole treatment of the human will and its motion under God? The principle involved here is the metaphysical principle we discovered as basic in the Suarezian concept of potency and act: The limited and imperfect can be its own actuality; the actual can be its own intrinsic limitation. More proximately, and as adapted to the order of operation that principle can be formulated thus: A created faculty which is potential with respect to formal second act can have in itself a virtual and eminent actuality in virtue of which it can, without distinct physical premotion, reduce itself to formal second act. That is the judgment which is basic in Suarez' account of the acts of man's free will and its movement by God, and that is the principle which gives this teaching continuity with the whole Suarezian system.

That Suarez bases his doctrine about the free act of man on that principle is beyond question; the whole foundation of his teaching about the created free act is that the potency is not physically premoved to that act, but reduces itself to act under simultaneous concursus. A thing can be reduced from potency to act only by a being in act; clearly then, the will which is (with respect to formal act) potential *is* yet of *itself* so actual as to move itself to that act without a prior reduction to act. With regard to the motion of the free will, he writes

that in a free act neither the first cause nor the second has any priority of nature; neither acts on the other.[460] It must follow that God does not move the will, but that it moves itself. Clearly, then, the very reality which is a potency is somehow itself actual. Suarez also says that God's concursus is not previous to or distinct from the human act; it is not concerned with the principle of the act (the faculty), nor does it in any way incline or strengthen that principle for acting.[461] What can this mean but that the will alone is a sufficient physical principle of its own reduction to act and that, therefore, even as potency it is actual? Is not essentially the same notion involved in Suarez' statement that God's act *ad extra* has no priority to the act of the creature other than a priority of nobility? [462]

Especially interesting, however, is Suarez' more detailed argumentation against God's premotion of the human will.[463] His general reason is that the essential subordination of second causes to God is amply safeguarded by simultaneous concursus. He argues, in particular, that the will needs no application to its act. His reason is that there is a sufficient application through the proposition of the object. Clearly, then, a faculty plus its object (which object Suarez insists from the beginning has no efficiency with regard to the act) is *ipso facto* sufficiently applied to its own act without a previous divine intervention applying the faculty. Necessarily, then, either the faculty in itself contains in some way the very application, or no efficiency at all is required to apply a faculty to operation. Thomists, insisting on the real distinction between potency and act, maintain that it is metaphysically impossible for that which is only power to apply itself to act for nothing can give a perfection which it itself lacks. Suarez, however, can teach that the human will needs no extrinsic application to act, and he can teach this because from the outset he has judged that the limited and potential is also, in some way, its own perfection and actuality. Therefore, as his own words

[460] *Opus. Primum*, Liber I, cap. 15, n. 7.
[461] *Ibid.*, cap. 4, n. 6.
[462] *Ibid.*, n. 8.
[463] *Ibid.*, capp. 5-6.

show clearly, the only application he conceives here is the presentation of the object to the power. That this power as such needs application to act he does not see, for the potential is somehow actual. The real point of difference here between Suarez and the Thomists, then, is not simply a question of human freedom; what is involved is the very nature of potency and act.

According to Suarez, also, the will needs no *motion*, for the motion would have no term which he can determine. The term can not be the act of the second agent for, if it were, only God would be active in producing the act. This teaching (so thoroughly in accord with what Suarez had written about the complete active and dominative power of the will over its own act) is flatly opposed by Thomists who insist that the will can be active in producing its act only on condition that it be moved by God. In itself, the will is (with respect to act) mere potency which to be active *must* be activated, for the potential is not, of itself, actual.

Thus God's motion does not deny activity to the power; rather it gives activity to it. Suarez reasons that if God moves the power to act then the power itself must be only passive. He does not conceive as possible a motion of this power to its act, a motion which gives to this power the actual activity of the power. He does not conceive it because he has already conceived the very power as somehow actual in such a way that for God to activate it would mean that its own connatural and due power to reduce itself to act is thereby impeded.

In Suarez' view, the will needs no complement in order to act, for every power is adequate to its own act. Especially to be noted is his argument against any complement which is a fluid quality. He argues that a faculty with such a quality and with simultaneous concursus either needs another premotion, or it does not. If it does, the process continues to infinity (which is patently absurd). If it does not need another, then the first premotion is not needed either. Second causes by nature do not require it (since *this* second cause, viz. faculty plus quality, does not need premotion), and why could not

God give creatures permanent powers equal to the combination of faculty plus quality? The Thomist answers, of course, that given this quality the faculty does not need another, as a ship already moving does not need another motion in order that it be moving. This one premotion, however, is necessary; even the *moved* second cause, while moved, requires to be moved. In other words the second cause can not reduce itself to the actuality of its own act. Every secondary agent, then, even the agent which has this quality, does by nature require it in order to act. In the second place, the Thomist adds, a permanent quality is impossible, for the reason that this quality is essentially a *motion* not a form. Suarez argues as he does because he has not understood fully the nature of this motion, and the reason he has not well understood it is because he has already excluded the need of any such motion on the ground that the potency itself is somehow actual.

For Suarez, no excitation of the second cause is needed, and here again the final reason for his position is the basic judgment that the will can reduce itself to act. Ultimately the whole Suarezian position about the motion of the will from first act to second act rests on the principle that there is no medium between first and second act. If that be true, if between power to act and the very acting there is no medium, then, of course, the will as a power is not moved to act by anything extrinsic to itself. It can be true only if the power itself *is* somehow actual. Only then can the will have (in the Suarezian sense) that complete active power over its own act which Suarez postulates, an active power so complete that the very potency moves itself to act.

As to the *determination* of the human will it is abundantly clear that Suarez maintains that it is from the will alone that the intellectual appetite which is in a special way undetermined and indifferent (from its very nature as following an intellectual knowledge) can determine itself. Thus, he says that determination of the will, not only need not be, but can not be from any agent extrinsic to the will or from any reality previous to the act of the will, for the determination is formally

and physically the very act of the will.[464] It is, of course, admitted by all that the determination of the will is the act of the will; the will determines itself. Suarez does not mean only that; he means that this determination is from the will as the latter is untouched by any previous determining quality. For him, if the will receives determination prior to its act, it is passive.[465] This is against the position that the will receives determination to determine itself. If any doubt remains, we have his arguments that predetermination of the created will would destroy indifference of specification and of exercise; he says that, since the will has freedom both of specification and of exercise, it cannot be pre-determined.[466] Speaking of the supernatural order, Suarez argues that there is in us no determining aid which is neither habit nor act, and he further notes that determination (through grace) would destroy that freedom which the will must have.[467]

Suarez simply dismisses any predetermining element; the will is not, in his system, predetermined in order that it determine itself. His reason is crystal-clear; the proposition "an indifferent power cannot of itself produce a determined effect" is true of a power which is indifferent by reason of some imperfection or defect. It is not true of a power (such as the will) which is indifferent from its very perfection.[468] A faculty which is positively and actively indifferent can of its own intrinsic power determine itself to its acts. Here, too, he is supposing that the undetermined, the potential, is, in an eminent way, its own determination, its own perfection. Indetermination can be an expansive perfection embracing the perfection of the many possible determinations; the potential can be an expansive actuality which somehow embraces the perfection of the many possible acts. The formula is by now familiar; there is unity and cohesion in the system of Suarez.

2. *Consequential Teachings.* The central and vital point in Suarez' teaching about the motion of the free human faculty

[464] *Ibid.*, cap. 8.
[465] *Ibid.*, n. 4.
[466] *Ibid.*, capp. 9-11.
[467] *Ibid.*, Liber III, cap. 12.
[468] *Ibid.*, Liber I, cap. 8, n. 6.

is clear: the human will can, of its own intrinsic powers, move and determine itself to second act without a predetermining motion by God. The metaphysical basis for that position is also arrestingly clear: what is potential and undetermined can contain eminently and virtually, the perfection and determination of many actual determinations. From these notions stem many of the other points on which Suarez and the Thomists disagree. That is hardly surprising; one would expect that disagreement in so fundamental a question as is here involved would inevitably lead to disagreement on many subsequent points. We shall here indicate some, at least, of these points, and their connection with this great central point. In so doing we shall, implicitly, be confirming our thesis that the differences between Suarezians and Thomists cannot be approached or settled as though they were isolated questions which bear only on human freedom. Those differences are so great, so fundamental, as to reach back with surprising proximity to the very starting-points of these two schools. But let us see the Suarezian propositions which flow from this judgment that the will is somehow its own actuality.

I. God's concursus (with this faculty which is the human will) must have an eminent, universal, and abstract character; and, Suarez adds, determination is too restrictive for the will.[469] That is one of the best revelations of the mind of Suarez which is to be found in all his writings on liberty; there, epitomized, one finds the mind of Suarez on this matter. God's concursus must be eminent and universal because it should be of like nature with the power with which it concurs, and that power (the will) is not bound to any one thing; it is itself an eminent, universal thing, so eminent and universal from its very perfection that determination is too restrictive for it. The will in its very aspect of potency and indetermination is conceived as more expansive in its perfection than any particular act which may formally determine and actuate it, for this eminence and universality of the human will is eminence and universality

[469] *Ibid.*, cap. 14.

from the very perfection of the faculty. The will as a potency is not conceived here as something of itself imperfect (because potential and undetermined) which is simply perfected by the second act actuating and determining it. Rather, the greater perfection is in the unrestricted potentiality which from its eminent virtuality can choose this or that particular act, and retain under act its own greater perfection. Here we remember the Suarezian dictum that a passive faculty which is *per se* ordered to such or such an act is, simply, more perfect than its act for it is, eminently, the active principle.[470]

Here, then, is a denial that act is simply more perfect than potency in the same order, a denial based on the premise that the potential can be more perfectly actual than that which, formally, is act. Thomists reject Suarez' teaching about the motion of the human will on the ground that nothing can reduce itself from potency to act, that such reduction can come only from that which is itself in act. But that proposition can hardly be made to apply in Suarez' eyes. In his system there is no question of the potency achieving by motion to a determined act a perfection it in no way has of itself. Rather, that motion is motion to something which is not, simply, more perfect than the will at all but motion only to one of the many formal actualizations which the will already eminently has of itself.

Quite clearly, then, the teaching that God's concursus should be of an eminent, universal, and abstract character (which is so contradictory to the Thomistic teaching that concursus is a determining motion to this particular act) flows from Suarez' notion of the eminent and virtual actuality of the human will as a potency. The disagreement about concursus then is proximately rooted in the disagreement about the nature of the will as an operative potency.

II. In the second place, it is absolutely basic in the Suarezian teaching that the effectiveness of God's concursus rests with the determination of the human agent. Thus Suarez writes that

[470] *Disp. Meta.*, disp. XLIII, sect. 6, n. 20.

God wills to concur with men who cooperate with Him, but such a volitional act of God of itself alone effects nothing.[471] The Thomist can not accept that. He can not adopt the stand that it is the creature who determines that God's volition shall be effective, and not God Who predetermines the effective volition of the creature. It is the created will, the Thomist insists, which of itself alone effects nothing, for the created will of itself alone is a mere potency, not act. But Suarez was certain to teach what he here enunciates. If the created potency is, in an eminent, virtual way, its own act, if its very nature as such a potency makes possible (and its free nature demands) that it move and determine itself, then either God's volition must be conditional and, of itself alone, actually without the effect, or God must violate the very freedom He has established. Rejecting the latter alternative Suarez accepted the former. This position is made possible only by Suarez' starting point that the will can reduce itself by eminent virtual act to formal act, more remotely that the potential can itself be actual. Given that possibility and then the doctrine that freedom *demands* that the free potency so reduce itself to act this position became inevitable.

Suarez argues that in the supernatural order man has it in his own power that God's sufficient grace, already given him, become concursus,[472] i. e., man has it in his power to determine that the good act be placed. He writes that God's influence enters in on condition that the human will cooperate.[473] Clearly, Suarez was not maintaining that God's influence was the moving element which predetermined the human will to cooperate; on the contrary, he maintained that the second cause determined the effectiveness of the conditional act of God's will. Here again the Thomist disagrees, insisting that the potential (the human faculty) is determined by God, Who is pure act, for the potential of itself alone is merely potential. Suarez could teach that the second cause gives effect to God's

[471] *Prol. Primum*, cap. 3.
[472] *Opus. Primum*, Liber III, cap. 6.
[473] *Ibid.*, cap. 14.

conditional will only because he conceived the potential as itself somehow actual. The formula is now familiar. One who would know Suarez must expect to meet it often, for like a great central theme it rings out again and again in the pages of Suarez.

III. No less essential in Suarez' account of God's moving of the human will is the teaching that the efficacy of God's efficacious grace is a *moral* efficacy, and not physical.[474] It is an efficacy which is rooted, not in the vocation itself, but in God's infallible foreknowledge that the created will shall consent to such a vocation. The Thomist can never accept this; for him a merely moral efficacy is unacceptable. How, he asks, can such a grace infallibly have efficacy from God's foreknowledge since the will as free is not of itself determined to consent to this particular vocation. On the supposition, it is not determined by God's motion either. Where, then, is the objective basis for God's infallible foreknowledge that *this* is the grace to which this human will shall consent? Where then is the efficacy of this grace if it is not in the vocation itself and can not be in this supposed foreknowledge of God? Suarez, faced with the fact of the efficacy of some grace, and with his own position that grace cannot physically determine the human will, was bound to resort to an efficacy which is merely moral. The very possibility of this position, too, rests upon the teaching that the created will as a power can move itself, by eminent or virtual act, to formal act. Had Suarez not first accepted that proposition he would have had to account for the efficacy grace in some other way. The interesting thing is Suarez' point that this efficacy is really rooted in God's foreknowledge. The Thomist can argue that God's knowledge is an intuition of reality. Therefore, if God, in knowing this will knows (without God Himself determining it) that the will shall consent to such or such a call then how can the power be free and of itself indifferent? There is some kind of determination there in the very second cause; how else is God's knowledge infallible? If

[474] *Ibid.*, n. 9.

God knows that the will shall consent, it shall indeed consent, but if, as Suarez says, the determination that it shall consent is not from God, then is it not from the second cause, and where then is freedom?

This argument would have little weight in Suarez' eyes, and that simply because of his notions of potency and act. Since Suarez held that the will is eminently and virtually its own act, it is not surprising that he also held that God can foreknow what the will shall do. Knowledge is indeed of reality, but the act of the will is already somehow a reality, supposing Suarez' position that act is *eminently* virtually in the will as a power. The very power therefore *actually* contains it, in an eminent way. We do not imply that the Suarezian position is without difficulties. However, granted his fundamental notion about the nature of potency, his position seems to be much stronger than one realizes who conceives potency as Thomists conceive it. What God foreknows is (on Suarez' grounds) already a reality, already has a certain objective truth and that without resorting to the alternative that the will is determined in itself and therefore not free. In other words, this position of Suarez seems quite consonant with his teaching about liberty as a whole, granted the eminent actuality of the will as a power; that principle makes this position almost inevitable, certainly reasonable.

IV. Intimately connected with this is the Suarezian teaching about mediate science (*scientia media*) by which God knows what the will would do in any given set of circumstances.[475] Here again one can object that a non-determining divine science about what the human will *would* do in given cases is impossible because where there is no determined reality to be known there is no certain science. In this case there is no determined reality for the will is not by nature determined to this act and (on the supposition) it is not determined by God either. But, again, this position of Suarez really has great force, accepting the principle that a potency can eminently con-

[475] *Ibid.*, Liber I, cap. 15; Liber III, cap. 14, n. 9.

tain its own act. If the will as a power does eminently contain these many possible determinations, then those determinations *are* eminently in the will, and so some of the difficulty of maintaining that God knows them is removed, for they are (in an eminent way) actual reality. Here again we do not imply that the teaching of Suarez is without any difficulty, but that teaching is in light of the basic notion we have explicated, surely reasonable. That notion makes these various teachings of Suarez unified, all parts of one homogeneous doctrinal body.

V. Suarez explicitly teaches that there is this difference, on God's part, between efficacious and sufficient grace: God foresees the effect in one and not in the other, but man has it in his power " to make God foresee that he will consent to the call." [476] Essentially the same notion (i. e., God's knowledge depends on the creature and on its activity) is implied in Suarez' teaching about God's foreknowledge and mediate science. Thomists emphatically reject the position that man can make God foresee anything, arguing that God's knowledge does not depend on creatures, that rather His knowledge is a cause of the creature and of the creature's act. Yet this teaching of Suarez, so widely divergent from that of the Thomists, this position that some of God's knowledge depends on the creature, comes, necessarily, from Suarez' original position that the will as potency can (and, in order to be free, must) determine and reduce itself to act. This must follow, for if that be true, if, physically, the will, without determination by God, reduces itself to act, then, since God must know that determination, His knowledge of it can only be knowledge depending on the human agent. That position is rooted deep in the formula that what is potential can, by its own eminent actuality, reduce itself to formal act.

VI. Suarez, having conceived physical premotion and predetermination as impossible, explains God's providence with regard to our free acts through predefinition. In itself this predefinition is, " a certain eternal decree of the divine will by

[476] *Ibid.*, Liber III, cap. 14.

which it absolutely establishes that something be done in time"; it precedes foreknowledge of the future act and it decrees, absolutely, the act. There is no predetermining or necessitating of the human will involved because the execution of this absolute predefinition takes the form of applying a means (to the predefined end) which means infallibly attracts the will, though it does not necessitate it; the human consent to this means is certain from divine foreknowledge. The connection between predefinition and the execution of the act of the second agent is thus founded in divine foreknowledge plus providence, not in the physical efficacy of a decree determining the human will to one thing.[477]

With all this, again, the Thomist must disagree. He argues that the will since, it is a free potency, is of itself undetermined that it shall or shall not consent to this means (the medium through which the predefinition is executed). The will is, according to Suarez' system, physically not predetermined by God; it would therefore be impossible (supposing that God does not predetermine the human will) that God foreknow the consent of man to this means. Thus God's perfect providence of our free actions could not be saved in the way Suarez explains. But if one grants the Suarezian concept of potency, if one supposes that the human will as a potency eminently contains its own act, it is then apparent that much of the difficulty the Thomist has with this position is removed. If the will, as a power, eminently contains its own act then that act is actually, eminently, in the will; there truly is something there for God to know. Here again, therefore (while admittedly difficulties do remain), this basic judgment that the potential can itself be somehow actual seems to be the foundation which renders possible and explicable another of the great issues which divide the Suarezian and Thomistic schools.

VII. The judgment (found so often in the pages of Suarez and used by him as something in the nature of principle) that predetermination of the human will would be necessitation of

[477] *Ibid.*, Liber I, cap. 16.

it is another very great point of difference between him and the Thomists. The latter teach that the will is as a free power so potential and indifferent that without determination it can never have its connatural free act; its very nature demands that it be reduced to a determined act. Suarez teaches that if the will received its act from an extrinsic agent it would be necessitated, not free, [478] that predetermination would be necessitation,[479] that it is the same thing to say that the will is not necessitated by something other than itself as to say that it is not determined to one by that other.[480] The notion, then, that determination is necessitation is truly a principle which Suarez uses again and again. Thomists maintain that determination is a genus containing under it, as species, determination which is contingent, and determination which is necessary.

Why should Suarez go on repeating and so often using the judgment that determination is necessitation? The answer lies in his concept that the will as a potency, is so eminently actual that it reduces itself to formal act. Conceive the will as an eminent actuality which by nature *can* and (in order to be free) must reduce itself to formal act, and you must conceive that the will's connatural way of operating freely is to operate without determination from any other agent. Therefore, if the human will in a given instance *is* determined by another agent, then that act is altogether outside the way in which the human will does act freely. The act, in other words is truly necessary and not free at all. If one grants Suarez' basic notions, then one must grant the conclusion that the determination of which Thomists speak would indeed be necessitation. Here, too, then the fundamental reason for this very important difference between the two schools is the omnipresent judgment about the nature of potency.

VIII. One very obvious difference between the Suarezian and Thomistic accounts of God's movement of the human will is in regard to those free acts which are sinful.[481] The Thomist

[478] *Prol. Primum*, cap. 2.
[479] *Ibid.*, cap. 4.
[480] *Disp. Meta.*, disp. XIX, sect. 6.
[481] *Opus. Primum*, Liber II, capp. 1-9.

maintains that, since the will is in potency to act and everything which is reduced from potency to act is moved by a being in act, the human will is moved by God even to acts which have a morally evil aspect. Yet it does not follow at all that God causes sin (moral evil) as such. Evil as such is not being; it is a privation of due perfection in an apt subject. As privation it has no *per se* cause but only a *per accidens* cause. So, the Thomist says, what God causes relative to a sinful act is not its sinfulness (which is not being; and God is not the Author of what is not) but its actuality, i. e., the natural being and perfection found in it. The moral defection is totally attributed to the deficiencies of the second cause, whereas the physical and metaphysical perfection of the act cannot be ultimately attributed to him. God causes actual reality, not the act's deficiency in the moral order. Suarez rejects this, arguing that if God were both to determine and concur in this act He would be a cause of sin (which is obviously impossible) for what is it to concur to an act, even determining concursus to this evil act, but to be a cause of sin?

The Thomist replies that it is not only possible but necessary that God move second causes. In moving them, however, He always respects their natures and peculiar exigencies. He moves them in a fitting way and according as they are disposed in themselves; so a thing ultimately disposed to act evilly God moves even knowing that disposition. What underlies Suarez' position is the judgment that a potency (this potency which is the will) can reduce itself to act having neither premotion nor predetermination from God. Because Suarez held that the will can act without a divine motion falling on it to determine and apply it, he could hold that God does not premove a man to the material element of an act which is evil. In Suarez' view, the very will itself as a potency can move itself to act; there is no need then to fall back on God's causality to explain the physical actuality found in any reduction of a potency to its act.

IX. Last of all we point out a most striking conclusion of Suarez with regard to God's efficacious grace, the conclusion

that (metaphysically or logically speaking) there is no inconvenience in saying that there could be a man whom God could not call efficaciously (though morally speaking that never happens) because there could be some one whom God foresees will never cooperate with grace.[482] Suarez finds it easy to safeguard divine omnipotence by appealing to God's power to impede the use of such a man's freedom. But the conclusion itself, that (metaphysically or logically speaking) there could be a man whose free acts are beyond the reach of God's efficacious grace, a man whose freedom can never be efficaciously ruled and guided by God's grace, is there and that conclusion, so far removed from Thomistic teaching, is a natural, an inevitable outgrowth of Suarez' starting point. If a power, as a power is so actual that it can reduce itself to act, and if *this* power as free *must* reduce itself to act so that God does not physically predetermine and premove it, then God's grace can not physically reach out, so to say, to guide and lead it in its free acts. Hence this freedom can indeed escape that grace of God.

Such is the Suarezion account of man's free acts: an account which is far indeed from that rendered by Thomists. For that difference there is one reason, Suarez' starting point. To it, ultimately, can be traced the great outstanding propositions in which he differs so widely from Thomism.

II. THE FREE POTENCY

Throughout our criticism of Suarez' teaching about man's free acts, the point we made was that the various teachings of Suarez which we discussed all flow from his notion that the human will as a potency can reduce itself to act. That notion comes from his position about the very nature of potency and act. The possibility, therefore, of Suarez' teachings on the acts of man's free faculty hinges upon that famous conception of potency and act concerning which so much has already been said here. But we can not afford to overlook the point that

[482] *Ibid.*, Liber III, cap. 14, n. 16.

Suarez did not teach that potency *must* reduce itself to act, nor that all potency does in fact so reduce itself. However, he does say that *this* potency which is a free operative faculty does reduce itself. We saw that at the very beginning of the previous section. Now why did Suarez teach that? We know this much: Suarez' teaching about man's free *acts* rests upon his doctrine about the nature of a free power. We know also that the very possibility of Suarez' doctrine about the free power rests upon his more general doctrine that at least some potency can be eminently actual. However, we do not yet know *why* he maintained that a *free* potency *must* be a potency which is of itself so actual that it can reduce itself to act without a distinct premotion. Until we know this we have not fully seen the basis of the Suarezian teaching.

The answer to the problem is a very old one. Suarez realized that freedom is a property which includes (if it is not identical with) indifference, active indifference in virtue of which a faculty can determine itself to act. The really vital question about man's *liberum arbitrium* is this: what faculty or faculties enter into its act? On the answer to that question depends the kind of indifference one shall posit as necessary to freedom. St. Thomas answers that this faculty is " none other than intellect and will "; [483] " a free judgment of reason "; [484] and he explains that " the root of liberty is the will as a subject but reason as a cause; for the will can bear on different things because of this that reason can have different concepts of the good." [485] St. Thomas, then, while recognising that the *liberum arbitrium* is not a distinct faculty from the will is far indeed from minimizing the role of intellect in freedom. Election, the proper act of the *liberum arbitrium*, is, for him, substantially

[483] *Ergo* liberum arbitrium non est aliud ab utroque; liberum arbitrium non est potentia separata a voluntate et ratione; non videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit alia potentia a voluntate et ratione (*II Sent.*, d. 23, q. 19, 3).

[484] Liberum arbitrium . . . definitur esse *liberum de ratione judicium* (*II Cont. Gent.*, c. 48).

[485] Radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subjectum sed sicut causa est ratio. . . . Ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones veri (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 17 a. 1, ad 2um).

an act of will, but *formally* an *act of reason*, for the form supplied by reason enters in to fashion, so to speak, the act of the free will. As a consequence its act can never be necessitated with respect to partial goods simply because it is, formally, from the intellect. Man has, through reason, a norm (which is the universal good) and so can always compare this particular good with that universal norm. Seeing the object and act as partial, particular things, inadequate to his appetite for universal good, he can not be necessitated with regard to them, for only those volitional acts of man can be necessary which regard universal good. Hence from the very fact that the act of *liberum arbitrium* is formally an *arbitrium*, i. e., a *judgment*, it is metaphysically impossible that that act ever be necessary with regard to a particular thing known to be such.

Suarez, as we have seen, had a quite different notion about human freedom as a faculty. To be sure, he derived that free faculty from man's intellectual nature, but practically speaking he divorced intellect from will in the order of operation. That divorce is what basically divides Suarez' account of man's free faculty from the Thomistic account, just as his judgment about the nature of potency and act is that which basically divides his teaching about free acts from the Thomistic teaching on the same point. Having divorced the two, he could still preserve freedom maintaining that its indifference is such indifference of a faculty with respect to its acts, that without divine premotion the will can move to act. In other words, it is a power indifferent in the sense that it has such dominion over its own acts that it can *of itself* move itself without God's premotion to this act or to that act, or not move itself at all, just as it chooses. He does, in fact, indicate that indifference as liberty. In doing so he made it inevitable that he should teach the doctrines about free acts which we have already discussed.

1. *The Central Doctrine.* We have already seen that for Suarez the will is the *liberum arbitrium*. The proposition that the will is properly the subject of freedom (since election, the free act, is substantially a volitional act) is admitted by all. But what Suarez really taught was that the will *alone* of human

faculties is the *per se* cause of free acts, and in that lies the root difficulty. We have seen that he argues that knowledge is a *per accidens* cause of the act of an appetite. Again he teaches that the appetite cannot use the formal apprehension (of the object) since it exists in another faculty, and that an appetite is of itself constituted in first act and needs no form to constitute it in first act.[486]

It is certain that an appetite is, in its being and without other modification, an inclination to some good. It does not follow, the Thomist argues, that, because an appetite is such in its very being, the will, is also with regard *to any operation*, without previous modification, a tendency in first act. If no form determines the will to this object it can never will this object, for its *natural* tendency is to the good in general, not to particular goods. Yet in fact the will tends to existing, concrete objects; hence, even in first act it must somehow be modified in order to tend to such concrete goods, by a modification which can only be from knowledge. Even with regard to the good-in-general the will is not of itself on the order of *operation* in first act. That good is the object of no particular act of will, but rather the ratio or driving force of every voluntary act. But Suarez' mind in this matter is abundantly clear: the human will alone, without an essentially causal modification coming from reason, is the principle of the free act. The free act has no essential, causal dependence on any faculty other than the will. Suarez did not merely divorce intellect from will in the free operation of the latter. He also freed the intellect and other faculties from any motion by the will which is, philosophically, *per se* efficacious, maintaining that the will's motion of them is a moral motion, an efficacy which is, philosophically speaking, *per accidens*.

That Suarez did not penetrate the interplay of reason and will in a free act seems evident, too, from his argumentation against the Thomistic position that intellect determines will finally and that will determines intellect efficiently.[487] In that

[486] *De Anima*, Liber V, capp. 2-3.

[487] *Disp. Meta.*, disp. XIX, sect. 6.

argument Suarez takes the judgment of reason to be the application of the object to the will, an act which precedes the free choice. In a case where true choice is to be made the application is rather counsel (the proposition of many objects) than a final judgment. What Suarez conceives as intellectual proposition of the object is actually the free choice itself on its intellectual side: it is the ultimate judgment by which man freely determines himself to the selected means. Suarez did not make this " application of the object " an essential part of the free act; he made it a preceding act. Suarez then failed quite completely to see that the acts of the *liberum arbitrium* contain in their very essence an intellectual side; he did not understand that free choice is in fact rational, formally speaking. Suarez says that the formula: " a judgment must determine will," is false in the sense that intellect first judges: " this is to be elected," for that would be opposed to the liberty of the will. In fact, intellect does judge " this is to be elected " and without prejudice to the free act, for that judgment is precisely the intellectual phase of the free act.

There can be no doubt then as to the fact: Suarez did teach a divorce of intellect and will in the order of operation. The will is not, philosophically speaking, a *per se* efficient mover of intellect, and intellect is not a *per se* cause of a voluntary act; therefore it is not a *per se* cause of that voluntary act which is a free act. Hence, and here is the important conclusion, freedom can not be simply the dominion of the faculty over its own act coming from the fact that the object of the act is manifested by reason as something indifferent, i. e., inadequate to the appetite of good in general. Yet liberty does certainly imply indifference. So, Suarez, to safeguard human freedom, appealed to the indifference in the will itself, an indifference he conceived as complete active indifference by which the will is so active *that it can determine its own indifference without predetermination by God.* Suarez never fully understood the intimate and intricate connection of intellect and will in any voluntary act. He divorced those two faculties; he saved the free power by maintaining that it is an eminently actual thing,

and in that lies the root of all disagreement between him and Thomists.

2. *Consequential Teachings.* To avoid all ambiguity, we must realize that in describing the free faculty as "active" Suarez does not use the term as it is frequently used among Scholastics, i. e., as naming a faculty whose act is transient. Suarez, of course, said that the act of the free power is an immanent act, and therefore he classifies that power as "passive" in the technical use of the term.[488] His meaning is clear: the free will is active in the sense that its act is not a received act as, let us say, the act of existence is received into created essences (according to Thomists). Suarez' reason for insisting on the active quality of the free power is clear: what is received cannot be rejected. If the will receives its act it cannot reject that act, and hence is not free, for freedom is power to act and not-act. Thus the quality of being active is posited as a necessary consequence of the will's indifference.

This basic doctrine is clearly opposed to the Thomists for, as we have seen, they teach that the will does receive actuation. Yet, from the actuation necessity does not follow because *liberum arbitrium* is an appetite which is intellectual, and which therefore, cannot, under any circumstances, be necessitated with regard to certain objects, no matter how it is moved toward them. The patient, Suarez says, is never free to reject or accept motion; when the agent moves the patient, the latter is moved necessarily. On the contrary, the Thomist says the will is of such a nature that it can not possibly be moved to any partial good as to something which necessitates it. The very nature of the will indicates that. The will can tend to a thing only as that thing is known, through intellectual knowledge. When a particular thing is known to be a partial, incomplete good, the will can tend to it only as to a partial good, i. e., as to something the appetition of which is contingent—always and necessarily contingent, since the will has as the object of its natural (and, therefore, necessary)

[488] *Prol. Primum*, cap. 2, nn. 1-6.

tendency only the complete and perfect good. Therefore, even when the will receives motion to act it does not act necessarily; since, in nature, the will is of such disposition that it cannot be necessitated by this motion then the motion does not necessitate it. Yet given this motion of God there is truly a necessity of infallibility about the action. This does not deny freedom of exercise. The very act is a judged object of the *liberum arbitrium*. The act itself is known and judged to be something contingent, i. e., to be something which is not the perfect good, and which is not connected by a line of strict necessity with the perfect good. Hence, the act, when placed, is seen and valued as a contingent thing without which the end of the will (the necessary thing) can be attained. Thus the very exercise of the act still is free.

The motion under discussion is adapted to the will, since God moves things according to their natures. Under this motion the will elects this act as a thing known not to be necessary to it; the motion, therefore, is motion to a contingent and not to a necessary act, even though the act infallibly follows. The necessity (of infallibility) is from the efficacy of God moving the will; the act is still free from the nature of the will, as St. Thomas makes clear. As long as the will tends to a good known to be incomplete (and even the exercise of the act is such a good) the will can not possibly act otherwise than freely and still retain its nature. Hence the freedom of the will does not postulate that it be active in the Suarezian sense; one can still reconcile freedom with divine motion by appealing to the intellectual nature of a free act.

Suarez again and again, though in slightly different forms, uses the same argument, i. e., if the will receives determination prior to its act it is not free. He writes that from a previous supposition comes necessity, but not from a subsequent supposition.[489] The answer already given is valid here, too. A previous supposition falling on a thing which by nature can not be necessitated does not necessitate the thing in its opera-

[489] *Ibid.*, cap. 6, n. 7.

tion. The will by its very nature can be necessitated by no supposition (even previous) because in respect of a partial good man always acts dominatively. He always sees the contingency of his act (unless reason is impeded) and has the real power to reconsider his judgment and elect not to act. Suarez attempts to prove that, contrary to Thomists' teaching, some necessity of consequence is opposed to liberty, saying that in the argumentation " man sees God, therefore, man loves Him " there is necessity of consequence, but yet no liberty. The necessity is necessity of consequent, not, the Thomist answers, of consequence, for the nature of man's will absolutely demands that man love God once he sees Him. The proposition therefore is in necessary matter, not contingent.

Why, in the physical order, did Suarez, contrary to the Thomists, postulate this peculiar active quality of the will in virtue of which the very faculty without premotion can move to act? Simply because of his failure to understand that, because the will is an intellectual appetite, its act with regard to any partial good must always be free, and therefore, *liberum arbitrium* is free even as moved by God, even in receiving its act from God. Because he did not see that, he safeguarded human freedom by appealing to this " active quality ". Having by his divorce of intellect and will, blocked off the will's being free from the intellectual nature of its act, he saved freedom by positing a potency so actual as to need no divine motion to premove it.

From the doctrine that intellect is not a *per se* cause of voluntary act, it follows at once that the will without regulation by the intellect can act. That doctrine is in Suarez. Thus, he says that some free volitions are had without a determining judgment, i. e., the will, undetermined by a judgment, acts.[490] Reason precedes volition even in the first act, the Thomist says, for in that act, God directly moves both intellect and will, but in an ordered way; the intellect in that act, as in all others, is the first mover of the will in the order of specification.

[490] *Disp. Meta.*, disp. XIX, sect. 6, nn. 2-3.

Suarez supposes that the will can be ultimate. The position that the will's own freedom is the unique reason for the choice of one of several equally eligible means [491] amounts to just that; it is an assertion that will can act without reason's regulation. The fact, according to Thomists, is that will, since it is a rational appetite, always follows reason, i. e., it chooses the more convenient (i. e., the better, at least apparently better) object. In the case of means apprehended as equally good, the will can not select one until reason indicates some aspect in it which, in fact, makes it better than the other goods, as St. Thomas says. But Suarez' position is clear: the will of itself is (in the order of second cause) sufficient to account for the choice. Consider, again, Suarez' statement that it is not absolutely necessary that an error of judgment precede a sinful act.[492] It follows that, absolutely speaking, a man can know what is right (judge properly) and in that act choose what is wrong. That is a very clear revelation of Suarez' mind in this matter. It supposes not merely that reason does not here and now regulate the volitional act; it even supposes that reason and will can be in open contradiction and yet an act follows. It is transparently clear that he conceived the free power as (*per se*) exclusively volitional, able to act in defiance of the reason which, according to Thomists, is of its very essence. Most certainly that position can rest only on the notion that intellect and will are not intimately interwoven in any free act.

Suarez, in common with Scholastics generally, teaches that indifference is necessary for freedom. But the question is what does indifference mean; does Suarez mean by it precisely what the Thomist means? It is clear that by indifference Suarez understands an eminent indetermination in virtue of which the indifferent faculty can, without God's predetermination determine itself, so that as the will is really for act it is, proximately, equally prepared as to both act and non-act.[493] That is not the Thomistic conception of the indifference of the will. The

[491] Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 12-14.
[492] *Ibid.*, sect. 7, nn. 9-11.
[493] *Prol. Primum*, cap. 2, 5; *Opus. Primum*, Liber I, cap. 1.

Thomist agrees that the faculty is, of itself, determined to neither alternative; as it is ready for act it is *predetermined* to act by God Himself. Yet man is still free because he can reflect upon this act he is about to place; he can compare it with the norm reason supplies (the good in general), see the deficiencies of this act and so he can not act. Hence, for a Thomist indifference or freedom does not suppose indetermination in the faculty as that faculty is proximately ready for act. But why did Suarez require this indifference (which is indetermination) even when the will is ready for act? Here again the fundamental reason is Suarez' divorce of intellect from will. In the face of that separation he found it easy to safeguard the faculty's dominion over its own act through such indifference.

Had Suarez admitted the Thomistic position that the will is indifferent precisely because reason proposes to it objects which are presented as partial goods and which are therefore incapable of causing a necessary act of the will, had he seen that as a consequence even the act of selecting such a good must be itself an object elected as a merely partial good, he would have seen that the dominative power of the will as that faculty is proximately disposed to act does not require indifference in the sense of indetermination. The will can be determined and free because, even in choosing, this object is known through reason to be a contingent good, the willing of which can be omitted without the will's losing its end, and in that power is true and sufficient dominion over the act. After all, our freedom is analogous to that of God, yet God's free acts are from all eternity, determined. Suarez answers that God's eternal determination does not destroy his freedom because it comes from that freedom. The Thomist adds that the determination of the human faculty comes from that free faculty, too, though not as that is unmoved by God since any potency, free or otherwise, must be reduced to act and, as a potency, can not reduce itself. We know that God is determined because we know that He is immutable pure act; we know that He is free because we know that certain objects cannot possibly necessitate His will since those objects are merely partial goods. No degree of

immutability can necessitate freedom, granted such objects; and, analogously, no degree of determination destroys man's freedom provided he is presented with objects known to be merely partial goods. Hence, for the Thomist there is no contradiction between freedom and predetermination. But for Suarez there is, because in his system man's reason does not enter into the act of *liberum arbitrium* as a *per se* cause. Therefore, the indifference (with respect to objects) rooted in that act of reason does not enter as a *per se* modification of the free act; hence if the faculty is determined by God there can be not left sufficient indifference to safeguard liberty.

Another of the conditions posited by Suarez as necessary to man's free faculty is that it have complete active and dominative power over its free acts.[494] No Thomist will quarrel with the statement that the *liberum arbitrium* has active, dominative power over its acts, for that faculty, under God's motion, does truly determine itself; its act is certainly under its dominion. The difficulty is with what Suarez understands by the *complete* power of the faculty; and there can be no doubt as to what that is. Suarez means simply that the created free faculty can move to second act without distinct premotion, predetermination. We know that Suarez *could* hold that because he held that it is not repugnant that the potential be, itself, somehow actual. Why did he hold that *this* potency *as free* must move without premotion? Having denied to intellect any *per se* causality with respect to a free act he could not explain the fact of human freedom by appealing to the role of intellect in free acts, but it was an easy matter, in light of Suarez' notion of potency to safeguard that freedom by making the will " completely active and dominative ". Here, too, there is a constant pattern; the possibility of Suarez' teaching on free acts rests upon his notion of potency and act, that those notions of potency and act were inevitably applied in treating of human freedom rests upon the concept of the divorce of intellect from will. Once they were divorced, Suarez' concept

[494] *Prol. Primum*, cap. 2, nn. 10-12.

of potency and act was a very natural way for him to explain the fact of man's liberty.

That the will as it is proximately disposed for act must be equally " expedited " for both act and non-act Suarez insists.[495] The Thomist of course argues that the will under God's motion is truly unimpeded for act and non-act, yet precisely as ready for act it does not regard both in the same way, for actions are individual determined things. Any agent proximately disposed to act must be disposed to an individual determined thing; he must not be indifferent to a disjunction. The indifferent faculty Suarez posits (an eminent thing capable of self determination without God's premotion) is in harmony with and supposed to, this teaching. Suarez maintains that to suppose that the will must, as disposed for act, be determined to one thing means that it is proximately impotent as to one part of its power, therefore not free.

Thomists answer that with determination freedom is not lost, for the faculty still has dominion over its act since both act and object are contingent not necessary things; and man, knowing that, can reconsider and in light of new counsel not act. God's determining motion is not motion to act in a way which violates the nature of the free power; it is motion to an act the object of which is judged to be a contingent good. Hence the act with respect to it is always revocable. Such motion as that does not destroy the freedom of the act or of the faculty, the Thomist argues; that motion is a true cause of the being of the act and of its being free. What underlies Suarez' argument? The assumption that the will is free in the sense that, with no distinct premotion, it actuates itself. Having accepted the Scotistic divorce of intellect from will (in operating) Suarez saved the fact of liberty in this way. Consider a free act as *per se* dependent on intellect and another avenue lies open.

Suarez continues that, supposing Divine premotion, the will does not have a proximately free power, for the condition for its not-acting (namely, the withdrawal of God's motion) would

[495] *Ibid.*, nn. 13-15; *Opus. Primum*, Liber I, capp. 1, 2.

not be under the will's power.[496] According to Thomists, even under divine motion the will has in its power the condition for its not-acting, namely, the imperation of a contrary judgment. The divine motion is a motion to the proper act of a faculty which has that power; it is not a motion which changes the intrinsic nature of the free faculty. One cannot find anything to truly exemplify God's motion of the will. Anything other than the will is naturally and necessarily determined to one act only; but the *liberum arbitrium* can never be necessitated because of its peculiar object. But, Suarez writes, an act in which the power is determined is not free since the act does not have the note of freedom except from the faculty which, in the case, is determined and not free.[497] That is the concept of freedom as active indifference carried to a logical conclusion; liberty is conceived as a disjunction existing in man, both parts of which disjunction are ready to leap into act. Actually, *liberum arbitrium* is one faculty bearing in each act on one object with regard to which it can actually have at one time only one attitude, although the contrary or contradictory attitude is always possible since the faculty must bear on this object in that way, i. e., recognizing it as contingent. Therefore even as determined by God the will must remain free.

The essential thing in all this discussion is that what is basically in question is the very nature of freedom. Can the free will be determined, yet free? Yes, the Thomist says. Because its act is formally an act of reason, a judgment indicating the merely partial goodness of this object, man has such dominance over that act that he can reconsider and elect not to act for he knows that this act is not necessary. Suarez can not accept freedom of that kind; he has already judged that a free act is so much an act of will that reason is not a *per se* cause of it. Hence the note of freedom cannot adequately be preserved by appealing to the influence of intellect. Freedom becomes the will's own active and dominative power to determine itself without God's distinct predetermination. To such freedom as that, predetermination is patently opposed.

[496] *Ibid.*, cap. 3, nn. 12-15.

[497] *Ibid.*, cap. 2.

Intimately connected with his failure to penetrate the Thomistic doctrine on the will as an intellectual appetite, is Suarez' explicit teaching that agents extrinsic to the will can necessitate the will with respect to partial goods. We read, for instance, that the act of a created will can be truly voluntary and therefore free of coaction, yet necessary because impelled by an extrinsic cause.[498] Again, Suarez says that to deny that God can necessitate the will with regard to indifferent objects is to deny God's omnipotence.[499] These are but a few examples of the doctrine. Thomists say that it is a metaphysical impossibility for God, even by His absolute power (and *a fortiori* for anyone else) to move the will in such a way as to make its act with respect to a partial good, known to be partial, a necessary act. The reason we have already seen. The *liberum arbitrium* moves to an object as the object is known to be a partial good only, a good which does not adequate the norm which man has of the perfect good. Man can not possibly will this object then as though it were the perfect good, since will follows knowledge. Since he cannot will it as the perfect good he can not will it necessarily, for he sees that it can be willed or not willed without either attaining or losing the perfect good (which he does will necessarily). As partial good the object has defects, imperfections. Whatever is known to have defects can never be willed necessarily, for man knows that the act of will bearing on it does not have to be; he can change his consideration from the good aspects of the object to the evil. Thus, whether he wills it or not, the act is contingent, and can be nothing other than contingent. To attribute to God's omnipotence power to change all this and to move the will so that it acts in a necessary way for a contingent object is to ask the impossible; for it demands that the *liberum arbitrium* become, under God's motion, not what it is, namely, an appetite which follows reason. But Suarez can maintain this possibility. In Suarez' eyes, therefore, any predetermining motion falling on the will can only necessitate its act. He teaches

[498] *Prol. Primum*, cap. 1.

[499] *Ibid.*, cap. 4.

that simply because he did not admit that an act of *liberum arbitrium* is formally an act of reason which manifests the inadequacy of this object (and act). Therefore, the act of willing or not willing the object can only be free, granted reason's operation, no matter how the will is predetermined.

How could God physically determine the will, which He can do only by necessitating it? God necessitates the will Suarez writes, by effectively restraining its natural power of resisting God's help.[500] This is his conclusion, then, that God's physical predetermination of this human faculty can only be something contrary to the connatural way in which this faculty acts, something which impedes the faculty from operating in the way its very nature (according to Thomists) demands. The very possibility of this teaching lies in the notion that a human potency can be such as naturally to need no premotion by God. The teaching that God's physical premotion can only necessitate proximately rests on the supposition that intellect does not enter as a *per se* cause of a free act. One who does maintain that causality of reason in this free act sees how the act cannot be other than free.

From this study of the teachings of Suarez it seems to us most evident that his teachings on human liberty so different in themselves from those of the Thomists, do in fact, rest upon the two principles we have indicated. Those principles are the final reason for the differences between Suarezian congruism and Thomism. And the fact that those two principles are so ultimate, each in its own order, has been the explanation of the continuing disagreement of the two schools. Agreement between them shall be reached (saving an intervention on the part of the Church herself) only in that day in which the two schools shall come to see eye to eye on the nature of potency and act on the very nature of a free power. Then and only then shall their differences be reconciled; then and only then shall there be harmony in their teaching.

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[500] *Ibid.*, cap. 5.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Eternal Quest. By William R. O'Connor. New York: Longmans, Green, 1947. Pp. 290, with index. $4.00.

Father O'Connor, professor of dogmatic theology at St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie, gives us in the present volume "the outgrowth of an article written in 1940 for *The New Scholasticism* and of a doctoral dissertation submitted to Fordham University in 1943."

"Students of St. Thomas," he says (p. 1), "are aware of the problem he has bequeathed to his successors in his celebrated doctrine of a natural desire for the vision of God. Men of the caliber of Cajetan and Suarez in the past and of Billot in the present have found this teaching *difficult* and even *ambiguous*. This is about the only point of agreement among the commentators when they undertake to explain what St. Thomas meant by this enigmatic desire."

He says later: "We cannot overlook the fact that the commentators and exegetes are not in agreement, no matter how confidently some of them may undertake to speak for St. Thomas on this question. Is it possible that the difficulty lies not with St. Thomas but with his interpreters? Could they have brought to this problem certain preoccupations and conceptions of their own which were foreign to the mind of St. Thomas and which, accordingly, serve only to confuse the issue? If this is the case, the commentators have to a large extent created their own problem, a problem that ought to be on the way to a solution if these foreign elements can be detected and removed. The main thing is to see the issue as St. Thomas himself saw it, free from the prejudicial influences of later years" (p. 30).

Following Father Brisbois, S. J., whose article appeared in 1936 in the *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, the author sums up into four groups all the explanations given so far on St. Thomas' "desire for God." "These groups follow the four great commentators, Bañez, Cajetan, Soto, and Sylvester of Ferrara. . . . These four have set the pattern, as it were, for all subsequent interpretations. Allowing for certain variations in expression and detail, no major departures from their views are discernible from their day to the present" (p. 25). As the author remarks: "Surely all four (main interpretations) cannot be equally right. Is any of them the correct interpretation? There is always the possibility that the difficulty lies not with St. Thomas but with his interpreters" (p. 71). Bañez and Cajetan, in fact, "are mainly preoccupied with safeguarding the transcendence of the supernatural" (p. 26 ff.). "This preoccupation with the Natural Versus Supernatural opposition certainly underlies the interpretation of Cajetan and Bañez" (p. 71; cf. pp. 30, 38).

It might seem strange that every preoccupation should be misleading or,

at least, suspicious. When Leo XIII was urging Catholic bishops to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas, and to spread it as far as they could for the refutation of errors that were gaining ground, because the Angelic Doctor not only had vanquished all errors of ancient times but supplies also an armory of weapons which brings us certain victory in the conflict with falsehoods ever springing up in the course of years (the Encyclical *Aeterni Patris*), he certainly was not partaking of Father O'Connor's pessimistic view. Were we ourselves to partake of it, we should declare misleading or suspicious his own new essay because the preoccupation that "the teaching of St. Thomas has become encrusted with the ideas and terminology of commentators and interpreters of later ages" (p. 1), which undoubtedly and strongly inclined the latter to read into St. Thomas their own viewpoints and conceptions (p. 2), underlies, without a doubt, his present effort.

Further, if Bañez and Cajetan are to be rejected on the ground that they were preoccupied, why does the author depart from Soto and from Sylvester of Ferrara who were not under any preoccupation? It is because of the influence that Scotus, he says, exercised on them. This influence of Scotus is not confined to terminology as far as the first interpreter is concerned; Soto depends on Scotus in several doctrinal points and especially in his natural desire, altogether innate, by way of *pondus naturae* (pp. 56-65). But Sylvester of Ferrara who "rejects the Scotistic interpretation of the natural desire of God in terms of a purely natural tendency or ordination of finality" (p. 65), is under Scotus' influence rather for his terminology. Then a new question arises: why could we not discuss a problem in the light of St. Thomas' doctrine using the terminology of Duns Scotus? Suarez is presented by Father O'Connor himself as keeping Scotus' terminology (p. 60) and subscribing, in spite of that, to Cajetan's doctrine (pp. 61 ff.) on this controversy about the natural desire for God.

Abstracting from most of the statements made by Father O'Connor against the outstanding representatives of the four main interpretations because, besides the fact that some of them could be easily challenged, all pertain to the preliminary, destructive part of the book, I pass to the exposition and criticism of his principal contention which is given as the constructive portion of the volume. According to Father O'Connor, commentators have misunderstood St. Thomas's desire for the vision of God, explaining it, in the field of psychology, as a tendency of the will, while the Angelic Doctor was speaking of it, in the way we must speak of it, in the field of metaphysics, as a tendency, a necessary tendency, of the intellect (pp. 10, 94, 137, 147, 156, 166, 180, *et passim*).

This is Father O'Connor's theory: For St. Thomas *appetere* extends as widely as *tendere* (p. 94); natural appetite and natural desire are equivalent terms (p. 96). After finding the place for natural appetite within the

broad line of final causality, the Angelic Doctor rooted it also in formal causality. Because the tendency is rooted in and flows from the nature of the object in which it is found, it is properly called natural tendency or desire (p. 98). "Natural desire is not merely an *ordo ad finem*, a relation dignified with the title of transcendental relation of finality. This element is certainly present in natural desire, but there is an equally important element, and that is *inclinatio in finem*. This inclination comes not from without but from within. It comes from the form, which is the *principium* of a spontaneous tendency towards the end" (p. 106).

All natural things being inclined towards their ends by God, their author, they have received from Him natural principles through which they are intrinsically directed and moved to those ends, which they consequently seek by natural appetite, tendency or desire (p. 103 ff.). What is true of natural appetite of things in general is true also of natural appetite in each of the various powers of the soul: each has a determined tendency towards its proper object and activity, the sense of sight, to seeing colored objects and not to hearing sounds (p. 111). "Natural appetite, accordingly, is an inclination that is found in every nature and in every power of nature. Natures and powers are innately inclined by God towards their proper ends and activities through the natural forms that He has given" (p. 116).

The intellect, then, has a natural tendency, inclination, appetite, or desire for the acquisition of knowledge (p. 136). Hence, it seeks to know the causes of the effects already known and is not satisfied to reach a knowledge of the existence of the cause but naturally looks further to the knowledge of its essence (p. 147). "The natural desire for God is simply the culmination of our natural intellectual curiosity" (p. 149).

This does not mean, as Father O'Connor warns us, that there is a separate little will attached to each of man's powers and consequently to the human intellect; as the good of each power pertains to the good of the whole man, the special power called the will inclines all the powers of the soul to its proper operation and thus embraces in its tendency the good of all other powers (p. 139 ff.). But, even when the human will is interested in the acquirement of knowledge by the intellect, it is not for the sake of knowledge but for the reason that knowledge is good, good for the intellect as well as for man (p. 164). Thus, if after knowing God's existence we wish to know His essence, it is not the divine essence as such, but the knowledge of the divine essence that appeals to the will as something good for the intellect and good for man to possess (p. 166).

A natural desire, such as has been just described, does not need being fulfilled. "St. Thomas is careful to deny that such a tendency must be satisfied, or that its existence proves that it will be satisfied. All he claims is that this tendency would not be there if it were not possible, at least, for it to be satisfied" (p. 141). Again: "Nature does not tend towards

an end or perfection that is impossible of attainment. This would mean that a natural form is tending by nature to an end that is not an end. Yet, beyond this possibility of attainment, the presence of the natural desire tells us absolutely nothing as to whether the attainment will ever be actually realized" (p. 149 ff.). Hence: "It is true that to arrive at such a vision (namely of God) the intellect needs to be elevated and strengthened above its natural powers. No reason exists, however, why any created intellect cannot, by itself, tend towards a more complete and perfect knowledge of anything of which it already has the minimum knowledge that it exists" (p. 150) Finally: "The mere presence of this natural, instinctive tendency to know what God is in Himself after His existence is known sufficiently indicates for St. Thomas the possibility of the vision of God, even though this possibility were never to be actually realized. No natural inclination is possible towards anything intrinsically impossible, although a natural tendency may be prevented from reaching its term by the presence of an impediment. The vision of the first truth, God, does not lie outside the range of possibility for a created intellect. If it did, we could not speak of a natural desire for this vision. The created intellect, however, needs to be elevated and strengthened before it can actually see God. Once this obstacle is removed by grace and the *lumen gloriae*, nothing will prevent the natural desire from reaching its term" (p. 181).

Let us close this summary of Father O'Connor's position with a few lines on the question of infants who die unbaptized and who are assigned to Limbo as their eternal tenement. "Knowing nothing about the vision of God as the end of man and his true beatitude, they have no natural desire for God under this aspect; consequently, they do not feel that they have lost true happiness in losing Him. . . . At the same time they have a natural desire for knowledge that is not and cannot be satisfied short of a direct vision of God, which in their case will never be realized. Anyone in this position must feel the *angustia* which Aristotle and all the *praeclara ingenia* of antiquity (to say nothing of ourselves) felt from the impossibility of having their intellectual craving for truth satisfied with anything less than a knowledge of the first truth" (p. 195 ff.).

Were I not among the writers on this particular problem, I would say that St. Thomas providentially left it unsolved so that the *praeclara ingenia* (3 *C. Gentes*, 48) of his disciples would feel that *angustia* of explaining what he meant by this enigmatic desire. To the long list of former commentators, Bañez, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Soto, Suarez, Sylvester of Ferrara, etc., and of modern writers, Brisbois, Cuervo, Doucet, Enrico di S. Teresa, Fernandez, Gardeil, Garrigou-Lagrange, Laporta, Roland-Gosselin, Ritzler, Sestili, Trancho, Vallaro, Yelle, etc., we must add Fr. O'Connor who decidedly intends to deliver us finally from that *angustia*. Has he succeeded?

Here is what I honestly think: Leaving aside the numerous texts in which St. Thomas attributes the desire for knowledge to man or to man's will, rather than to his intellect, and not considering that the reason for attributing it at times to the intellect is that he is dealing with formal beatitude (cf. I-II, q. 4, a. 2), I would say that the fundamental question is this: is it man's eye that sees, man's intellect that understands, man's will that wills, or is it rather man who sees by his eyes, understands by his intellect and wills by his will? I favor the second viewpoint: *it is man who wills and wills by his will.* Thus I understand why the virtue of studiousness, like the contrary vice of curiosity, is located by St. Thomas, not in the intellect but in the will (II-II, q. 166), and why the *studium cognoscendi* is given by Cajetan as an *actus voluntatis passive in potentiis cognoscitivis existens.* (In II-II, q. 166, a. 1, n. 4.)

Consequently, if the desire for God's vision be said to be the culmination of natural intellectual curiosity, it belongs to the virtue of studiousness to keep that desire of the will within reasonable limits, since *potest esse vitium ex ipsa inordinatione appetitus et studii ad discendam veritatem . . . , inquantum aliquis studet ad cognoscendam veritatem supra proprii ingenii facultatem* (II-II, q. 167, a. 1). And as it is but the virtuous man who has a right to tell us in what real happiness consists (I-II, q. 1, a. 7), even those words of St. Thomas which are presumed (p. 192) deliberately to have been omitted in Q. 5, *De Malo,* find here their suitable place: *Ex hoc quod caret aliquis eo quod suam proportionem excedit, non affligitur, si sit rectae rationis* (In 2 Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 2). And if we were to speak, as Fr. O'Connor does, of the *lumen gloriae* as removing an impediment or an obstacle on the part of the intellect (pp. 79, 181, 190), we have in mind a distinction made by the Angelic Doctor: *Dupliciter aliquid impeditur ab alio. Uno modo, per modum contrarietatis, sicut frigus impedit actionem caloris: et tale impedimentum operationis repugnat felicitati. Alio modo, per modum cujusdam defectus, quia scilicet res impedita non habet quidquid ad omnimodam sui perfectionem requiritur: et tale impedimentum operationis non repugnat felicitati* (I-II, q. 4, a. 5, ad 4um).

This restraining of the natural desire for the vision of God is not so arduous an act. Studiousness, like other potential parts of temperance, has to moderate a tendency which bends easily under the yoke, for as we have a natural appetite for knowledge, we also feel strongly a natural inclination to avoid hard work and application. As St. Thomas puts it: *Quantum ad cognitionem, est in homine contraria inclinatio. Quia ex parte animae, inclinatur homo ad hoc quod cognitionem rerum desideret. . . . Ex parte vero naturae corporalis, homo inclinatur ad hoc ut laborem inquirendi scientiam vitet. Quantum igitur ad primum, studiositas in refrenatione consistit: et secundum hoc ponitur pars temperantiae. Sed quantum ad secundum, laus virtutis hujusmodi consistit in quadam vehementia inten-*

tionis ad scientiam rerum percipiendam: et ex hoc nominatur (II-II, q. 166, a. 2 ad 3).

Though the knowledge of the divine essence stands as a very important acquisition, the natural desire for that knowledge differs also from the natural desire for happiness, and the more that desire is kept restricted to the intellectual and metaphysical order, the less it appears as necessarily connected with the second desire, which is volitional and psychological.

Since we see so many people who, though always and necessarily seeking after happiness, do not feel the slightest pain at their absolute ignorance in religious matters, how, if the desire for the vision of God is kept outside the field of psychology, can we speak of *angustia* in those *praeclara ingenia* of the old philosophers and in infants who die unbaptized? We cannot speak of pain, of real though metaphysical pain in eyes which actually do not see because, for instance, we deem it convenient to keep them closed; we cannot speak of experiencing real pain when most of us, knowing of the existence of Mars and wishing to know whether it is inhabited by men, still give up and resign ourselves to being ignorant.

It is a long time since I wrote a paper on the subject: "El deseo natural de ver a Dios," in *La Ciencia Tomista* (vol. 23, 1921, pp. 49-60). Even after carefully reading and rereading essays like this one of Fr. O'Connor, I still maintain that this desire is, to put it in modern terms: first, an elicited desire, for it is desire of the will following cognition on the part of the intellect, as it only after our knowing God's existence through creatures that we strive after the knowledge of His essence; secondly, a desire *formaliter* natural, because it has as its proper object the essence of the First Cause of the effects that are seen in the universe; thirdly, a desire inefficacious in Philosophy, since the knowledge of that essence is above the proportionate object of our intellect (I, q. 12, a. 4), and it is only after knowing by faith the possibility of satisfying that desire that a theologian may say with St. Thomas: *Ad perfectam beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus humanus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae* (I-II, q. 3, a. 8).

By explaining the desire under consideration as a purely intellectual tendency, Fr. O'Connor has escaped only by a miracle the danger of making it an innate desire by the way of a *pondus naturae*: his principles and his limiting of cognitional desire to sensitive appetite and to the will (pp. 110, 120 ff., 126-133, 162, 182, 234) would have spontaneously led him to it. But he has not escaped the difficulties that he himself opposes to the elicited desire just explained. If the desire of the intellect is not necessarily to be fulfilled, such as is the case with the desire attributed to the will: we have in both cases an inefficacious desire, so far as its realization is concerned. The capacity for intellectual knowledge is infinite, but the capacity for goodness in the will is infinite also. The beatific vision comes under

the adequate object of the will as much as God's essence comes under the adequate object of the intellect: *bonum et verum convertuntur*; what is *summum bonum* is also *summum verum*. If our will cannot naturally tend to the beatific vision because this vision is *formaliter* supernatural, neither can the intellect naturally tend to the knowledge of God's essence except insofar as this is *formaliter* natural, the essence of the First Cause of natural effects. If it " is not the divine essence as such, but the knowledge and vision of the divine essence that appeals to the will as something good for the intellect to possess " (p. 166), we can equally say that in the explanation I just gave it is not the divine essence as such but the possession and the fruition of that essence that appeals to the will as something good for itself to have, for we are dealing with subjective beatitude, which is something created, an operation of man (I-II, Q. 3, a. 1 f.).

We have to insist on this particular point.

It does not help, in my opinion, to say with Fr. O'Connor that the *supernatural versus natural* opposition was not a preoccupation for St. Thomas, as it was for Bañez and Cajetan. On historical grounds St. Thomas must be given due credit for his keen separation of both orders. As Leo XIII says of him: " Carefully distinguishing reason from faith, as is right, and yet joining them together in a harmony of friendship, he so guarded the rights of each, and so watched over the dignity of each, that, as far as man is concerned, reason can now hardly rise higher than she rose, borne up in the flight of Thomas; and faith can hardly gain more helps and greater helps from reason than those which Thomas gave her " (Enc. *Aeterni Patris*). And when Fr. O'Connor tells us that " St. Thomas does not speak of an obediential potency in the created intellect to know God as He is in Himself " (p. 264), or " of an obediential potency either for happiness or for the vision of God " (p. 37), I have nothing to do but to remind him of the quotation given on p. 13, where the Angelic Doctor writes: *Est autem duplex hominis bonum ultimum. . . . Quorum unum est proportionatum naturae humanae. . . . Aliud autem bonum hominis naturae proportionem excedit, quia ad illud obtinendum vires naturales non sufficiunt, nec ad cogitandum vel desiderandum . . .; et hoc est vita aeterna* (14 *De verit.*, 2).

Were we anxious to know not so much what St. Thomas held as what is to be held on philosophical and theological grounds, it seems to me that the natural desire so cherished by Fr. O'Connor meets an insoluble objection, for it is not sufficient to say that a natural desire would indeed be in vain if it were impossible for it in any circumstances ever to reach its goal (pp. 141, 189), in which sense we can speak of a natural desire in man for immortality. Since natural desire is interpreted as a positive tendency (p. 224) and *motus* (pp. 94, 106, 246, 252), flowing from a natural form and this form is given as impressed by the author of nature in order that man's intellect tend by an inner movement towards the end

destined to it by the same author of nature, the difficulty lies in this: how the author of nature could have ordered man's intellect to an end to which He, the author of nature, cannot finally lead it; how the author of nature could ever have impressed on man's intellect a positive tendency or appetite or *motus*—to be specified by their term—while He, the author of nature, cannot satisfy that tendency, fulfill that appetite, bring that motion to rest, because the vision of God, even abstracting from its quality of beatific vision, is certainly above the heights to which the author of nature can raise a human or angelic intellect.

While expressing my personal ideas on the unsatisfactory features of Fr. O'Connor's explanation of St. Thomas' natural desire for God on purely intellectual grounds, I am glad to offer him the most sincere and deserved praise for having enforced by exegetical and philosophical arguments the elicited character of the desire in question, for having discriminated some of the elements taken by some Thomists from Scotistic sources, and for feeling himself deeply that sovereign *angustia* worthy of the *praeclara ingenia* of past and present times.

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Liberty against Government: the Rise, Flowering and Decline of a Famous Juridical Concept. By Edward S. Corwin. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948. Pp. 233, with index. $3.00.

So long has Edward S. Corwin been considered one of the better writers on matters of constitutional theory that the appearance of a new book bearing his name may rightly be regarded as an event. Mr. Corwin's style is at once forceful, vigorous, and stimulating, and his views are generally refreshingly free from adherence to convention for its own sake. His latest study, *Liberty against Government*, indicates that his comparatively recent retirement from Princeton has brought no concomitant retirement from intellectual vigor. This volume contains, in surprisingly small space, all the features associated with Corwin's earlier works, and a new analysis of the concept of liberty as found in our Constitution. Since not only the document, but also its application and interpretation are here treated, it can be seen that Corwin has, in his usual commendable fashion, compressed much thought into little space. That his manner of treatment necessarily should bring to light the defects of his virtues is, however, inevitable.

Even before considering the merits and demerits of the volume, mention should be made of the foreword, written for Mr. Corwin by Alfred L. Vanderbilt, Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court; it deserves a

special review of its own. Betraying in every line an acceptance of the sociological jurisprudence of Holmes, the foreword concludes by quoting with approval his definition of a word: it is not, Holmes remarked, "a crystal, transparent and unchanging, it is the skin of a living thought, and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and time in which it is used." Passing lightly over the matter of how many living things vary in color and content according to circumstances, Vanderbilt then remarks that Corwin's work here demonstrates the extent to which this statement is true of the word "liberty," as used in a juridical sense.

Fortunately for the reader—and for the reputation of the writer—Corwin's work does no such thing. It does, instead, reveal the extent to which muddled thinking, and failure to recognize any objective standards of law have played havoc with our juristic institutions. It shows, also, that the present Court is bewildered by the trend of thought inaugurated by its predecessors, a trend which has brought this Court into flat contradictions of its own statements in successive opinions. But to say that Corwin's book vindicates Holmes's expression is simply to ignore the author's own words.

Corwin's aim, it is true, may have been precisely to illustrate Holmes's theories; if this is the case, the book is an admirable failure. It would seem, however, that the author's purpose was somewhat more objective, and that he is led, albeit reluctantly, to note many defects in the Holmesean approach. He admires Holmes, there can be no question of that, but he does not apotheosize him. In this alone the book is a refreshing contrast to most of the modern works which deal with law under any of its aspects. At the conclusion of his discussion, the author comes, somewhat abruptly, to a point where the present Court also finds itself: the term "liberty" applies to almost every phase of modern life, and is *therefore* in need of further definition. This is hardly orthodox sociological jurisprudence.

It is the word *therefore* in the statement above which is significant. If Corwin's conclusion means anything, it means that the term, liberty, is now beginning to be understood in its original sense. His discussion of the rise, flowering, and decline of a famous juridical concept, if it means anything, can mean only one thing: the concept he defines as liberty was not liberty at all, but a special kind or category of right. A reading of the book makes this point evident, and a detailed examination of the presentation is therefore in order. Parenthetically it may be noted, before beginning this examination, that Corwin's habit of defining is at once an assistance to the reader and an illustration of the fallaciousness of the sociological school's approach.

In his first chapter—which moves provocatively and rapidly toward an historical survey of origins—Corwin defines liberty as the *absense of re-*

straints imposed by other persons upon our own freedom of choice and action. Thus defined, and italicized by the author, liberty seems far removed from such definitions as the right to be directed in one's own interest, or—more exactly—as the power elective of means so long as the order to the end is preserved. Mr. Corwin promptly deprives his definition of some of its peculiarities, however, by noting that, in society, a man has liberty because restraints are imposed upon others, and upon the government itself. As to the checks imposed upon the man himself, the author is significantly silent. One may well inquire, then, why define liberty in this strange fashion at all?

The answer seems to be that such a definition makes possible a graceful approach to the question of *juridical liberty*—again Corwin's italics—and that this liberty is a type of *constitutional liberty* " which we Americans term *judicial review*." We have, therefore, a statement of the problem. This is to be a study of the struggle between the legislature and the power of judicial review. As such a study is not particularly new—even to Corwin—one might wonder why a new volume, preoccupied with this theme, should now appear. The saving feature of the book is that Corwin promptly and cheerfully loses sight of this objective, and concerns himself only obliquely with it as he discusses numbers of other matters.

There is first his discussion of Roman and English origins. Law, as it has affected English and American institutions, finds its first philosophical exposition in Cicero. From Cicero we skip blithely to John Locke, pausing briefly to note Bracton's invaluable collection and John of Salisbury. There were no substantial contributions made before Cicero or, after him, until Locke. Such are Corwin's contentions, and they are the veriest nonsense.

He himself notes (p. 16) that Cicero wrote of a Roman practice to include in every law a prohibition against what was sacrosanct. This is nothing less than an admission that Cicero was not inventing judicial review. Furthermore, Cicero's writings were efforts to make available in Roman terms a number of Greek concepts. If judicial review can be traced back to antiquity, and Corwin has not yet shown that it can be, why begin with Cicero?

If we begin with Corwin's Cicero, must we ignore all the intermediaries between Cicero and Locke except John of Salisbury? This procedure means that we ignore, for example, St. John Chrysostom, who held that the ruler was bound to obey the terms of his contract. It means that we attribute to John of Salisbury a doctrine which was taught forcefully for at least three centuries before the appearance of his *Policraticus*. It means that the contribution of Isidore of Seville to the notion of holding the sovereign to an objective standard of conduct is ignored—or not known. Isidore taught, preached, wrote that the king was called so because of his kingly power: *rex a regendo*, and that *regendo* meant *recte agendo*. Isidore's

etymological proclivities do not concern us; what is important is that John is pointed out as introducing the idea of making the king rule rightly, without any credit being given to the general European tradition in which he wrote. Judicial review cannot be proved as having ancient and respectable origins if only part of its course is traced. Perhaps it had these origins, but Corwin destroys all but a small percentage of his case when he suppresses, or fails to use, materials which are easily and abundantly available. He gives himself away completely in a footnote (p. 29), where he remarks, concerning a new edition of Fortescue: "I have gathered from a casual examination of it that it says nothing which should require me to recast what I have already said."

Such cavalier dismissals of the accepted practices of research are perhaps to be expected, or condoned, in a scholar whose reputation has long been made. They do, however, point up the fact that this book is largely a recasting of old material into new patterns, the latter not yet comfortably free from the old lines. What value there is in the ensuing discussion, and there is much of value, must always be measured with this qualification in mind. Thus when he remarks that English restraint on authority has its source in a professional or craft mystery (p. 31), not only is he ignoring the research of other scholars, but he is failing to take into account the very facts he has just enumerated. If the king was considered to be *sub Deo et lege* in Bracton's time, it was not necessary to manufacture a craft mystery to account for government's subjection in Fortescue's century.

Corwin indicates his attitude rather clearly, too, in enumerating Coke's argument in Calvin's case. Coke gave, almost in the same words as were universally current in the medieval schools, an account of the law of nature as being the moral law infused into the heart of man. This argument Corwin labels "quaint" (p. 36), and goes on to talk about an influx of natural-law ideas from the Continent. Again this is only half—probably less than half—the truth; again there is an utter failure to recognize the persistence of a tradition, or even to acknowledge its existence.

Between Coke and Locke there are no significant changes noted, but when the latter is reached, due process comes to the fore. The concept of due process of law was introduced by Locke, according to Corwin's presentation, to mean that the government could use only *reasonable law*. Corwin sees this as anticipating the modern latitudinarian concept (p. 46); he does not see it as a seventeenth-century reflection of law framed according to right reason. Surely the latter conclusion can be justified on historical grounds, and this professes to be an historical chapter in an historical discussion.

In the next chapter, the doctrine of judicial review is examined far more competently, and real contributions are made; for here the distortions are made not by a commentator whose historical knowledge is sometimes

deficient, but by the jurists themselves. Now judicial review is seen as exercised in the United States, and—even before the Civil War—exercised with the idea of preventing government from interfering with property rights. The tendency to narrow the originally broad application of the concept is sufficiently obvious in this sound third chapter; with the background better understood and elaborated, damning evidence would have been presented. The question arises, even as this evidence appears, as to the amount of responsibility pre-Holmes jurists must bear for shaping his sociological theories before him. Paradoxically—at least in a book which is introduced with obeisances to Holmes—the pre-Civil War chapter shows Kent, Story, Shaw and their contemporaries piously pronouncing judicial review doctrines to justify what they feel is necessary for the community at the time, a Holmesean attitude if there ever was one. Corwin's contribution to the development of our understanding of American jurisprudence is here an invaluable, if unconscious, one.

His discussion of the period before the Civil War is notable also for its inclusion, though sometimes only in footnotes, of the opinions of judges who kept referring stubbornly to rights of individuals as being larger than mere property rights. In the case of one such Justice, Ormond of Alabama, two opinions are given which are allegedly contradictory. As included in the discussion, their contradiction is not shown, but rather their identity. On these pages (pp. 95, 96) Ormond is insisting on an objective standard for the law. Even in the case of *Wynehamer v. New York*, which Corwin cites to exemplify his analysis of the narrowing content of judicial review and due process, the justices display some confusion in their terminology. Here Corwin deserves great praise for sifting out so much of value from so many cases, and here is to be noted his deficiency because of the lack of historical knowledge which started his investigations so badly. Occasionally this lack betrays him into the standard impatience with Taney (pp. 110-11), whose remarks on the lack of due process in the Missouri Compromise may certainly be attributed to the same attitude as that of Coke. Again, in the same argument, Corwin refers (p. 111) to a statement of Justice Johnson's as "cryptic," quite ignoring the fact that he had himself just given its historical foundation.

This matter of ignoring his own earlier discussion reaches heights of absurdity when he says that due process was originally procedural and had become broadened to include substantive content of legislation. Happily for the argument, only the word "broadened" need be affected here; for the whole chapter showed not a broadening but a narrowing, and not from adjectival law to substantive law, but entirely within the latter.

The pre-Civil War period is followed by a discussion of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, where some work of great value has been done in showing the influence of Spencer and jurists who followed him. These men still further narrowed the idea of judicial review by narrowing the

concept of liberty. As Corwin felicitously phrases it (p. 138): "The [American Bar] Association soon became a sort of futuristic sewing circle for mutual education on the gospel of *laissez faire*." The arguments from this point are neatly summarized in Holmes's dissenting opinion in *Lochner v. New York*, but Corwin presents, on the other side of the picture, Mr. Harlan insisting on the existence of a true higher law, distinct from that of the so-called higher-law school. The preoccupation which immediately follows with the problem of judicial notice seems to be a strained attempt at justifying the sociologists, but it is difficult to refrain from giving them some sympathy when the smug arguments of the *laissez faire* group are read. Chapter IV is actually the best explanation for the initial appearance of the sociological jurist that I have seen, and its value is augmented by the quotation from Holmes which recognizes the "historical validity" of the due process concept. No less valuable is the stigmatizing of Holmes's "clear and present danger" rule as one made up out of whole cloth. The rule is actually much more soundly based than that—though Holmes would deny the contention—but it is good to note that both Corwin and the members of the Court recognize it as having been stated as it was as an expedient for the times.

A detailed resumé of the contents of the remainder of this chapter would be interesting to undertake, but of doubtful value. Constructive, destructive, and downright inaccurate statements are made, but the conclusion in the fifth chapter is at least reassuring. By a somewhat circuitous route, Corwin arrives at the conclusion that the Court has cast aside the narrow nineteenth-century concept of liberty, and is back with Cicero and Locke. The conclusion is more reassuring than accurate, but—even as stated—the journey back to orthodoxy cannot be attributed to the pilotage of Mr. Holmes, who in these pages is convicted over and over again out of his own mouthings of platitudes. Since these are the Edward Douglass [*sic*] White Lectures, it is interesting to see the Chief Justice's old rival so served. It is somewhat saddening to see the Chief Justice himself represented only by one of his characteristically heavy-handed attempts at levity.

There are two major errors in expression which should be noted: on page 105, *not* is left out of a sentence, which makes Corwin appear to accuse the Court of being illogical when he intends precisely the opposite. On page 85, he remarks that the 1830's were susceptible "to crusades against the legal disabilities of women, slavery, and intoxicants," when of course intoxicants were then subject to no disabilities of a legal nature. Despite such inaccuracies as these and those noted in detail above, the study is a good one, and would have been better if Corwin had followed Cooley's example (p. 117) to admit his own bias.

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The Protestant Era. By Paul Tillich. Translated and with a Concluding Essay by James Luther Adams. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. 354, with index. $4.00.

Der Glaube bei Emil Brunner. By Lorenz Volken. Fribourg, Switzezrland: Paulusverlag, 1947. Pp. 242. Fr. 10.20.

The Religion of Philosophers. By James H. Dunham. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947. Pp. 314, with index. $4.00.

Protestant theology has held little attraction for the contemporary intellectual. His speculative interest, when he has it, moves much more to philosophy and to theoretical science than to genuine theology, and Belloc was standing on historical fact when he said that there is not enough intellectualism left in modern man to formulate a genuine heresy. Maritain has recently remarked that he did not see how the philosophical spirit of modern man can develop any further in the direction it has been pursuing. Meanwhile, in direct opposition to the naturalist belief that the acceptance of the ultimate stifles the spirit of inquiry, traditional philosophy and theology continue to grow. Nothing is more inexhaustible than the ultimate.

Protestantism began as a protest. The philosophical counterpart of this fact would probably be translated as a *Kritik*. Kant and later Kierkegaard were typical expressions of the Protestant spirit, and the one by his formalism, the other by his polemic against Speculation, have given a deeper dye to the subjectivism latent in Protestant theology since its origin, shrinking the area of genuine intellectual discussion until religion has come to mean nothing in the way of dogma but simply Kantian " good will " or Kierkegaardian " passion." It is not startling that there are few original intellects in modern Protestantism and that the intellects which are most prominent are anti-intellectual. Religion without dogma is like a frame without a picture.

Paul Tillich, an exile from Nazi Germany, has been on the faculty at Union Theological Seminary, New York. One of the most prolific of Protestant theologians, he represents Evangelical Theology and is broadly associated with its dialectical wing, whose most prominent spokesman is Karl Barth. *The Protestant Era* is a collection of his essays and speeches over a period of almost a quarter century, translated from the German by James Luther Adams who supplies a concluding essay on what Tillich is trying to say.

Like Niebuhr, Tillich is gravely concerned with cultural and social problems, but it is not exactly clear just how this social-consciousness is born of his more fundamental principles. He is fascinated by the movement of history, by fate, necessity, and freedom, and yet he nowhere alludes to the historical underpinning of his own Protestant message. He envisions a

kind of Christian socialism as an ideal and even possible society emerging from the present world crisis, but at the same time his theological background must foment radical individualism among men rather than a public landscape of social agreement.

If there is any theme threading through this book, it is the application of the so-called Protestant principle, justification by faith alone, but it is never quite clear just what kind of faith it is, what are its contents, and how it is grounded. Faith on Protestant premises ought to be just an act, without specification by an object, and a principle that is simply a protest ought not to be called a principle. It really has nothing to enunciate.

The present is part of the Protestant era, Tillich holds, but when and if the era passes, the Protestant principle will remain, adapting itself to the new historical situation. But where, as Plato said, does this argument lead? It certainly makes man the servant of history and the so-called timeless, a toy of time. Even in the matter of morals which is about all that is left of Protestantism, it makes religion an affair of circumstance more than a subscription to unchanging principle. There is a note of Barth in such an analysis—the same kind of reasoning, or lack of it, which led Barth to take a stand against Hitler but to refuse a similar protest against Soviet barbarism in Eastern Europe. It is pragmatism; it is atomism; it is even Marxian by its underlying historical determinism. It replaces dogma by dynamism.

Tillich introduces an orginal terminology to characterize the relations of religion and culture. " ' Theonomy ' has been defined as a culture in which the ultimate meaning of existence shines through all finite forms of thought and action; the culture is transparent, and its creations are vessels of a spiritual content " (p. xvi). Associated with this concept and descending from Kierkegaard is the notion of *kairos*, " the fullest of time " (Chapter 3), which is not achieved once and for all as in the Incarnation but which in some participated form is a modality of all right action. Marcel has stressed this same description of—let us call it—prudence, from the Catholic side, when he insists that truth and goodness are incarnations. But the difficulty with Tillich and the whole existential approach, including ultimately Marcel's own philosophy, is that it plays upon the unique character of moral conduct to the neglect of the universal factors which are not just Hegelian logic, as Kierkegaard liked to say, but reliable guides in reaching a moral decision.

But there are other difficulties against the concept of theonomy. Are there ever any actions, even those of a secularized and materialistic modern man, which do not express the ultimate meaning which the agent attaches to existence and are not the " vessels of a spiritual content " which he gives to his own life? Tillich wishes to distinguish theonomy from autonomy which denies an ultimate aim to civilization and from heteronomy which is

the attempt of religion to dominate cultural activity "from the outside." Does the author have in mind that theonomy is organic? But then the corporate character of an organism is a long way from the atomism which the Protestant principle commands. Luther became alarmed later on in his life when he wrote that there were almost as many "sects" as "heads." From a revolt against a public authority, of doctrine as well as discipline, binding men to each other, Protestantism has not become transformed into an organ for achieving social solidarity. Faith without dogma is as blind as morality without intelligence.

Nor does the author face squarely up to the responsibility in which Protestantism shares so heavily for the current division among modern men which has led to wars and depressions, to the jeopardy of civilization itself whose members have become as atomized as the matter in their bombs. Tillich, with his historical-consciousness, ought to compare the social and cultural estate of man three hundred years after the Reformers with that of the medieval man three hundred years before. He had his problems, and they were serious ones as human problems always are, and Europe was threatened at times in the middle ages. But the threat always came from the outside. The twentieth century presents European man (and his descendants in America) imperilled from within regarding the very bases of his civilization. It would be in keeping with the problems which Tillich treats to ask the question: why? It is not historically sound to ask a doctrine that divides men from each other to unite them into some semblance of social order and even of Christian socialism. The holes in a sinking ship cannot be plugged by drilling more of them.

Tillich shows a wide range of historical scholarship. But he seems to view history more as string of atomistic beads rather than a continuum. His philosophy of history thus becomes too vertical, a commerce between God and man that is direct alone and that refuses to trace the flow of time horizontally back to the *kairos* where a Church was born and empowered with a one, holy, Catholic, and apostolic character, no part of which modern Protestantism can identify in itself.

Religion is more than a matter of will. Faith is will commanding intellect, and it perfects intelligence rather than belittles it. The facts which natural intelligence discerns in history past and present ought not to contradict a religion that claims to be truly Christian. The leading question is not what religion does to society or its promotion of culture but whether it is true. Faith is the assent to something as truth and not primarily as good, and this intellectual aspect of belief ought to be re-examined by modern Protestantism. Until it does so, Protestantism such as that of Tillich will not only be at variance with supernatural truth but even with the nature of man which grace presupposes, perfects, and endows with habits, as opposed to acts, a series of disconnected *kairoi*.

Emil Brunner deserves rank almost with Barth himself as an exponent of dialectical theology. Yet there are important differences which divide the two. In a preliminary reply to Niebuhr's speech before the World Council of Churches at Amsterdam, Barth condemned those who "theologize on their own account." This marks an important difference not only with Niebuhr but also with Brunner.

Brunner's drift toward speculation, however slight, can be detected from the philosophy which he has borrowed and applied to express his thought. It is personalism, chiefly that of Buber, Ebner, and Gogarten. Like Bergson, Brunner stands opposed to the intellectual approach to reality like that of an abstracting mind, examining the objective world. The highest form of awareness is that of one person for another, *eine Personbegnung* or as Marcel says a "confrontation." It is only by such an experience of another that a person is constituted, according to Brunner's view.

Brunner does not accept the transcendent God of Barth, where God is "wholly other." The *Personbegnung* is not only between man and man but, in its highest and unique sense, between man and God. It is only by his relation to God that the person is constituted and the sinner who remains in sin is not "a personal person." He is a person only in the material, not in the formal sense. Unlike Barth, Brunner seems somehow groping toward the analogy of being and is willing to preserve the phrase *imago Dei* in something of its traditional sense.

Personality, however, is not the individual substance of a rational nature, as Boethius said. The distinguishing mark of a person is "activity, actuality," so that the theandric relation which determines man is dynamic. There are analogies between the human person and the *relatio subsistens* of the Trinity. Brunner's account of human personality should be compared with that of René Le Senne.

Another way of describing the God-man relation or the *Personbegnung* in the religious sense is faith. It cannot be analyzed, as Catholic theology insists, into voluntary and intellectual aspects, Brunner holds. It is an act of the total personality. It is love. It is sentiment, something like the *Frömmigkeit* of Schleiermacher. It is existential.

Brunner is sharply critical of Catholic theology for supposedly having depersonalized belief. It has transformed, he charges, the person of Christ into abstract, doctrinal theses. It is, he goes on, *eine Lehre* rather than *eine Personbegnung*, and as a Protestant theologian, he naturally makes capital of papal authority by attempting to show it as a human interposition which destroys the dynamic, person-to-person relation of true Christianity.

God is the Lord God of Hebraic tradition, but at the same time there is a community between God and man combining with the Lordship of God into a dialectical paradox. But history is not meaningful as a continuum in time, first because Brunner will not accept the depersonalized, intellec-

tual way of examining it and secondly because its distant past will not allow the immediate relation which is all that there is to faith. In Brunner's view, the past must, as it were, be relived and "presentified" (*vergegenwärtigt*). Christ must be immediately there for the believer, as he was for the Apostles. Brunner is not interested in the relation between Christ and the Apostles, so much as the relation between Christ and present-day man. Like Tillich, he escapes from the burden of examining history to test the historical claims of doctrine. It is not doctrine that matters for him. It is persons. When the Word was made Flesh, it became concrete, and Brunner thinks that Catholic theology has forgotten this fact.

But did the Reformers forget it? In the first dawn of their protesting movement, they emphasized the personalism of truth, Brunner holds, but then political and polemical circumstance forced their religion into a case-hardened and impersonal form like that of their Catholic opposition. Protestantism thus came to be another form of doctrine rather than a Christian personalism, it is added, and the task of contemporary theology is to recover and rekindle the true light of faith which the Reformers glimpsed only momentarily.

Lorenz Volken has written a sound and yet rather simple exposition of Brunner's faith. The chapters are extremely well organized and helpfully subdivided. The author has a way of repeating himself without becoming repetitious and writes with a clarity and a confidence that are reinforced by a considerable bibliography and copious citation. A discussion on Hegel's influence in dialectical theology might have further enhanced this work. Hegel is likewise present in German personalism. This point could be etched out by asking with a Sartre how, in Hegelianism, we come to know ourselves and others.

Volken's book starts a new postwar series of *Studia Friburgensia*, published under the direction of the Dominican professors at the University of Fribourg. It is recommended reading for all those interested in dialectical theology which has been active in the Germanic sections of Europe and is beginning to show signs of life in this country.

Volken's critical approach to Brunner is a laudable and entirely Thomistic piece of work. He admits a great deal of Brunner's personalism by distinguishing and contradistinguishing in his arguments and shows his failures as shortcomings rather than complete aberrations from truth. Catholic theology, he adroitly points out, does not deny, indeed it insists, that truth was made concrete for man when the Word became Flesh. But at the same time, Catholic tradition also affirms that truth is truth and not simply a blind and existentialist *Personbegnung*. Volken quotes the New Testament to show examples where Christ asked men to believe in doctrines and deeds, in principles and promises. He cites Luther to show that he was not the personalist which Brunner makes him out to be.

Regarding the act of faith as a *Totalakt*, Volken invokes the principle,

actiones sunt suppositorum, to show that the person acts through his will and his intellect. Even in reference to the supernatural, it is not the Cartesian but the Thomistic man that corresponds to the demands of reality. But because the intellect is at work in the act of faith, obeying the command of the will, Volken will not admit the blind existentialism of Brunner. He shows that faith in Catholic tradition is not the abstract intellectual approach which Brunner paints, but neither is it, like dialectical theology, anti-intellectual. It is really supra-intellectual, with faith being more certain than purely natural knowledge and higher than, rather than counter to, reason.

The book closes with a section on faith and ecclesiastical authority. Dialectical theology ought to examine anew the meaning of a Church to see whether the very existence of a church is not incompatible with existentialism. In this light too, one may ask, as Volken does, what happened to the Church in which Christ said He would always abide and hence preserve from error, before the Reformation (if not before dialectical theology). On Protestant principles, were there not more than a thousand years when error supposedly prevailed in the Church and hence when a clean break occurred with the Divine origins of historical Christianity. It could also be asked, especially against Brunner and Barth who make so much of the private reading of the Bible, what happened to all the souls before Gutenberg's invention of printing made the Bible accessible? Was Christianity held in abeyance until the invention of printing?

Dunham's book stands in contrast to the themes of Tillich and Brunner. It examines the philosophy of religion in a supposedly typical cross-section of western thinkers from Plato to Comte and presents a pageant of intellectuals, rather than existentialists, in their attitude toward religion.

By its general theme, this book recalls the scholastic thesis that there is a natural religion where the unaided mind can arrive at truths concerning God, man, and the relation between them that we call religion. But reminding is about all that Dunham does. For though pleading in his preface that he will let the men speak for themselves, he introduces his own criticism into their messages which slants the book to agnosticism rather than to genuine religion. Thus, he allows Kant's arguments against speculative reason to prevail but takes upon himself the burden of criticizing Augustine. He allows Hume's verdict against religion to be pronounced uninterruptedly but cracks his whip against Aristotle and Aquinas.

St. Thomas does not merit a chapter by himself. Augustine is the sole Catholic among the ten figures. This is unfortunate since it was not until Aquinas spoke that the distinction between natural and supernatural was clearly made and it became possible to talk about a philosophy of religion. Augustine did not keep reason and revelation properly distinct, and his philosophy of religion is largely his theology of the subject.

But omissions are not the only faults in this study. Though Aristotle is praised as a scholar, he is also portrayed as having grossly misconstrued Plato's doctrine of ideas and as having persuaded history that they were in a separate heaven when Plato meant them to be logical rules. This is not the first time that Aristotle's account of Platonism has been challenged, but the anti-Aristotelians are swimming against heavy swells. There is ample textual evidence in Plato to show that Aristotle was right, and besides this, as a student of Plato, he ought to be trusted to tell us what meaning really subtended the metaphors of his master, especially so if he were the careful scholar that Dunham depicts him to be. If the Good is only a "logical principle (p. 19), it can even be denied that Plato believed in a transcendent God.

Dunham is not nearly as good in his study of Aristotle as he thinks Aristotle was in the study of his subject-matter. Aristotle did not suppose that "the passive intellect belongs of necessity to the sensory equipment of the body" (p. 64), and St. Thomas sufficiently showed how it is possible to reconcile the eternity of motion with the necessity for a Prime Mover. Nor did Aristotle consider the *Nous* to be a "logical genus" and reason to be "the idea which sums up the meaning of human behavior" (p. 99).

In the chapter on Aristotle, not enough weight is laid on the transcendent character of the Prime Mover which made Aristotle almost a deist and drove the fathers of the Church away from him and toward the Provident God of Plato. The God of Aristotle is not "the aesthetic Whole" (p. 71), nor even "Pure Actuality" (p. 60). Dunham would have been more helpful if he had developed Aristotle's definition of God as "the thought of a thought." He would have been more complete had he also stressed the moral philosophy of Aristotle. In the sixty-two references in the chapter on Aristotle, the *Ethics* is mentioned only four times.

The chapter on Epicurus does not sufficiently emphasize his views on chance or the "swerve" among the atoms, and it is certainly an overstatement in the chapter on Marcus Aurelius to say that "the doctrine of the Stoics does not assume that the emotions are radically infected with evil" (p. 102).

The treatment of Augustine is more than an affair of omissions and understatements. Mixing philosophy and theology because Augustine was badly chosen for inclusion among pure philosophers of religion, Dunham launches into an attack on the doctrine of original sin as based on a "mythological story," as biologically unsound in its concept of heredity, as distorting the picture of personality against the facts of modern psychology, as ethically unrealistic because its evades personal responsibility, and as contrary to the character of "a gracious Lord" (p. 146). Theologians will raise more than their eyebrows against this curious misunderstanding.

It is naive as the question which J. B. S. Haldane posed some years ago as to whether Christ is anatomically present in the Eucharist.

Finally, Augustine's argument to the existence of God from truth is by no means " a preview " of Anselm's ontological argument (p. 128), and even if it were, it was not Kant who exposed the inadequacy of Anselm (*ibid.*).

In dealing with Spinoza, the author does not wish to label him as a pantheist. Yet he declares that " God is identical with all substance which is the basic concept of Spinoza " (p. 211). It would have been useful if the author in his apparently wide range of scholarship had also consulted a dictionary to see what the word " pantheism " means.

Truth would have profited if Dunham were as critical of Hume as he is of Augustine and Aristotle and if Kant had been presented as constructing such a doctrine of the speculative intellect as to make unreliable even its awareness of the categorical imperative in the practical intellect. With all of Kant's inadequacy, he certainly intended God to be more than " a regulative formula " (p. 273).

Though presenting intellectual approaches to religion, this book would leave the reader just as skeptical as the meditations of Tillich and Brunner. It is not a reliable presentation of the subject-matter in many places, and the criticism is sloped to an agnostic viewpoint. In general, it will not recommend itself to those who want to know what others have taught, and it is not a worthwhile guide to readers who want to know what to think themselves.

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An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature. Compiled by R. A. Kocourek. St. Paul, Minn.: North Central Publishing Co., 1948. Pp. 176.

A translation of St. Thomas Aquinas' *De Principiis Naturae* and of the first two Books of the *Commentary on the Physics of Aristotle* are the chief contents of this deceptively simple little book which should be a treasure for Thomists. It is very economically printed in view of class-room use. In addition it contains a brief introduction on the nature of scientific demonstration, plus several precious excerpts from Aristotle and St. Albert the Great on the utility of the study of natural science, an outline of the natural science of Aristotle and of Book I of the *Physics*.

Its appearance is, one may hope, significant. Hitherto, although the major theological works of St. Thomas have reached translation, there has

been little translated of his philosophical works except the *Opuscula*. These, however, can only be footnotes to the fundamental expositions which continue to lie buried in the *Commentaries* on Aristotle. Since there is a certain scarcity even of the Latin editions of these works, there is some excuse for the absence of translations of them also. But as the truth of St. Thomas becomes more and more evident, the absence of translations of his major works is going to become more and more ironical. In the meantime, we continue to see the anomaly of more and more philosophical works *about* St. Thomas, but few or no book *of* St. Thomas.

The assumption is, no doubt, that the devotees of St. Thomas are perfectly familiar with his major teachings. How this can be, when even his major Latin editions are not widely circulated, is something of a mystery. Prof. Kocourek's translation of a substantial portion of one of those major works may now give us the occasion to reflect whether we do not often use the term ' Thomistic ' with somewhat reckless abandon. For example, the subject matter of the philosophy of nature—usually called ' cosmology ' in deference to that staunch old " Thomist," Christian Wolff—is occasionally said to be *inanimate* mobile being. In Book I, Lesson I of Prof. Kocourek's translation, one will find St. Thomas being quite specific that the subject of the philosophy of nature is mobile being *absolutely*. The study of inanimate mobile being and animate mobile being, as the same Lesson reveals, comes under a later treatment of particular types of motion. Likewise there is the question of *how* the philosopher of nature studies mobile being. In order to avoid clashes with the scientists it is sometimes proposed that the philosopher should study from the angle of *ens*, and leave the *mobile* to the scientist. But Book II, Lesson IV emphasizes that the natural philosopher studies *ens mobile* as a single unity: ". . . In natural science there is neither a consideration without sensible matter nor a consideration of matter alone, rather every consideration is of the matter along with the form. . . . The philosophy of nature considers the form in so far as it has existence in matter, etc." The two-pronged approach is not considered since " *ens* is not a genus " (p. 22). The initial unity is *ens mobile ut sic*, whose intrinsic principles are not *ens* and *mobile*, but *form* and *matter*, studied as they exist together. And since " everything which has matter is mobile " (Bk. I, Lesson I), and the material being is known through sensible motion, it is precisely under the aspect of *mobile* that the natural philosopher studies his subject. As St. Thomas writes in Book III, Lesson I: *Ignorato motu, ignoratur natura.*

Nor should the teacher feel that all this is above the heads of his students. On the contrary, anyone who has dutifully labored year by year to expound the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrines of matter and form and the four causes, will find that St. Thomas' own explanation, in Prof. Kocourek's fluid and easily-followed text, is better than anyone else's explanation of his explanation. A few examples added to those of St. Thomas should

suffice. The *De Principiis Naturae* covers the whole matter succinctly in some 14 pages. Neither teachers nor students need wonder whether the book is 'Thomistic,'—it is St. Thomas himself!

Finally, this little book which starts one out squarely on the study of the science of nature with a treatment of matter and form and the causes of nature, also brings squarely before the eyes of Thomists the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrines of chance and necessity in nature (Book II, Lesson VII sq.). There seems to be a certain tendency to skirt apologetically the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy of nature in its full implications. But while Thomists are apologizing for it, advanced scientists such as E. T. Whittaker ("Aristotle, Newton, Einstein," *Science*, Sept. 17, 24; 1943) are rediscovering it. In fact, in the Lessons mentioned one will find the principles, long ignored, which have now again been recognized not explicitly, but *veritate coacti*, in the "principle of indeterminism," one of the most recent milestones of science. If Aristotle and St. Thomas are not always abreast of modern scientific theory, it may not be because they are behind it, but because they are ahead of it. That challenge awaits the intrepid Thomist. In the meantime, Prof. Kocourek has helped to start lifting the veil from our crystal ball. May he find many coadjutors—and publishers!

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Cybernetics. Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. By Norbert Wiener. New York: J. Wiley and Sons, 1948. Pp. 149. $3.00.

Philosophers have frequently been accused of not taking account of what happens outside of their speculative world and of living in too often mentioned "ivory tower." They have been advised to step down and to talk to the people in the market place as did Socrates; whether the people would have the patience and interest to listen to the philosopher may be questioned. Yet, it is true that philosophers cannot afford to overlook what is being done in other fields of human endeavor. Thus, when a book is announced by the publisher as "of vital importance" for all sorts of specialists, among them the philosopher, it is the latter's task to give due consideration to the matter. If the philosopher sometimes feels that he has not gained much, there are nevertheless other instances in which he realizes the existence of truly philosophical problems arising in fields of which he has hardly any knoweldge.

The present work constitutes just such an instance. The facts it reports, the ideas it submits deserve attention and study on the part of the phi-

losopher. The book is written, or at least so claims, to acquaint non-specialists with highly interesting facts and very suggestive theories and attitudes. Some chapters, however, are quite technical and contain many pages of strictly mathematical reasoning which presupposes a greater knowledge than the average reader probably possesses. Nor is the terminology always intelligible to one not acquainted with certain data, as the case may be, of mathematics, physics, or biology. Unfortunately, there is also a number of rather disturbing printing errors. Thus: on p. 67, " group of operators " rather than " of operations " is probably meant; on p. 77, in the discussion of the equation (3.081) the symbols are missing to which the remark refers; in the formula (3.942) a bracket is missing; on p. 117, the discussion is on negative values of t, not of l; the symbols used in the diagram 2 (p. 121) and those used in the explanation are not the same (Y in the latter and γ in the former). The reader may wonder why the first equation mentioned has the number (2.01); suspicion arises that a part has been cut out. These defects are the more regrettable in that they render the study of Dr. Wiener's book even more difficult. Nevertheless, a careful evaluation of the author's ideas is necessary.

Dr. Wiener is professor of mathematics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is much more than a mathematician; he possesses an astonishing grasp of many, apparently heterogeneous matters, which he knows how to integrate and relate. The introduction tells the story of his work: how out of technological problems emerged an ever widening inquiry, and how this was furthered by the collaboration of mathematicians, physicists, engineers, biologists, physicians, and others. This story in itself is a fascinating chapter in the history of scientific inquiry. Dr. Wiener and his group came to realize gradually that the problems, and the procedures by which they were handled, were fundamentally the same in the most diverse fields. The book's table of contents suffices in evidence: Chapter II is on " Groups and Statistical Mechanics "; Chapters V, VI, and VII are concerned with " Computing Machines and the Nervous System," " Gestalt and Universals," " Cybernetics and Psychopathology, Information, Language, and Society." The reader, opening the work, may wonder what relations there may be between statistical mechanics and universals, or between the former and such topics as psychopathology or language. The astonishing thing is that there are indeed such relations.

" Cybernetics " is a new name, derived from the Greek *kybernétēs* from which stems " governor " by way of the Latin *gubernium*. The elementary facts to which this name refers can be illustrated by pointing out such implements as the thermostat; this gadget turns on and off the heating system and thus, this system of which the thermostat is a part regulates itself. A similar mechanism exists in living organisms. A directed and coordinated movement, as, for example, one intended to grasp something,

depends for the accuracy of its execution on a continuous " feed-back " of sensory data originating in the active muscles. German physiology has spoken, for many years, of *Selbststeuerung, self-steering*. A pertinent fact was observed, more than sixty years ago, by the Viennese physiologist Exner: a horse feeds by grasping the food with the lips; if the sensory nerve of these organs is severed, the innervation of the muscles remains unimpaired; yet, the feeding process is disturbed and even rendered impossible, because this process demands that the tactual stimuli, arising from the contact of the lips with the food, and the kinaesthetic stimuli, arising in the muscles, be referred back to the central nervous system. Exner spoke of " sensomobility " to indicate the close cooperation of the " information " furnished by the sense organs and transmitted through the afferent fibers on the one hand, and the effectory organs and their nervous connections on the other.

If these facts illustrate, as very simple examples, the basic principle, the further developments are far from simple. The principle of the " feed-back " is, for instance, the foundation of the enormously complicated machines which have been invented to do all sorts of calculations, achieving in an amazingly short time an amount of work which a mathematician could not accomplish in many days, or even weeks. The mathematical and technical details need not be reported here. The general nature of the achievement, however, especially the analogies the machine shows to the performances and the structure of the brain, and the implications of a philosophical and social kind, call for our attention.

To comment on the last mentioned aspect first, it must be noted that the creation of machines which replace human operations to a hitherto unexpected degree has, as Dr. Wiener says, " unbounded possibilities for good and for evil." It must be realized that the instruments of mechanical computation are only one type of implements which may reduce the need for human activity far more than has ever happened before. They amount to " a new and most effective collection of mechanical slaves to perform the labor " of mankind. People who now earn their living by labor face the competition of the machine to an extent much greater than has been the case thus far in the industrial revolution. If the latter was, to quote the author, a " devaluation of the human arm by the competition of a machine," the new phase is " bound to devaluate the human brain at least in its simpler and more routine decisions." Highly skilled individuals, scientists or administrators, may survive this " second industrial revolution," as the skilled artisan survived the first; but it may happen that " the average human being of mediocre attainments or less has nothing to sell that is worth anyone's money to buy."

Dr. Wiener feels that the dangers of this new development can be avoided only by having " a society based on human values other than buying and

selling." He also feels strongly that " those who have contributed to the new science stand in a position which is, to say the least, not very comfortable." His wish that a large part of the public understand the situation is one reason for his publishing the book.

This admission of responsibility and clarity of vision on the part of a scientist inaugurating what he believes to be a new era of technological and, consequently, social developments must be gratefully acknowledged. Usually the inventor or discoverer sees only the assets of his work and not the risk all progress in such matters inevitably entails. The broad outlook of Dr. Wiener leads him also to other statements concerning the significance of his work; on these points, however, remarks can be made only after reporting on the main ideas of the book.

The first chapter places the whole set of problems within the framework of a general consideration of some traits characteristic of the present situation. The title: " Newtonian and Bergsonian Time," is indicative of the broad basis on which the author's views rest. A survey of the history of science and technology is summarized thus: " If the seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries are the age of clocks, and the later eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries constitute the age of steam-engines, the present time is the age of communication and control." The age just past is set over against the present as that of power against communication engineering. The latter is distinguished from the former by the fact that its main interest is not economy of energy but the accurate reproduction of a signal. Related to these problems are those of the automaton, that is, the " working simulacrum of a living organism." Included is the clockwork which astonished the people of Newtonian times, the combustion engine later imagined as an analogy of the organism. Today we have automata which open doors by means of photocells, point guns at a place indicated by the radar-beam, or solve differential equations. Parallel to this development can be observed a changing interpretation of the organism. The physiologists of the immediate past conceived of the organism in terms of power engineering; notions like energy balance, potential, and others stand in the foreground. It may be permitted to this reviewer to confirm this remark. The study of metabolism and of working activity concentrated mostly on questions of " efficiency," the ratio of energy appearing as work to that " wasted " in the form of heat; the human organism used to be described as a badly constructed machine, since its efficiency is notably below that of, *e.g.*, a Diesel motor. Little did anyone wonder then at the astonishing efficacy of this " badly constructed machine " which keeps on working under the most variable conditions, is capable of adjustment, of regeneration, and of co-ordination. The newer study of " automata, whether in the metal or in the flesh " looks differently at its problems; " its cardinal notions are those of message, amount of disturbance . . . , quan-

tity of information, coding technique, and so on"; the feature of precision of response to the message received might be added.

Although admittedly fundamental for the whole set of ideas, the succeeding three chapters of Dr. Wiener's work cannot be adequately reported here since a detailed exposition of mathematical and scientific procedures and notions would be necessitated. It might again be pointed out that the book would be much more readable for anyone lacking special training if these chapters were, at least, summarized in a non-technical language. Further, the average reader will be deterred from perusing pages which contain important references to problems of biology.

One such problem is that known as *homeostasis*. This name refers to all apparatus which, in the organism, works towards the maintenance of a definite level of performance; body temperature (at least in warm blooded animals), concentration of hydrogene ions in the blood, regulation of heart rate, blood pressure, metabolism, and other functions fall under this heading. Homeostasis is equally important in the machines of the type discussed by the author. The machines, too, are regulated by "feed-back" and insofar operate on the same principles as the organism.

The parallel is pursued in Chapter V: "Computing Machines and the Nervous System." Like the machine, the nervous system contains elements which function as relays, the so-called neurons. The analogy can be carried further: parallels may be found between the function of memory and certain devices for "storing information"; between the threshold and other properties of the machines; between the processes of association, including the "conditioned reflex," and the "learning ability" of the machine. The author does not wish to state that the organism actually operates on the same principles, when learning, but that it well might be so.

Chapter VI, "Gestalt and Universals," continues the drawing of parallels. It should be noted that Dr. Wiener uses the terms: "universal" or "substance," in a sense different from that given to them in Scholastic philosophy. This is, no doubt, his right; yet, it should be realized so as not to raise unjustified criticisms. The most interesting case discussed in this section is that of an apparatus destined to permit the blind person to read by means of transforming the visual into an auditory pattern (or *Gestalt*). Thus information, usually conveyed by one sense, is replaced by information through another sense. The author reports a remarkable incident: at a meeting of several men concerned with the different aspects of these problems, a diagram was shown of a certain arrangement of photocells and oscillators, exemplifying one principle of such a reading apparatus. One participant, a student of the brain, asked, when he looked at the diagram, whether it was a schema of the visual cortex. Dr. Wiener is right in emphasizing this incident; it indeed confirms rather astonishingly the basic legitimacy of his parallels.

The considerations which the author devotes to questions of psychopathology appear to this reviewer as less convincing. It is, of course, true, as Dr. Wiener does not fail to remark, that our knowledge of both the normal and the abnormal functions of the brain, or mind, is still far from being satisfactory or allowing far-reaching conclusions.

Organisms which live in " organized " groups can do so only on the basis of communication; " all the nervous tissue of the beehive is the nervous tissue of some single bee." The amount of information available to the race can be determined and compared with that available to the individual. The race—or, perhaps more correctly, the community—can profit from individual information only if the latter modifies somehow the behavior of one individual to another. The principle of the " feed-back " and all its further developments hold good here also. However, only small and closely knit communities have a considerable measure of homeostasis. The notion that competition is itself a homeostatic process is false; the free market does not result in a stable dynamics of prices, redounding to the greatest common good. Modern society is, in fact, dominated by the powerful few; and, their power resides mostly in the control of the means of communication. An organism is held together by the possession of means for acquisition, use, retention, and transmission of information. " In a society too large for the direct contact of its members, these means are the press . . . , books and newspapers, the radio, the telephone system, the telegraph, the posts, the theatre, the movies, the schools and the church." These means of communication are subject to a threefold constriction: elimination of less profitable means in favor of the more profitable; concentration in the hands of a powerful and wealthy minority, and therefore expressive of their opinions; attraction of those who are ambitious for power, because communication is the chief tool for achieving power.

These and other factors render it, according to Dr. Wiener, improbable that the new science of cybernetics will be of any greater efficacy in regard to social questions. With remarkable clarity of vision, the author points out that the success of scientific procedures depends on the possibility to achieve " a high degree of isolation of the phenomenon from the observer." There exist already in science instances in which this isolation becomes quite difficult. But, " it is in the social sciences that the coupling between the observer phenomenon and the observer is hardest to minimize. . . . In the social sciences we have to deal with short statistical runs, nor can we be sure that a considerable part of what we observe is not an artefact of our own creation. . . . There is much which we must leave, whether we like it or not, to the 'un-scientific' narrative method of the professional historian." These are the closing words of the book.

It has, we may assume, become evident in what respect and to what degree this book is relevant to the philosopher. Some few concluding

remarks, therefore, will suffice. The importance of the work done by Dr. Wiener and his team may be viewed from three sides: first we learn a great number of amazing facts; secondly, we realize that there are analogies between certain mechanical devices and the organism which go much further than most of us believed; thirdly, we are faced with questions concerning human life of a tremendous importance.

It is not yet the time to proceed towards a philosophical evaluation of the facts; they must be studied, pondered, and analyzed. The question is: do they convey information that is basically new, that is of such a nature that it might force us to revise certain fundamentals of our outlook on reality?

A point which seems to allow for present discussion is that of the analogy or parallel between the machine and the organism. At first sight, it might be felt that the explanations of the author furnish a strong support for some mechanistic theory of life. Dr. Wiener himself speaks mostly of analogies and does not claim that the organism, or the brain in particular, is " nothing else but " such a machine. Perhaps it would not be wrong to say that the new discoveries and the many striking analogies remain, after all, on the same level as prior discoveries; they teach us more, much more, of the physical conditions underlying the vital, and especially the mental processes; but they do not " reduce " either of these processes to the strictly mechanical level. The case would be different if the machine could do more, namely, if it were capable of inventing a brain, as the brain is capable of inventing a machine. Or, if the machine were to bring forth its own offspring and educate them.

The most important aspect from the viewpoint of the philosopher is the third. The dangers of which Dr. Wiener speaks cannot be overrated; they are very real and imminent. To avert them there is, as the author clearly realizes, but one way: a basic reform of the modern man's attitude with regard to his total life, himself, and his fellows that he may be able to cope with the situation which is sure to arise within not too distant a time. Man must be ready. And, who else, on the human level, can possibly contribute towards that preparation, towards the reform of the human spirit, indispensable if mankind is not to be involved in catastrophic difficulties, but the philosopher? Here an enormous task awaits him, and no small responsibility.

One is deeply grateful to Dr. Wiener for his clear-sighted awareness of the limitations of the " scientific approach." His words are yet another evidence of a new conscience, if one may say so, among the scientists themselves. No warning can be more timely than that expressed by Dr. Wiener in the last lines of his book.

One further remark, perhaps, the author could have made. His machines are exceedingly clever; they can do the most amazing things; they regulate themselves and their operations by " feed-back "; they resemble

in their structure and achievements the human being to an unexpected degree. But, one great difference persists: man's behavior, too, is regulated by "feed-back" and resembles in many respects the machine; yet, the kind of behavior man chooses, he chooses freely. However much he may be like a computation machine, he is a free agent; and no machine will ever be that.

Obviously, there is ample matter for reflection in this volume. If it is not easy reading, it is highly rewarding. It is warmly recommended for thoughtful consideration.

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A Philosophy of Submission. By HENRY V. SATTLER. Washington: Catholic University Press, 1948. Pp. 212, with index. $2.25.

The subtitle of this dissertation is "A Thomistic Study in Social Philosophy." Relying almost exclusively on the *Summa Theologica* of the Angelic Doctor, Father Sattler manages very neatly to construct a valuable philosophical work. His subject is timely. This fact the author does not fail to mention in his Introduction. He extends the importance of his material not only to the obvious fields of totalitarian and democratic government but likewise into the spheres of capital and labor, the family, and education. Written in a smooth and literary style with the advantage of good logical presentation, *A Philosophy of Submission* makes easy, enjoyable, and worthwhile reading.

Dr. Sattler has divided his work into six chapters. In his first section, he treats of the nature of submission and its division. He points out that St. Thomas has no formal treatment of the concept and hence the author must seek the word and its synonyms from the texts of the Angelic Doctor. Father Sattler defines submission generically as "the acceptance of ordination by anything" (p. 5). This would include, the author continues, all creatures whether animate or inanimate, whether intellectual or non-intellectual. However, the writer makes it clear that his concern is with human submission.

The main interest, then, of the dissertation is with submission insofar as it is voluntary. "Voluntary submission is that which proceeds from the will with a knowledge of the end . . . *as* end" (p. 12). Here Fr. Sattler employs St. Thomas' doctrine on the *voluntarium* and draws out of it something of the nature of submission. From this analysis he makes an important threefold division of free submission: submission to subjugation, submission of perfection, and submission of degradation (p. 13). Thus he anticipates what he later describes as the two vices and the virtue of submission. At the end of the first chapter, Dr. Sattler makes the following

observation: "From these brief considerations, it will immediately appear that submission in itself is neither good nor bad" (p. 18). For the unwary reader this is certainly confusing. Since virtues are always good, one logically concludes that submission is not a virtue. Of course, we can justify this statement on the grounds that there are no special names to designate the three varieties of submission and hence submission without qualification can be either good or bad.

In his next chapter the author examines the habits and acts of submission. Dr. Sattler considers love as a motive rather than a habit or act of submission. Because submission indicates a debt or obligation (p. 21), the matter for its further development will be taken from the realm of justice. The author then shows how submission has a part to play in the virtues of religion, piety, patriotism, observance, gratitude, and social justice. After all this, the author does not arrive at a distinct virtue called submission. That he wanted to or not is never indicated. He merely ignores the possibility. Indeed, he refers to the potential parts of justice just listed as "virtues of submission" (p. 33). There is also a treatment of the acts of religion and these are described as acts of submission. Although Dr. Sattler declares that obedience and submission are not the same thing, he admits that obedience is "so bound up with submission that what is said in general of subordination will have application in obedience as well" (p. 59).

The third chapter considers the limitations of submission. It is here that the author proceeds to examine the vices opposed to submission. However, as yet he has not established that submission is a virtue. What he actually has shown is that submission is found in many virtues and their acts. Dr. Sattler certainly has demonstrated that submission is a condition or prerequisite for many of the potential parts of justice. Nevertheless, he now proceeds as if the fact of submission being a distinct virtue has already been proved. It has not and the following evaluation made in his fourth chapter shows that the writer was not sure of what he had in submission: "As any other virtue, submission once exercised becomes easier, more delightful and more stable. Exercise of devoted acts begets more and truer devotion" (p. 125). He neglected to add that repeated acts do not make devotion a virtue; we fail to see how submission can be considered a virtue. Rather we would hold that submission is a necessary condition for virtues. It would seem from what Dr. Sattler has written that he should have concluded that submission is an integral part of the virtues that he mentioned under justice, instead of trying to create a new virtue. In any event if Dr. Sattler conceived of submission as a virtue, he has left many questions unanswered. Is it, for example, a general or special virtue? Is it a distinct virtue? To what cardinal virtue is it annexed? What is its material cause? What are its formal and material objects?

Two other points of criticism might be mentioned here. In considering

submission's relationship to social justice, the author admits there is a special problem. Then he attempts to explain away the difficulty with the statement: "The reason for the confusion seems to be the inadequate conception of social justice even in the teaching of St. Thomas and down to our own day" (p. 60). Aside from the fact that the term "social justice" is comparatively a modern expression, one should be inclined to admit a lack of penetration of St. Thomas' doctrine rather than to place any blame on the Angelic Doctor.

The other point is purely minor. It is, after all, very easy to be unfair in one's criticism of a dissertation. The writer is concentrating on his material from a very special viewpoint. He may write things that he knows accurately enough, but because he is not immediately concerned with them he will leave them rather vague and thus expose himself to misinterpretation. Hence when Dr. Sattler states that docility is an intellectual virtue (p. 12) he gives the impression that because St. Thomas considered it as an integral cognoscitive part of prudence therefore it necessarily follows that docility is an intellectual virtue. St. Thomas has no formal treatment of this virtue, but upon investigation it appears to be a potential part of justice attached to the virtue of observance. At least one authority, Dr. Mortimer Adler, maintains that it is a moral virtue annexed to justice. Indeed, the author himself does make docility a moral virtue by the time he reaches his last chapter.

Notwithstanding these remarks, the dissertation of Dr. Sattler remains a superior work and a worthy production. One of the characteristics of the book is the evident thinking that went into its composition. The author has many excellent insights and although he does not stop to develop them, since such would exceed the scope of his work, he nevertheless makes them clear enough for the reader to perceive the implications. For example, Dr. Sattler definitely establishes the need of decentralization in government and the resulting notion of personal responsibility. These ideas are particularly brought out in his chapter on the limitations of submission.

A whole chapter is dedicated to an evaluation of the contributions of contemporary non-scholastics on the subject of submission. The author showed excellent perspicacity in his handling of this difficult section of his book. One of his best contributions is to be found here as he points out not only what modern authors say but also that what is correct in what they say is nothing other than St. Thomas in the current vernacular. The treatment here is admittedly cursory, but it is nonetheless satisfactory. *A Philosophy of Submission* deserves a wide audience of readers. The topic is of major significance in our day. Fr. Sattler's exposition of all the various angles of submission does justice to the importance of his subject and affords a valuable document for our times.

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Philosophical Commentaries; Essay towards a New Theory of Vision; Theory of Vision Vindicated. By GEORGE BERKELEY. (Edited by A. A. Luce.) London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1948. Pp. 287, with index. 30s.

This work is the first volume of a projected edition of *The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne*, put forth by Prof A. A. Luce, of Trinity College, Dublin, and Prof. T. E. Jessop, of University College, Hull. The complete edition will be in eight (or nine) volumes, together with a *Life of George Berkeley* by Prof. Luce. The biography and volumes two and three are announced as forthcoming, while the others are in preparation. The various volumes will include material that has come to light since A. C. Fraser's editions of 1871 and 1901. Editorial and textual apparatus will enable the reader to trace changes in the development of Berkeley's thought. This edition is announced as the first item in a new *Bibliotheca Brittannica Philosophica*. The project could hardly begin with a better representative of British philosophy during the course of the last four centuries than George Berkeley.

Both in the present work and in a work published in 1944, Prof. Luce has wisely given the title of *Philosophical Commentaries* to what is generally, although not properly, known as Berkeley's *Commonplace Book*. Here are given the more than nine hundred entries that make up Notebook B and Notebook A. As is stated in the editor's introduction, the text printed here is "the text as Berkeley left it, but not, as in the *editio diplomatica*, the text in the making." Copious notes on the entries are given by Prof. Luce. These are based on his 1944 edition, but limitations of space have led him to reduce his comments and to omit many references found in the earlier edition. Because of the importance of the *Philosophical Fragments* for an understanding of Berkeley's thought, an even larger annotation of the entries would have added greatly to the volume. The present reviewer would like to have seen a more thorough documentation of the various scholastic terms and doctrines, both those accepted by Berkeley and those rejected by him, than is given here. It is unfortunate that the note on No. 749 contains so outmoded a statement as the following: "Berkeley would banish the arid metaphysics of the schools, but of course he recognizes metaphysics (*e. g.* 162-3, 239); his philosophy is metaphysics, but he claims, with reason, that it is commonsense."

The editor contributes a valuable introduction not only to the *Philosophical Commentaries*, but also to *An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision*, and *The Theory of Vision . . . Vindicated and Explained*. In the case of the two works on vision, his notes are for the most part textual in character. The volume does not contain an index, but this is doubtless in view of a general index to be placed at the end of the complete edition. The book is well printed on good paper and is attractively bound. The

world of learning should welcome this new and needed edition of Berkeley's writings. It is hoped that the forthcoming volumes will maintain the high standards set in the present work.

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Thomas Heute. Zehn Vorträge zum Aufbau einer neuen existentiellen Ordnungs-Metaphysik nach Thomas von Aquin. (Thomas To-day. Ten Contributions for the Composition of a new existential Metaphysical Order according to Thomas Aquinas.) By AMADEO SILVA-TAROUCA. Vienna: Herder, 1947. Pp. 212. S 28; sfr. 14.

The author presents in ten chapters, which preserve the form of lectures, the essence of Thomistic philosophy. His intention is to show that the views of the *Doctor Communis* are not only timely and allow for an immediate application to actual problems, but that they constitute the only philosophy which promises to the modern man understanding of himself and of his present situation. The keyword is " order." It is order for which the modern man longs, order which he needs in the midst of the confusion surrounding him, order to rebuild a decent and meaningful life after the destruction which overwhelmed him. In Aquinas the author sees the philosopher of order. The history of the western world and its civilization is the history of the striving for order. The lasting endeavor of the Occident was to unite within one encompassing order nature (that is, society, state, art, civilization), and supernature. The Thomistic synthesis appears as the relatively best and the hitherto only philosophy of order.

This order is not merely a formal one; it is what the author calls an existential order. As such it tries to follow the very structure of reality, whereas a formal order, we may add, can be established on the basis of any arbitrarily chosen principle or property. To obtain the vision of the existential order one has therefore to follow the indications reality supplies. This discovery proceeds by five steps: the experience of being; the principle of efficient causality; the existence of God; the principle of finality or the final cause; the principle of order. St. Thomas was the first to recognize that the demonstration of God's existence is the foundation of all systematic interpretation of reality and so also of every philosophical systematization.

As soon as the general validity of the principle of finality is recognized and it has become evident that every being acts for the sake of some metaphysically ultimate end, it follows that all created beings are ordered in regard to one another. Order implies a multitude of ordered members, a uniform, thoroughgoing principle of relations, and a corresponding articulation, arrangement, or pattern, which is the order itself. Order is discovered

as soon as we approach any experience whatever. We are rendered aware of four modes of relations in being; that of the external things to sensory perception; that of sensory data to the process of knowledge; that of the latter process to the formation of universal concepts; that of the single concepts, judgments, and conclusions into the scientifically known object. The existence of a universal and recognizable order can be made intelligible only within a theocentric conception.

These general ideas, which can be here only indicated and should be studied in the original work, are then applied in the last five lectures, dealing with the order of the universe, the optimism of order, the natural philosophy of order, the position of man in the center of order, and the order of the love of God.

The interpretation of Thomistic philosophy from the angle of a metaphysics of order throws an interesting light on several questions. Thus, the author considers the hylemorphic conception as less basic than is usually the case. "The theocentric doctrine of order can . . . be constructed in its whole width and depth and its comprehension of the universe . . . without reference to the notions of matter and form in the sense of hylemorphism." On the other hand, the notions of potentiality and act are fundamental insofar as they refer to degrees of perfection and are related to one another as being capable of perfection to being perfected.

Man is placed between animal and angel; his sensory powers connect matter and spirit. Substantially, he consists of body and soul forming an essential unity; nature culminates in man as the microcosm. Whether the notion of the microcosm is indeed as fundamental in the philosophy of St. Thomas as the author thinks may be questioned. At least, the Thomistic notion must be distinguished from pre-Thomistic ideas on the microcosm as well as from those proposed by the philosophers of the Renaissance and of later centuries.

The discussions on the points reported are interesting and no less so is the remainder of the book. At the end six pages of notes are added in exceedingly small print. Unfortunately, there are many printing errors. The style is not easy; if these lectures were actually delivered, they must have taxed their audience rather considerably. It might be worth while to translate this slender volume because of its many provocative ideas, its definite novelty of approach, and the ability of the author to present the Thomistic system in its totality and in reference to problems of the day. In view of the heaviness of style and certain peculiarities of language, a translation would, however, amount almost to a rewriting of the work. It is regrettable that the way in which things are presented renders the study of the work difficult even for a student well acquainted with German; but if he is able to overcome these obstacles, he will undoubtedly feel rewarded.

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BRIEF NOTICES

States and Morals: A Study in Political Conflicts. By T. D. Weldon. New York: Whittlesey House, 1947. Pp. ix, 310, with index. $3.00.

The exigencies of the present international situation, as well as the remembrance of the recent international carnage, have caused many thoughtful men to attempt a re-appraisal of our political theory. One of the most arresting and provocative of these attempts, at least in its initial stages, is that of T. D. Weldon, in *States and Morals.* The very juxtaposition of the two concepts in the title is both stimulating and hopeful, and the subtitle, too, is well-chosen as an explanation.

Weldon is a Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, which seems to be experiencing a new reform movement, somewhat milder and more diffuse than that of a century ago. In Weldon's case, the effort to reform his hearers and readers is concerned primarily with political thinking, since he contends that a reform in political thought will necessarily be followed by a reform in political action. The book, then, is political philosophy, very largely, with some condensed history of that tremendous subject, and with some few conclusions drawn at the end of these treatments. There are five chapters devoted to the theoretical and historical exposition of the problem, one to its solution; the balance struck seems to be a fair one.

In his preface Mr. Weldon points out that there are very many political conflicts today, each likely to have unpleasant results. If the bases for misunderstandings were removed, he feels, many of the conflicts would disintegrate automatically, and opportunities for peace would be multiplied. What is the basic difficulty in each case is the confusion which has arisen as to what is basic; if the conflicts between nations and individuals are about economic matters, then an economic approach to an economic solution must be attempted, but if—as many contend—the difficulties are really ideological, then a quite different approach must be used. At least it seems valuable to consider the various political ideologies now subscribed to, and to determine whether their adherents must always be opposed to each other.

To arrive at an understanding of the situation, Weldon, taking nothing for granted, proceeds to examine the aim of political philosophy, and discovers that it is concerned with the grounds upon which the State attempts to exercise control over its members. This truth, elementary though it may appear, is worthy of restatement, because disagreements on precisely this head are frequently basic to other types of disagreements, or are implicit in quarrels ostensibly non-political. By considering a number of

situations which have arisen as a result of adherence to divergent political theories, Weldon arrives at the conclusion that all of them are logically defensible, since no one of them can be more than a practical working hypothesis. With such a conclusion not everyone could agree, but in Weldon's system it is a perfectly logical corollary to his earlier statement that we cannot rely upon revelation for an answer to political questions. While the position taken by Weldon is logical, it cannot, however, be admitted that his premises or his conclusions are true. The problems he presents here are ones which he declares are dialectical, whereas they actually exist in the realm of epistemology, as his final chapter shows definitively.

Having adopted the position that all political theories are logically defensible, Weldon can confidently assert that the answer to the important question: does the individual exist for the State or the State for the individual? must rest upon something more solid than guesses. Inasmuch as he has ignored one of the bases for a sound approach to political theory, this statement comes to the reader as something of a shock; unless Weldon is willing to place some reliance upon reason, after flouting the possibility of guidance from revelation, what solid ground can he hope to use for his answer to this question? Yet his whole treatment of the question up to this point is a triumph of brilliant logic which aims to discredit human reasoning rather thoroughly. The remainder of the book is thus a remarkable intellectual exercise, in which the reader is expected to admire the reasoning by which Weldon dismisses that process.

From his first chapter the author continues by examining political theories, and concludes that there are two categories into which the State may fall, the organic and the mechanical. Next he considers the political philosophers and compresses their ideas, with real genius, into understandable form. At this point alone—that is, for the first three chapters—the book would be of great value to the student of political theory.

Then are considered states in theory and in practice, which is another way of saying, for Weldon, that there is a consideration of his central thesis, that states are what they are called because the individuals who inhabit them believe them to be such. Here again the epistemological difficulty displays itself. This chapter is certainly the weakest in the book. Like the others, it is admirably written; the phrasing is not only felicitous but arresting. Where the earlier chapters, however, were capable of concealing the unsound basis of the structure which was being erected, the fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters exhibit this weakness clearly. The basis for judgment is experience, and not even objective experience, but intuition, personal conviction based on observation. Although this sort of conviction must be conceded to have its basis in reality, the difficulties involved in arriving at conclusions which are sound from such observations alone must also be conceded to be almost insuperable in practice.

The book, then, falls flat, after holding out promise of being really valuable. It is still worth reading, and many of its sections deserve thoughtful consideration, but when it arrives at chapter six all it can say is that political dogmatism is dangerous and should be avoided. Weldon asserts that the same statement might be made about moral dogmatism, although he feels that it would be "too much to expect that the quest for certainty in these matters will ever be abandoned." Certainly his incisive examination into the nature of man and of the state in the opening chapters of this book could not have prepared the reader for so jejune a conclusion. It is all the more pitiable that a number of the corollaries drawn from this conclusion are apparently quite sound. Perhaps Mr. Weldon should abandon his concrete observations, and concentrate longer on abstract thought.

Proto-history. By H. C. E. Zacharias. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1947. Pp. 398. $4.00.

From the time that men began to record the events in which their social or political groups had engaged, there has been a steadily increasing mass of material which is called history. It has long been known, however, that the activities of men before the use of written language became widespread were susceptible of being known through the existence of artifacts and remains of various kinds. Such materials illumined much of the dark epoch known as prehistory, and into this epoch Professor Zacharias casts new light based on recent researches. He refers to the periods and the peoples he is studying as belonging to a period of protohistory, and he subtitles his work: *An Explicative Account of the Development of Human Thought from Palaeolithic Times to the Persian Monarchy*. On the basis of this time delimitation and in the light of his concluding paragraphs, Professor Zacharias obviously intends to carry the story much further into the historical period.

Such an undertaking, if carried out in the spirit of this book, will be greeted with enthusiastic approval. Professor Zacharias, who teaches history at the Catholic University of Peiping, presents here in a fascinating style and thoroughly convincing manner a synthesis of tremendous amounts of modern research into the historical activities of early man. Eminently readable and understandable, the book should make an invaluable addition to the shelves of any history student's library. No technical knowledge of history is necessary for enjoyment of this book, but even an elementary acquaintance with history and its auxiliary sciences will inspire respect for the vast erudition of the author of *Protohistory*.

An additional word might be said about the discussion of auxiliary sci-

ences contained in Dr. Zacharias' book. The functions of linguistics, anthropology, archaeology, palaeontology, and other disciplines are discussed in simple, lucid fashion in the first chapter. Such discussions are rare in formal historical literature; this volume could be recommended to the novice history student, or to the teacher of historical method, on this basis alone. Professor Zacharias' qualifications to speak on these subjects are evidenced not only by his treatment of them, but also by his introductory remarks concerning Wilhelm Schmidt, to whom the volume is dedicated. As a student and follower of Schmidt's method, Zacharias is perfectly equipped to carry out the task he has set himself.

Following these preliminary notions, in which he incidentally disposes of a good many popular misconceptions in biology and anthropology, the author examines in detail the primary civilization types. These are three, he maintains: the venatorial or hunters' type; the agriculturalist or peasants' type; the pastoral or shepherds' type. After these three types of civilization had appeared in the world, they began to intermingle, and, out of the fusions of strains which resulted, our modern, complex civilizations were built up.

Using these three types, shown to exist almost simultaneously, Zacharias then proceeds to a masterly examination of the earliest historical societies which resulted from their evolution. No more thorough or penetrating analysis exists on this scale in English of the earliest historical activities and interminglings of Egyptians, Sumerians, Akkadians, Hittites, Cretans, Babylonians, Assyrians, Persians, and other smaller groups. The book concludes with the establishment of the Persian empire.

While no fault can be found with the treatment of materials, nor with the matter covered in this book, there are two minor points which are somewhat annoying. Nowhere is the term *protohistory* explained, and nowhere is there any evidence that the subtitle is accurate, since this is both more and less than a history of thought. These are errors or defects, however, which a second edition can easily correct; there is every reason to hope that many editions will follow this one.

Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies. By Clinton L. Rossiter. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948. Pp. 331, with index. $5.00.

Political events of the past two decades have aroused an extraordinary amount of interest in the means employed by states to maintain internal order. Some have resorted to extra-legal devices, others have relied entirely upon constitutional instruments. The most interesting feature of the use of these instruments has been their conformity to a constitution. General

understanding of the term dictatorship would have presupposed a violent opposition to constitutionalism. The difficulty may be stated quite simply: is it possible to have a constitutional dictatorship? Clinton Rossiter undertakes to answer the question in a well-written closely-reasoned volume. The worth of his answer is evident not only in his choice of examples, but in his analysis of the behavior of states operating as constitutional dictatorships and in the principles he derives from this analysis.

The inspiration for the book was the desire to compare the experiences of some modern democracies faced by crises. Originally, only France, England, and the United States were to be considered, but it quickly became obvious that the short-lived Weimar Republic offered so many opportunities for comment and comparison that it would have to be the basis for a fourth section of the study. With these ideas in mind, the author explains in his preface, he began his researches. They were exhaustive, relentlessly so, and they have been placed in proper perspective by an introductory section on the use of dictatorship in the Roman Republic. If any faults are to be found with this volume, they must be in the nature of comments upon the author's explanations for his procedures. Far from apologizing—as he does—for giving this Roman introduction, he should point out more vigorously the necessity for a thorough understanding of the older device in order to appreciate newer ones. Only in such apologies, and in the sometimes flippant manner in which he presents them, is Mr. Rossiter to be criticized adversely.

Rome's experiences with dictators during the days of the Republic are briefly but thoroughly detailed. There follow sections devoted to Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, to the French provisions for *l'état de siège*, to the English concept of martial law, and to American experience with emergency powers conferred upon the executive. Each of these sections has a fundamental pattern: the history of the device used; the theory of the device; its practice, and an analysis of its advantages and disadvantages. Since the states considered differ so widely in so many of their political practices, the difficulties of adhering to such a scheme are obvious; that it has been adhered to while the differences were considered and accounted for is a real testimonial to Mr. Rossiter's technical brilliance. Certainly no important feature of the experience of each of these countries has been left out of this account.

In his consideration, the author points to the difference of emphasis in one state after another; now the single-executive dictator is employed, again the executive-legislative dictator—or cabinet, or the multiple-member legislature subordinated to a committee. In each case, however, the underlying idea is to make control unitary, a striking illustration of the Aristotelian notion of the efficiency of monarchical government. The literature for the experience of each of the states has been examined so carefully, and so much use has been made of the leading authorities on politics and inter-

national law as these studies are essayed in the states, that one can only express awe at the author's erudition. Possibly still greater awe is due his achievement in presenting his findings in a terse, trenchant, eminently readable style. To the American reader, the section on the United States will be not only more appealing but more revealing. Readers from the other states, however, could surely not complain of the manner in which their governments have been treated. To the degree that objectivity of treatment is a virtue, Rossiter may be credited as objective; where his writings reveal a more interpretative approach, he has been extremely fair to possible opponents. More praise would be superfluous for Rossiter, but his press deserves special mention for its attractive presentation of his work.

De Certitudine Principiorum Theologiae; De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis. By John of St. Thomas. Quebec: Laval University, 1947. Pp. 331, with indexes. $2.00.

Perhaps the only, and probably the best way to induce anyone to read a preface is to publish it as a separate book. Notoriously neglected, prefaces, especially in philosophical and theological works, offer the common principles and major premises of each of the treatments that follow. Subsistence in print is, therefore, especially appropriate for these tracts of John of St. Thomas because of their intrinsic value, the authority of their author, and their contemporary interest.

So great has been the interest among near contemporaries in the principles of dogmatic theology that many have taken what has traditionally been considered the defensive part of dogmatic theology and erected it into a separate science, calling it Apologetics. Unwarranted as is the formal separation of Theology and Apologetics, the emphasis upon the common defensive principles of theology is certainly justified in this, and any age of faithlessness and paganism. Moreover, something more than the " question-box " technique is required. Not merely a manual of arms in religion but a general plan of strategy of theology must be offered to those who are to combat with equal facility the errors of those who have no faith, have but the figure of faith, or have truncated their faith with heresy. For pagans, for Jews, and for Protestants distinct treatment and adroit reasoning according to the principles each already accepts is undoubtedly necessary; such treatment and such skilled and forceful reasoning is provided in the prefatory principles of this greatest of Thomistic post-reformation theological works, the *Cursus Theologicus* of John of St. Thomas.

Because he is the first great Thomist of the modern era, John of St. Thomas enjoys an authority that is unsurpassed by later and lesser figures in his own Thomistic tradition and by those considered even greater in the lesser schools within the Church. His prestige, certainly not diminishing,

is, on the contrary, increasing as theologians appreciate more and more that counter-reforms depend not upon the solution of cases by accommodations but by the broad sweep of principles.

The solid principles that John of St. Thomas offers in these two tracts delineate and define the cogency in authority of both the remote principles of faith and the proximate animated norm, the Holy Father. While John of St. Thomas eschews particular cases, he gives all the principles required to answer difficulties that might arise in defending the faith. Moreover, he gives all the fundamental objections against the faith that are brought by the various classes of unbelievers. He answers each succinctly and with clarity. About the Roman Pontiff, the theological teachings of John of St. Thomas are clearly defined and for most Thomists definitive.

These authoritative and useful principles are offered in a most readable form in this edition, whose pagination and format is tantamount to a commentary. Unfortunately, of necessity the editors have followed not the definitive edition, but the imperfect Vives edition; this reproduces the errors of previous editions and adds many distinctively its own. To compensate for this deficiency in detail, the editors have confected biblical, onomastic, and analytic indexes, which make of this work not only a readable introduction to theology, but a ready manual for controversy.

Compendium of Theology. By St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P. (translated by Cyril Vollert, S.J.) St. Louis: Herder, 1947. Pp. 366, with index. $4.00.

If you want something done, ask a busy man. Brother Reginald wanted a simple compendium of the truths of theology, and so he sought out his friend Saint Thomas. With the unmatched style of a peer in both poetry and prose Saint Thomas wrote a masterpiece of brevity, readability and profundity. Its writing, like that of the immortal *Summa*, was halted by the divine call summoning Thomas to eternal bliss.

The exposition of theology may be lost to the ken of all but the most subtle minds, or it may be directed to the knowledge of even the unlearned. Saint Thomas chose the latter form of exposition in the *Compendium*. The words of the prologue indicate that in this he strove to imitate the Divine Master: "No one can say that he is unable to grasp the teaching of heavenly wisdom; what the Word taught at great length, although clearly, throughout the various volumes of Sacred Scripture for those who have the leisure to study, He has reduced to brief compass for the sake of those whose time is taken up with the cares of daily life."

The *Compendium* follows the division of the theological virtues into faith, hope and charity. These are further subdivided into chapters which

vary in length from a paragraph to several pages. The considerations under faith treat first of those truths about God which " have been subtly treated by a number of pagan philosophers." Thereafter, attention is directed to " other truths about God revealed to us in the teaching of the Christian religion, which were beyond the reach of the philosophers." Subsumed under the heading of faith are: the unity and trinity of God, Creation, Providence, the Incarnation, and the Last Things. Having completed the 246 chapters on faith, Saint Thomas proceeded to develop the treatise on hope according to the petitions of the Lord's prayer. Prayer is the expression of hope, and its perfect expression comes to us from the Divine Master Himself in the *Pater Noster*. Death intervened in the writing of the tenth chapter to bring to him the realization of hope.

Father Vollert is to be congratulated on a felicitous translation. He has notably augmented the arsenal of American Thomists. Whether in the Lay Theology movement, or on the cleric's bookshelf, or in the hands of the college student, this book will serve as a perfect companion to the reading of the *Summa* or stand on its own as an independent source.

Philosophisches Worterbuch. Edited by WALTER BRUGGER, S. J. Vienna: Herder, 1948. Pp. 532. S. fr. 16.50; S 38.

Under the leadership of Father Brugger the faculty of Berchmans College has cooperated with other German savants to give to the non-specialist a pocket-size dictionary of philosophy. The resultant work offers a topical rather than a word by word listing of philosophical terms. Important words, representing the main notions in philosophy, are selected for treatment. A more exhaustive list is provided at the beginning of the book, and the reader is referred to the salient word under which he will find the particular term treated. At the very end of the book a similar list of philosophers is found and a like reference is made.

The authors describe briefly the history of a word's usage, together with its etymology and its meanings. The genesis of key philosophical doctrines is described, and their development traced with darting strokes. A bibliography is appended to each item. Included also is a seventy-five page outline of the history of philosophy starting with the sacred books of ancient India and ending with the present day.

The value of this little volume can hardly be overstated. Although suffering in a minor respect from the usual misconceptions of Banez' position, the book is otherwise quite accurate and up to the minute, especially in its treatment of current philosophies.

Psychiatry and Religion. By Joshua L. Liebman (ed.). Boston: Beacon Press, 1948. Pp. 221. $3.00.

Fifteen contributors are contained in this account of the proceedings of the Temple Israel Institute on Religion and Psychiatry held in Boston in October of 1947. The general subject is the need and effectiveness of collaboration between psychiatrists and men of the religious profession. Although the problems as such have no direct bearing upon the matters usually discussed in these pages, the question has aroused much interest in recent times, and there are certain basic views which permit of a brief consideration.

The late Rabbi Liebman says in his preface that "the goal of both disciplines (religion and psychiatry) at their best is to lead us to an inner serenity and an inner maturity that will make us friends rather than enemies of justice and peace." Two comments must be made here. In the first place, one wonders in what sense this juxtaposition of religion and psychiatry ought to be understood. They are not on the same level either by nature or by their place in the order of knowledge. Psychiatry is what the Greeks called a *techné*; it is medical knowledge and its application. Religion is obviously knowledge also, but knowledge of another kind, and its "application" is primarily the conformity on the part of the individual to the Divine Law. In the second place, there is the failure to envision religion under this latter angle. The whole tenor of the book is much more that of a technique, of using religion as such, hence of making religion subordinate to the needs of man, and not centering religious behavior around God. This is clear from a remark made by P. E. Johnson, professor of the Psychology of Religion at Boston University, in replying to a question (p. 139): "We have varying concepts of sin because sin is a human invention. It is our interpretation of what God wants us to do. . . ." Are there no commandments?

Many contributions supply valuable information and worth while reading. The deficiency of the care for mental patients in even outstanding hospitals is forcefully pointed out by A. Deutsch. The facts reported should arouse everyone, especially those who are responsible in the various States, to the highest efforts toward improvement.

The book is in three parts, of which the first, "Where Psychiatry and Religion Meet and Part," comprises papers by S. Hiltner for the Protestants, Rev. O. F. Kelly for the Catholics and by Rabbi Liebman. Father Kelly remarks that "psychiatry is a relatively young science," which is true, but not because Harvard Medical School introduced its first course in psychiatry in 1920. After all, there had been psychiatrists before, and this science, in 1920, could look back over a history of more than one hundred years,—even in America. The name of Benjamin Rush ought not to be forgotten.

The second past deals with " Hospital Care," and the third with " The Individual and His Environment." The emotional needs of the child, the conflicts and the sense of guilt in the Adolescent, Problems of Marriage and the " Grief Situation " are discussed. It is noticeable that the psychiatrists are not as much opposed to correction and punishment as are some of the more " progressive " educators.

The general interest in this symposium lies, perhaps, not so much in the facts and ideas presented as in the recognition, also and even chiefly on the part of the psychiatrists, that man is in need of faith and of religious foundations for his daily existence. It is also generally admitted that there should be no sharp dividing line between the work of the priest, minister or rabbi on the one hand and that of the psychiatrist on the other. However, this reviewer would like to observe that some caution is necessary in this regard. First, psychiatric work is essentially medical; the leading part in it will always be allotted to the psychiatrist. Lay-psychiatry is a dangerous thing. Secondly, there are aspects of religious influence which go beyond what the lay-person may handle, primarily, of course, in reference to the sacraments.

There can be no doubt of the seriousness and sincerity with which the contributors approached their subjects. That religion in its relevance for human life could be discussed at all in such a manner and by such a forum is in itself a hopeful indication that the attitude of crude naturalism is waning and that a new sense of spiritual values is being awakened. This book is not for everyone, but students of these matters, the Catholic psychiatrist as well as the priest, will indubitably profit from it.

Chance and Symbol. By Richard Hertz. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. 206, with notes. $3.00.

This work, as so many of recent times, seems to be born of dissatisfaction with and profound worry about the present state of affairs and is expressive of a search for stability, for ultimate truths and values. This attitude manifests itself in a nostalgic appreciation of the past, a criticism of the present, and on optimistic anticipation of the future. Accordingly its three sections are entitled: " The Tender Past," " The Tough Present," and " The Metaphorical Future."

Back of the views presented by the author there are, as he implies, two experiences. One is that of the generation of 1900 and life in Germany; the other is that of the conflicts and problems of today and life in America.

European mentality was fashioned, during the nineteenth century mainly, though earlier also in a lesser degree, by the impact of the " machine age " upon a civilization which had slowly grown and which included many traces, even active factors, stemming from the past. The most powerful

of these factors was " form "; that is, a system of life and a way to look at things by which facts were raised to another level by becoming symbols and allegories. Historical form is opposed to " number." The realm of the latter is " chance," of the former " symbol." The naked facts which science investigates reveal as such no meaning; they are given meaning when transformed into allegory. To the progressive mind, form appears as reactionary and value a fictitious quality. This mind lives in " action-space," created by the subject's interested analysis; action-space is set over against " ideal-space," created by the subject's disinterested synopsis.

The modern world suffers from a " cancer of formlessness "; it is a-historical or even hostile to history. " Whenever a restraint dies . . . a gentle manner expires, a throne is dismantled (thrones represent continuity), the most savage cartoons in American papers celebrate this . . . as if the disappearance of history were a guaranty for history in the making." The vision of significance behind the things has been lost. The Baroque was, the author thinks, the last age alive to the allegoric or symbolic aspect of reality and capable of comprising the totality of life in symbolic form.

The author conceives of the world as being dominated by " chance " and consequently " number " on one hand, and as the manifestation of the " Process " on the other. Apparently, the Process (always written thus) takes the place of God and divine providence, with the notable difference that God creates and maintains the whole of reality, inclusive of chance; whereas " Process, in the organic, cumulative sense in which the word is used here, is the presence in the world of an urge . . . a willingness not to be trapped by chance on its own level . . . but to beat it by the slowly developing analogy of a spiritual coherence: the memory of a race, the myth of a group, the style of a region—a culture." Believing in the Process, the author also believes in " nature's inner goodness."

But, if we understand correctly the author's idea, this inner goodness will not become effective nor the Process go on to higher levels unless man does his part. That he can do it is evidenced by the fact that the world of chance and number contains regions where chance, which rules the whole of the universe, is superseded or overcome by integration: the living organism. Here arise form and value, on a still primitive level indeed. If one passes from life to mind, the picture changes. No empirical philosophy has ever, Dr. Hertz remarks, explained the " faculty of the human creature to form an idea of the natural current of his activity in which he is fatally involved and then to adjust his behavior . . . not to the dictates of the physical norm but to the idea he imposes upon it."

An old story of Oriental origin to which the author refers illustrates in fact better than anything else his basic attitude: a man riding his camel in the desert is suddenly thrown into an abyss by the animal. He manages to hold on to a rose bush and sees to his terror two mice nibbling away the roots of his precarious safety; but he sees also a blooming rose and

smells its fragrance and is swept away by the beauty of this impression so that he forgets his danger and his situation to become utterly lost in the contemplation of beauty.

It may be gathered from this parable and from the whole tenor of the book that the author is chiefly concerned with what may be called the "rehabilitation of the spirit." Man inevitably falls prey to the "activist sin" which is coterminous with life and hence "original." (Question arises how far Dr. Hertz has been influenced by Heidegger, whom he occasionally quotes though rather disapprovingly. In the latter's conception there also figures the notion of a guilt coterminous with man's being.) Life in man, or man in life, feels guilty "because it is not the form of that perfection which it can conceive . . . or because it does not correspond to its own ideas."

Though man has to cooperate, it is ultimately the Process in which the author places his hopes.

These few remarks can give but an imperfect idea of Dr. Hertz' world of thought. The reader is dealing with a mind in quest of truth and seeking a light in the darkness of the present world. The conception submitted is, in a way, a compromise. However much the author wishes to overcome and to see overcome "chance" and "number," however much he longs for an era of renewed spirituality, for a reinstatement of value—which he apparently believes to be incorporated mainly in art and beauty,—he apparently cannot free himself wholly from the modes of thought which dominate and fashion the general mentality of the nineteenth and the present centuries. Many of his propositions are subject to criticism from the metaphysical viewpoint. Yet, he cannot be refused recognition of a serious effort, a consciousness of the evil state in which man finds himself, or the earnest will to contribute towards a betterment of human affairs. However much one may disagree with his basic position, one may surely welcome his work as yet another sign of spiritual awakening.

The Everyday Catholic. By MARTIN HARRISON, O.P. Oxford: Blackfriars, 1947. Pp. 384. 10/6.

In his *Commentary on the Epistle of St. Paul to the Hebrews* (cap. 5, l. 2), St. Thomas remarks that "Theology is truly food and drink, because it nourishes and quenches the soul. Other sciences illumine the mind," he continues, "but sacred doctrine enlightens the soul." This little-known passage shows that St. Thomas did not limit Theology to the realm of intellectual speculation. The same passage could also be used to persuade people that St. Thomas would be most pleased with Fr. Harrison's *The Everyday Catholic.*

This compendium of brief and pithy meditations on the chief beliefs and

practices of the Catholic faith does not pretend to qualify as a manual of Theology, at least not in the ordinary acceptation of that term. *The Everyday Catholic* certainly qualifies as a *vademecum* of theology for the laity. It has particular value for the professional theologian who will find herein many remarkably original applications of the truths of faith to the spiritual needs of everyday Catholics.

Father Harrison's book deserves wide acceptance for three principal reasons. First, *The Everyday Catholic* offers a remarkably complete coverage of those divine truths that are necessary for salvation and for Christian living today. Secondly, this book presents these truths with a clarity and brevity that will whet the appetite of the everyday Catholic for this food that nourishes the soul. Finally, throughout the whole work there is evidence of an almost indefinable quality that distinguishes some few of our spiritual books. Every mediation gives evidence of having been written by a man who has the rare faculty of being able to communicate something of his own devout spirit to his readers.

The Two Worlds of Marcel Proust. By HAROLD MARCH. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1948. Pp. 276, with index. $3.50.

Extreme dualism has been a temptation to western thought since Platonism gave classical expression to the doctrine of " the two worlds," and the history of early scholasticism is the struggle of this Platonic view with reason's attempt to integrate. The harmony which Aquinas detected between reason and faith, immanence and transcendence, body and soul, and between many other apparent polarities received only a brief recognition. The later scholastics, by their doctrine of logic and by their voluntarism, were moving once again toward an exaggerated dualism, and with the Cartesian and Kantian temper of more recent times, Plato was reborn.

Literature, in its office as an incarnation of philosophy, records various tidal stages of human speculation. Dante, as a theologian and philosopher, is an outstanding example of a poet portraying the thought of his times. Milton, Pope, Wordsworth, Goethe, and Whitman can be dated in the history of philosophy as well as in that of literature. Proust is but another instance that the greater a writer is the more he takes a philosophical stand. It has often been stated that he expresses a dated (and now dead) form of social attitude. In this fact alone, he represents a philosophy.

The ultimate meaning of Proust is well stated in the title which Mr. March has chosen for his book. In the opening chapter, entitled " The Climate of Ideas " (into which Proust was born), the reader is introduced to the motley currents of the 19th century. The flow of this chapter could

have been made much more effective if the author had organized it to lead toward the dualism which Proust represented. In this introductory material, Descartes' name is unmentioned. Without him, it is extremely difficult to write a clear and coherent background for modern dualism and for Proust. Fouillée, Guyau, Ravaisson, and Maine de Biran are likewise important omissions. Ben-Ami Scharfstein has suggested (though perhaps in exaggerated form) the extent to which such men influenced Bergson. If they did not directly influence Proust, they are responsible for part, at least, of his " climate of ideas." The relation of Proust to Bergsonism seems likewise more intimate, perhaps through a common background, than Mr. March is willing to concede. Georges Cattaui, a keen student of Proust, brackets him with Bergson and Cézanne. Though Mr. March devotes some attention to art, he does not mention Cézanne as part of Proust's intellectual climate. Nor, in a more profound sense, does he emphasize the Deism which made it at least timely, if not logical, for both Proust and Bergson to seek " transcendent reality " through supra-intellectual intuitions instead of seeing God as expressed everywhere through creatures. Mr. March is perhaps not a professional philosopher who appreciates all these themes. What he has written in his background chapter is interesting and enlightening. But it is not complete or profound.

Like Augustine, Kierkegaard, and Bergson, Proust was fascinated by the fact of remembering. " Involuntary memory," he held, was a means of living the highest experiences given to man, after the more conventional ways of knowing restricted him to the world of matter. His chief work was entitled *A la Recherche du Temps Perdu*. Proust, like Bergson and Freud, agreed with the more orthodox western view that nothing which man ever does really dies. In this respect, they endow all experience with a meaning and even an eternity. This side of Proust stands in contrast to the decadent and revulsive life that he often gives to his characters. But the difficulty is that Proust's higher organizing principle of life is not rational but involuntary. It is more like the unpredictable trajectory of Bergson's famous snowball than the rule of law which turns life on an axis of purpose as known and willed. Characters in novels should be more than psychological studies. They should, in some ultimate way, be morally conditioned. Where they become matters of mere interest rather than of inspiration, they tend finally to bore a reader by sheer repetition so that an author's repertoire of characters must be continually varied, finally seeking to satisfy interest through the pathological. Psychology is a field of interest, but the limits of the purely psychological are rather severe. Could Proust have written another " great " novel?

Proust held that things are not what they seem. He also declared that our social personalities are merely creations of other minds. Here again Proust is a philosopher but a bad one, in the sense of disregarding common

experiences of men to which literature ought to give body and depth. Proust sounds too much like Kant and Bergson, charging that the human mind is naturally inclined to illusions. He is an expression of Cartesian skepticism. Though Mr. March does not mention the fact, Sartre has found Proust an ally, and he cites him freely in *L'Être et le Néant*.

Mr. March has spent considerable time in the patient analysis of Proust's life and character by reference to his work and in the probing of his great novel. These analyses are well done and should be helpful in the study and appreciation of Proust as an author. But just as it is a defect in T. S. Eliot's poetry that he has to write footnotes to clarify it and just as Shaw's plays are weak if they require prefaces, so Proust is less of a literary artist when so much of his life and character is needed to explain his works.

Du Réflexe au Psychique. By Paul Cossa. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1948. Pp. 286. 125 frs. Belges.

In its subtitle this volume is stated to be "A Presentation of the Nervous System." It is prefaced by a few remarks by R. Dalbiez and concluded with a "philosophical note" by P. Philippe de la Trinité, O.C.D. The renowned French neurologist does, indeed, present the basic features of the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system in a clear and readable manner, and with a welcome wealth of references to past and recent research. The student of these matters will regret the absence of a bibliography; for the average reader, however, this book may serve as an excellent introduction and a source of reliable information. The philosopher will be mainly interested in the third section: the physiological basis of mental activity. As Father Philippe points out in the appended note, there is no datum of experimental or clinical experience that proves incompatible with the fundamentals of Thomistic philosophy.

The topics discussed in this third part are: sleep, emotion, the function of certain cortical areas and the evidence of electro-physiological (electro-encephalographical) research, the relation of sensation and knowledge, of motor impulses and movement, speech, conditioned reflexes (the critical and sensible attitude of the author and this thorough analysis of "reflexology" are well worth noting), and a final chapter on "spiritualism and brain mechanics." Mental troubles, says Dr. Cossa, are not expressive of the disease itself, but of the response the mind makes to it; hence, these troubles are highly individualized. The response is one of the total human being; the mind (or, as the author says, the "psychism") responds as a whole to whatever wounds it. There is always present some mental factor in the causation of organic troubles and some bodily factor in that of allegedly purely mental disturbances. This seems to agree with the views proposed today as "psychosomatics," although there is no reference to these

studies. The human person must be envisaged, therefore, as substantially one. Mental activity cannot be " reduced " to cerebral mechanisms. The spirit is essentially of another nature than is matter.

Thus, it can be easily seen that Father Philippe has no difficulty in integrating these views into the system of traditional philosophy. Indeed, he begins his note with a lengthy quotation from Aristotle as the most appropriate summary of Dr. Cossa's ideas. The scholarly nature of the work and the mass of information it contains give solid basis to recommend it most highly.

Les Epilepsies; leurs Formes Cliniques; leurs Traitements. By L. MARCHAND and J. DE AJURIAGUERRA. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1948. P. 721, with index. 475 frs. Belges.

This work is strictly a medical treatise, summarizing ably the knowledge of science concerning the various forms of epileptic disorders. Although it will prove most useful to the physician and psychiatrist, the book has little bearing on non-special problems. The medical layman will profit, however, insofar as he will realize that the question of epilepsy is a very complex one and that there are yet many points concerning which clarity is lacking. Popularly, epilepsy is thought of as the trouble productive of the well known paroxysms or " fits "; in truth, these attacks are but one symptom among many, the most impressive but not the most important, as the authors justly point out. The educator, the jurist, and the priest ought to know that there are definitely epileptic difficulties without a " fit " occurring. It is also useful to know that, in some cases, epileptic disorders may cause passing or even lasting disturbances of consciousness which may be such that the casual and inexpert observer fails to notice them. This fact has obvious and definite legal importance and, more widely, in regard to all questions involving possible defective consent. It is distinctly commendable that the authors devote a good portion of the work (180 pages) to the so-called psychic epilepsy and the various mental disturbances associated with this disease or, rather, group of diseases. Epilepsy may persist without mental disturbance or deterioration although the latter is not an uncommon consequence. Hence, a knowledge of these matters is of importance in regard to problems of marriage, vocation, etc. There is a good bibliography after each chapter, although the authors assert that, owing to the conditions of war and post-war times, they have not been able to survey all the newer studies. Since American medicine has, and for the same reasons, lost touch with the endeavors of European scholars, this work should be most welcome.

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